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INTRODUCTION 
 
“Europe will not be made all at once, or according to a single plan. 
It will be built through concrete achievements  
which first create a de facto solidarity” 
 
Robert Schuman, 9 May 1950 
 
Disasters have always been an important part in the history of the human species, 
as the eruption of Vesuvius in 79 A.D., the plague occurred during the Middle 
Ages or the recent tsunami in Asia. Imperatives of humanity have created moral 
interventions to assist victims of disasters and solidarity in response to calamities. 
On this occasion, it is worth recalling that some orders of chivalry, such as the 
Knights of Malta, founded in 1080, provided relief to those in need, including 
those affected by disasters. With the rise of the modern nation State and 
international law, in 1758 the Swiss diplomat and lawyer Emer de Wattel wrote 
the following passage:  
“....when the occasion arises, every Nation should give its aid to further the 
advancement of other Nations and save them from disaster and ruin, so far as 
it can do so without running too great a risk...if a Nation is suffering from 
famine, all those who have provisions to spare should assist in its need, 
without, however, exposing themselves to scarcity...To give assistance in 
such dire straits is so instinctive an act of humanity that hardly any civilized 
Nation is to be found which would refuse absolutely to do so...Whatever be 
the calamity affecting a Nation, the same help is due to it”1.  
The creation of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and the 
adoption of the Geneva Convention of 22 August 1864 for the Amelioration of the 
Condition of the Wounded in Armies in the Field resulted from the concerns 
expressed over the protection of those wounded in the field during armed conflicts 
as form of a disaster. Equal recognition of the needs of those affected by other 
disasters began to come about in the second half of the nineteenth century. In 
                                                          
1
 See, E. de Wattel, Le droit des gens, ou Principes de la loi naturelle, appliqués à la conduite et 
aux affaires des Nations et des Souverains, London, 1758, p. 114.  
2 
 
accordance with their mandate2, national Red Cross and Red Crescent societies 
provide assistance and relief in disasters which may afflict peoples during 
peacetime as a condition of their vigorous development and a useful preparation 
for their wartime work; in peacetime, they devote themselves to humanitarian 
work that corresponds to their wartime duties, that is, giving relief in case of 
public calamity which, like war, demands immediate and organised assistance. 
Nevertheless, the provision of international assistance to victims of disasters other 
than armed conflict has only positioned itself as a major issue on the agenda of the 
international community since the beginning of the twentieth century. The 
importance attached to disaster relief gained further recognition over the course of 
the past century as the frequency, intensity and complexity of disasters increased. 
With the formation of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement 
and the establishment of the International Relief Union, international disaster 
relief began to make its way into the realm of international law. Since then, 
whereas mutual self-interest has driven States to conclude instruments concerning 
their conduct in war, international cooperation in the area of protection and 
assistance in the event of disasters seemed to take on a wider dimension.  
 
1.  Methodological premises of investigation  
 
1.1 Objective of the research and investigation plan 
 
The present work is aimed at exploring and evaluating the functional and 
normative impact of solidarity as conceived within the EU legal order and, in 
particular, within the so-called EU disaster response law, that is the set of legal 
instruments dealing with disaster response both within and outside the Union’s 
territory. Indeed, on the one hand solidarity – to which the Lisbon revision has 
contributed to give impetus – represents the paradigm of reference of the 
structural and normative configuration of the very EU integration process. On the 
                                                          
2
 See, Resolution no. 3 of the Second International Red Cross Conference, Compte rendu des 
travaux de la Conférence internationale tenue à Berlin du 22 au 27 avril 1869 par les délégués des 
gouvernements signataires de la Convention de Genève et des Sociétés et Associations de secours 
aux militaires blessés et malades, Berlin, 1869, p. 251. 
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other hand, the adoption of a common strategy addressing disaster response could 
be privileged field for extensive solidarity in the relationship between Member 
States and between them and the Union. Therefore, attempts will be made in 
answering the following questions: to what extent do the instruments of EU law 
intervening in the event of a disaster respond to the requirements of solidarity as 
expressed by the Treaties? What is the legal nature of solidarity within EU 
disaster response law? Does the principle of solidarity have a normative effect 
thus establishing solidarity obligations on Member States and on the Union in the 
event of a disaster? In order to respond these questions, the research work will be 
developed in the following way. 
 
Chapter I starts from the finding that the growing number of disasters and subjects 
involved has recently forced the international community to consider the 
opportunity of elaborating a specific regulatory framework concerning the 
international response to such situations. Indeed, at present there is no universal 
and comprehensive legally binding set of regulations governing international 
response to large-scale disasters and prescribing specific obligations of solidarity 
upon States. Moreover, it illustrates and assesses the content of the Draft Articles 
on the Protection of Persons in the Event of Disasters on which the International 
Law Commission has worked on since 2008. The chapter ends with a brief report 
of the main instruments of regional cooperation that could foster better 
coordination among interventions and potentially establish specific obligations of 
solidarity upon States participating in those arrangements.  
Chapter II serves as a sort of feeder between the international and EU law 
frameworks by focusing on the notion of solidarity as central principle and 
keystone of the whole political and legal structure of the EU integration process. 
Therefore, this chapter addresses a legal reconstruction of the concept of solidarity 
as conceived both within the Treaties and by the CJEU jurisprudence by dwelling 
also on its relationship with the principle of loyal cooperation. Perceived as 
instrument of ‘solidary integration’ between Member States and as addressee of 
the material solidarity enshrined in the Treaties, the Union has progressively 
developed a number of instruments capable to implement such a solidarity-based 
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approach. Hence, with particular reference to the EU competence in the field of 
disaster response, the analysis proposes a preliminary overall picture of the 
different legal means that will subsequently be explored by stressing their 
multilayered nature.  
Chapter III is dedicated to the instruments providing for financial assistance – 
namely the EU Solidarity Fund and the emergency support instrument – as well as 
to the EU rules concerning the adoption of public measures State aids for 
supporting companies hit by a calamitous event. Indeed, EU solidarity in case of 
disaster affecting a Member State manifests itself not only through direct 
financing instruments, but also through a number of derogations progressively 
adopted to general legal frameworks concerning State aids and fiscal policies. In 
this chapter, particular emphasis will be made on the relation between solidarity 
and the principle of conditionality which comes in when dealing with EU 
instruments of financial assistance.  
Chapter IV explores the Union Civil Protection Mechanism which represents the 
main instrument providing for in-kind assistance and envisaging a more 
cooperative attitude among Member States, by rendering the EU catalyst of 
solidarity. The chapter develops around the main normative and institutional steps 
that have been adopted in the long way towards the creation of a more effective 
and functional Mechanism of civil protection at EU level. The inclusion of a 
specific legal basis (Article 196 TFEU) within the Lisbon Treaty and the adoption 
of the Council Decision 1313/2013/EU have marked the latest step of the 
‘institutionalization’ of EU civil protection and the establishment of the Union 
Civil Protection Mechanism. The chapter ends with an overview of its main 
operational and legal characters by investigating the relevance of the principle of 
solidarity for the effectiveness of the very Mechanism and its interaction to the 
principle of loyal cooperation in this regard.  
Chapter V, as final chapter, is aimed at evaluating one of the main novelties of the 
Lisbon revision, that is the so-called ‘solidarity clause’ enshrined in Article 222 
TFEU which requires both the Union and the Member States to act “in a spirit of 
solidarity” in assisting another Member State affected by a disaster. Therefore, its 
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content and implementation by the Union and the EU Members will be evaluated. 
Moreover, since it could be the synthesis and the link amongst all the examined 
instruments, it will be evaluated what are the interactions between the solidarity 
clause and the illustrated solidary mechanisms. Finally, it will be illustrated the 
real legal value of the solidarity clause and its implications in terms of duties 
imposed.  
 
2. Theoretical premises of investigation 
 
Given the extension of the issue at stake and the broad variety of instruments that 
could be covered in the course of the whole work, it is firstly necessary to address 
some theoretical premises. Since the analysis is entirely based on the notion of 
solidarity within the EU legal order and aims at evaluating how it shapes the 
instruments to be activated in the field of disaster response and whether it can 
establish specific duties on the Member States and on the Union, it is above all 
crucial to explore the notion of solidarity according to the international legal 
theory in order to better assess the peculiarity of the EU legal framework. In 
addition, considering that to research or discuss the consequences of any 
phenomenon it is indispensable to have a clear idea of what that phenomenon is, 
an initial clarification of the term ‘disaster’ is required in order to elucidate what 
is in and what is outside of the field of investigation of the present work.  
 
2.1 The notion of ‘solidarity’: what legal value under international law? 
 
The term ‘solidarity’ comes from the Latin word solidum, that means ‘hard’ but 
also ‘money’ and, in particular, from the expression of Roman Law in solidum 
obligari, that was used to indicate the obligation in which all common debtors 
committed themselves to pay to the creditor the whole debt. Over the centuries, 
this definition of solidarity has assumed a sociological dimension by becoming 
expression of the sameness of individuals who share a common interest. It is akin 
to the notion of fraternité which requires individuals identify themselves with 
others and are bound together by a feeling of common identity thus allowing them 
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to receive mutual support when needed. As a consequence, at micro level and 
from a sociological point of view, solidarity includes not only philanthropic or 
altruistic evaluations, but also a reciprocal (or self-interest) dimension 
institutionalised and normalised through the establishment of citizenship rights3. 
Thus, solidarity reflects also in the preparedness to pool and share resources with 
others, as well as in the readiness for collective action4. However, according to the 
classic theory pioneered by Durkheim, in homogeneous societies such as the 
national ones (even though this assertion calls for caution) the likeness of people 
makes philanthropy, rather than reciprocity, the main connotation of solidarity. 
Instead, at supranational level, the heterogeneous construction based on diversity 
and legal plurality makes solidarity inspired more by the do ut des formula, as 
there is not the same perception of others5. When the notion of solidarity entails 
elements of reciprocity and interdependence, it departs from the notion of 
fraternité thus creating societies in which, more likely, individuals engage in 
solidarity when they expect a future return from their actions.  
Solidarity is, therefore, a very complex notion since, unlike other principles that 
find legitimacy from universal rights, a moral dimension and philanthropic-based 
aspirations are generally attributed to it, even though hardly measurable and 
observable6. For the purposes of the present work, the first main problem is to 
                                                          
3
 See, A. Somek, Solidarity decomposed – being and time in European citizenship, University of 
Iowa Legal Studies Research Paper, 2007, pp. 7-13.  
4
 See, S. Stjernø, Solidarity in Europe – the history of an idea, Cambridge University Press, 2005; 
C. Barnard, “Solidarity and the Commission’s Renewed Social Agenda”, in M. Ross, Y. 
Borgmann-Prebil, Promoting solidarity in the European Union, OUP, 2010, p. 80; M. Ferrera, 
“Towards an ‘Open’ Social Citizenship? The New Boundaries of Welfare in the European Union”, 
in G. De Burca (ed.), EU law and the Welfare State: In Search of Solidarity, OUP, 2005, pp. 19-
20. 
5
 See, E. Durkheim, The division of Labor in Society, Mcmillan Publishers Ldt., 1984.  
6
 See, C. Boutayeb, “La solidarité, un principe immanent au droit de l’Union européenne. 
Éléments pour une théorie”, in C. Boutayeb, La solidarité dans l'Union européenne. Éléments 
constitutionnels et matériels, Dalloz, 2012, pp. 1-3; E. de Wettel, “The emergence of international 
and regional value systems as a manifestation of the emerging international constitutional order”, 
in Leiden Journal of International Law, Vol. 19, 2006, pp. 611-632. Generally, solidarity refers to 
relationships between human beings belonging to the same community, group or society. The idea 
of solidarity as object of sociological research was initially theorized in France by Durkheim who 
distinguished between “mechanical solidarity” (solidarité mécanique) – based on resemblances 
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frame the concept and to explore its effective scope within the international legal 
framework and according to the international legal theory.  
International law is not characterised by a longstanding tradition of solidarity, but 
rather by the idea of sovereignty, consolidated with the rising nation-States and 
empires after and against the previously united theological and imperial 
framework. Instead, solidarity as principle of international law was first assumed 
in the mid-eighteenth century by Emer de Wettel who argued that States have a 
duty to mutual assistance in order to improve their general situation and relations7. 
Hence, he considered solidarity as the essential and imperative condition for the 
existence of a community of States. At the end of the XIX century, the ‘solidarist 
movement’ spread throughout international legal scholarship, with Georges Scelle 
as one of its most prominent representatives, thereby crashing with the 
prominence of sovereignty in the international community. Despite the numerous 
attempts to reconcile the tension between the interests of individual States and 
those of the global community, sovereignty superseded solidarity and this was to 
continue until the UN was created. The two World Wars made clear the necessity 
to bring international law legislation beyond old frontiers and to meet new fields 
of application by increasing the necessity of major multilateral cooperation.  
The Charter of United Nations represents the first piece of evidence of the 
operation of solidarity between States, by stating that the UN aims to “practice 
tolerance and live together in peace with one another as good neighbours, and to 
unite our strength to maintain international peace and security”. Similarly, Article 
1(3) of the UN Charter provides that one of the purposes of the United Nations is 
“to achieve international co-operation in solving international problems of an 
economic, social, cultural, or humanitarian character”. More recently, the concept 
of solidarity has been explicitly listed in two resolutions of the UN General 
                                                                                                                                                               
between individuals – and “organic solidarity” (solidarité organique) – based instead on the 
integration of different groups of individuals through the division of labour. 
7
 See, E. de Wettel, Le droit des gens, ou Principes de la loi naturelle, appliqués à la conduite et 
aux affaires des Nations et des Souverains, cit. 
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Assembly – namely resolution 56/151 of 19 December 20018 and resolution 
57/213 of 18 December 20029 – which have defined solidarity as:  
“a fundamental value, by virtue of which global challenges must be managed 
in a way that distributes costs and burdens fairly in accordance with basic 
principles of equity and social justice and ensures that those who suffer or 
who benefit the least receive help from those who benefit the most”.  
Notwithstanding the supposed anarchical international system lacking a supreme 
authority and the tensions between the national realm and solidarity desires, the 
progressive introduction of ethical and moral concerns in the development process 
of the international legal system has thus contributed to reinforce the broader idea 
of a world community of interdependent States. At level of practice, the most 
significant number of texts dealing with solidarity has been created with regard to 
international economic and environmental law by including provisions on State’s 
obligations to cooperate and protect the economic and environmental interests of 
other States10. Indeed, States have progressively perceived that acting in a manner 
that preserves the good of the whole community also preserves their own 
interests. Progressively, strict voluntarism and sovereignty have thus been 
challenged and the fundamental transformation in the substance and structure of 
international has paved the way to the transition from a ‘law of co-existence’ – 
where international law is limited to the traditional sphere of diplomatic inter-
State relations and to the mutual respect of national sovereignty – to a ‘law of 
cooperation’ at universal and regional level11. In this sense, current international 
framework would be characterised by a shift from an “essentially negative code of 
                                                          
8
 See, UN General Assembly, Resolution on the Promotion of a democratic and equitable 
international order, A/RES/56/151 of 19 December 2001. 
9
 See, UN General Assembly, Resolution on the Promotion of a democratic and equitable 
international order, A/RES/57/213 of 18 December 2002.  
10
 These obligations, which have erga omnes character, have been articulated in the well-known 
Barcelona Traction case, in which the International Court of Justice has drown a distinction 
between the obligation of the State towards the international community as a whole and those vis-
à-vis another States. See, ICJ, Barcelona Traction case, Belgium v. Spain, 1970.  
11
 This new theory of international law has been proposed by Professor Friedman, see W.G. 
Friedman, The Changing Structure of International Law, Stevens and Sons ed., 1964. 
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rules of abstention to positive rules of cooperation”12. This means to take the 
notion of solidarity in the theoretical discourse concerning the nature of 
international law and to make it one of the facets of cooperation lato sensu13. As 
stressed in 2004 by Dos Santos Alves for the UN Commission on Human Rights:  
“solidarity implies a communion of responsibilities and interest between 
individuals, groups, nations and States, and sometimes it appears linked to 
the ideal of fraternity proclaimed by the French Revolution. The notion of 
solidarity (...) corresponds with the notion of cooperation, because one only 
cooperates in an act of solidarity. Solidarity is one of the greatest values in 
the construction of human rights. Resort to the use of the word cooperation, 
first in the Charter of the United Nations, later in most of the documents 
emanating from the Organization, is the main indication that solidarity has 
undergone a long and difficult journey”14.  
In such a broad meaning, solidarity thus becomes synonymous with cooperation 
which, certainly, is nowadays part of a number of international normative 
instruments. Nevertheless, this use of solidarity is not particularly incisive and 
clarifying also because solidarity does not perfectly equate cooperation, but rather 
contain it. Therefore, from the international law perspective the main problem is 
how to frame the concept of solidarity: what does it exactly mean? Is it an idea, a 
value or a principle? Or is it all of these? Actually, no clear answer has been 
proposed so far, but it appears necessary to evaluate whether solidarity can be 
                                                          
12
 Ibid., p. 62.  
13
 According to some scholars, solidarity is not the same as cooperation which requires a previous 
agreement upon a common objective (see, L. Boisson de Chazournes, “Responsibility to Protect: 
Reflecting Solidarity?”, in R. Wolfrum and C. Kojima (eds.), Solidarity: A Structural Principle of 
International Law, Springer, 2010, pp. 93-109), but it is plausible that in a broader semantic 
perspective the two concepts can be put alongside. The term ‘cooperate’ comes from the Latin 
cooperari which is formed by co- and operari which means “work together”, easily reflecting the 
very essence of the term ‘solidarity’. For deeper insights on the international obligation to 
cooperate, see J. Delbrück, “The international obligation to cooperate – an empty shell or a hard 
law principle of international law? A critical look at a much debated paradigm of modern 
international law”, in H. P. Hestermeyer, D. König, N. Matz-Lück, V. Röben, A. Seibert-Fohr, P. 
Stoll, S. Vöneky (eds.), Coexistence, cooperation and solidarity. Liber Amicorum Rüdiger 
Wolfrum, 2012, pp. 3-16.  
14
 See, R. Alves, Human rights and international solidarity, Working paper, 15 June 2004, 
Economic and Social Council, Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2004/43, Commission on Human Rights, Sub-
Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, para. 22.  
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addressed as notion independent from that of cooperation and to what extent it can 
be said more than the general concept of ‘neighbourness’.  
What reported above leaves no doubt on solidarity as a value or a moral attitude to 
be pursued within the international community15. In this sense, the concept does 
not have a legal content, but belongs more to the arena of political projects 
adopted by individuals, States, and other actors. In this regard, Laurence Boisson 
de Chazournes summarises the core elements of the definition of solidarity as 
follows:  
“First, solidarity is a form of help given by some actors to other actors in 
order to assist the latter to achieve a goal or to recover from a critical 
situation. At the international level, one should that such form of assistance 
does not necessarily have to be understood in the context of a state-to-state 
relationship, but it can be understood as the help provided by a State, or a 
group of States, to the population of another State. Second, solidarity takes 
place within a shared value system at the level of a given community (in our 
case the international community). Third, solidarity entails a moral 
obligation in the sense that it is value-based, i.e. the moral obligation to take 
into account the interests of others and to provide them with assistance. 
Fourth, this moral obligation is owed by some members of the that is means 
to use it as a normative criterion for evaluating and judging the rightness of a 
given set of facts, and for fostering measures to strengthen cooperation 
international community towards other members of the same community, 
and this will vary from one situation to another”16. 
From such a perspective, solidarity would be – albeit its relevance – just a 
universal value of the international community which arises only from 
international treaty law. Hence, the tendency to establish constitutions and to 
favour forms of integration at international level is probably the highest 
expression of solidarity as project to create a ‘community’17. This ‘constitutional’ 
role played by solidarity is particularly evident in regional contexts, where the 
concept acts as a cornerstone for supranational integration. Apart from the 
                                                          
15
 See, B. Simma, A. Paulus, “The ‘International Community’: Facing the Challenge of 
Globalization”, in European Journal of International Law, Vol. 9, 1998, pp. 266-277. 
16
 See, L. Boisson de Chazournes, “Responsibility to Protect: Reflecting Solidarity”, cit., pp. 94–
95. 
17
 See, J.H.H. Weiler, “The political and legal culture of European integration: an exploratory 
essay”, in I-Con, Vol. 9, 2001, pp. 678- 694. 
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European Union experience, the constitutional side of solidarity also appears in 
other regional realities. The African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights18 
refers to solidarity, inter alia, in Article 21(4): “States parties to the present 
Charter shall individually and collectively exercise the right to free disposal of 
their wealth and natural resources with a view to strengthening African unity and 
solidarity”. In addition, the preamble of the Charter of the Association of 
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) 19 recalls “the need to strengthen existing 
bonds of regional solidarity to realise an ASEAN Community that is politically 
cohesive, economically integrated and socially responsible in order to effectively 
respond to current and future challenges and opportunities”. 
A second approach aims at identifying solidarity as a principle, or as a structural 
principle, of international law and giving it a legal structure that works in relation 
not only to other principles of international law, such as sovereignty, subsidiarity, 
good faith, and equity, but also to different regimes, such as disaster relief, 
humanitarian law, environmental law, refugee law, trade, international 
development and State responsibility20. According to this viewpoint, solidarity is 
thus a multifaceted notion which can offer different declinations according to the 
different sectors and the approaches considered. First of all, solidarity as principle 
implies assistance and collaboration for achieving a goal as well as for recovering 
from a critical situation. At international level, such form of assistance does not 
necessarily operate in the context of a State-to-State relationship, but it can be 
provided by a State or a group of States to (directly) the population of another 
State. Secondly, solidarity takes place in any community where some basic values 
and principles (i.e. equity and social justice) are shared by the members of the 
community thereof. Finally, solidarity has a clear moral connotation which asks to 
                                                          
18
 The African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights has been adopted on 27 June 1981 and 
entered into force on 21 October 1986. 
19
 The ASEAN Charter was adopted on 20 November 2007 and entered into force on 15 December 
2008.   
20
 In this regard, a very detailed overview is in A.G. Koroma, “Solidarity: Evidence of an 
Emerging International Legal Principle”, in P. Hestermeyer, D. König, N. Matz-Lück, V. Röben, 
A. Seibert-Fohr, P. Stoll, S. Vöneky (eds.), Coexistence, Cooperation and Solidarity - Liber 
Amicorum Rüdiger Wolfrum, cit., pp. 103-130. 
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take into account the interests of others and provide them with assistance, often on 
a spontaneous basis21.  
Rüdiger Wolfrum has, however, made a step forward in this regard by describing 
the principle of solidarity as that consideration which “makes a joint action 
mandatory” wherever there exists a community of States based upon common 
values and common interests, and that calls for balancing obligations in joint 
actions22. In this perspective, solidarity has thus a constitutional dimension that, 
when interacting with norms of positive international law, is more than a ‘simple’ 
driving principle and implies extra-legal obligations. It is, indeed, core and 
interpretative tool of many relevant primary and secondary international rules 
which have been constituting the “natural habitat for the creation of solidarist 
primary rules”23. In this way, the principle of solidarity has become trigger and 
cornerstone of both a normative and an operational dynamic in a number of 
branches of international law by affecting also the allocation of rights and duties 
among the agents of international law. In particular, it should be capable of 
creating negative obligations on States not to engage in certain activities as well as 
positive duties to carry out certain measures for a common good24. According to 
this definitional orientation the notion of solidarity is hence double-faced as it has 
the role of both inspiring the response to dangers or events and creating common 
rights and obligations to be perfectly balanced. Such combination of, respectively, 
negative and positive dimensions completes the process of ‘constitutionalisation’ 
of the principle thereof and confirms the transformation of international law into a 
                                                          
21
 This definition is driven by that provided by L. Boisson de Chazournes in “Responsibility to 
Protect: Reflecting Solidarity?”, cit., p. 93. 
22
 In particular, Wolfrum indicates three different levels of intervention: the achievement of 
common objectives through common action of States, the achievement of common objectives 
through differentiated obligations of States and actions to benefit particular States. See, R. 
Wolfrum, “Solidarity amongst States: An Emerging Structural Principle of International Law”, in 
Indian Journal of International Law, Vol. 49, 2009, pp.  8-20. 
23
 See, K. Wellens, “Revisiting Solidarity as a (Re-) Emerging Constitutional Principle: Some 
Further Reflections”, in R. Wolfrum, C. Kojima (eds.), Solidarity: A Structural Principle of 
International Law, cit., p. 4.  
24
 See, A.G. Koroma, “Solidarity: Evidence of an Emerging International Legal Principle”, cit., p. 
103.  
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value based international legal order25. Furthermore, the multifunctional character 
of solidarity makes it one of the constituent element of the concept of justice in 
public international law. The principle of solidarity has, hence, reached different 
stages of development in the theoretical discourse. But, such a perspective – 
which makes solidarity both value and constitutional principle of international law 
– encounters some obstacles and doubts. 
First of all, from the perspective of legal experience, the whole range of 
qualifications of solidarity illustrated above comes into a less sharp focus. 
Solidarity as a fact is present, but relatively insignificant in its implications as 
legal principle because in its practical application it needs to be balanced against 
other applicable principles, especially that of sovereignty and consent. The 
emerging character of the principle of solidarity is inevitably linked to the 
recognition that the “international law of solidarity is progressively realising”26, 
but also that it is “bound to create conflict” with the idea of State sovereignty27.  
Secondly, the characterisation of solidarity as a key principle of international law 
does not appear to be leading to clear implications in terms of normative quality. 
As a matter of fact, there is still a lot of scepticism among scholars about the 
autonomous normative character of solidarity in international law. Despite many 
rules in international law express some aspects of solidarity and it is used as 
parameter of interpretation, at present there is not any rule expressly prescribing 
solidarity per se as a legally binding norm. Moreover, as underlined by the very 
Wolfrum, solidarity may be a principle inherent in some regimes, but not in every 
regime: it lacks universality28. It is too abstract and indefinite in contours and 
contents to become a normative concept that produces steering effects on State’s 
behaviour in international relations. It is a mechanism for inspiring and 
                                                          
25
 See, R. Wolfrum, “Solidarity amongst States: An Emerging Structural Principle of International 
Law”, in Indian Journal of International Law, cit., p. 8. 
26
 See, I. de la Rasilla del Moral, “Nihil Novum Sub Sole since the South West Africa Cases? On 
ius standi, the ICJ and Community Interests”, in International Community Law Review, Vol. 10, 
2008, p. 196.  
27
 See, E. Jouannet, “What is the use of International law? International law as a 21st century 
guardian of welfare”, in Michigan Journal of International Law, Vol. 28, 2008, p. 818.  
28
 See, R. Wolfrum, “Concluding remarks”, in R. Wolfrum, C. Kojima (eds.), Solidarity: A 
Structural Principle of International Law, cit., p. 228. 
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interpreting many rules, but it is not a rule itself. This happens, inter alia, because, 
as pointed out by Emmanuelle Jouannet, incarnating moral values into the law 
thus blurring the boundaries between law and morality, between categorical 
imperatives and moral duties, is dangerous if not complex29.  
In the absence of clear obligations of solidarity, as stressed 350 years ago by Emer 
de Wattel, no rights of solidarity may exist, but merely legitimate expectations, 
which not necessarily result in effective interventions30. Bridging moral values 
into the realm of law, where State sovereignty and the principle of subsidiarity 
characterise the interdependence-based structure of international law, can be a 
limit to the acknowledgment of duties and rights of solidarity. And when rights 
and duties do not balance, solidarity cannot prevail.  
Even though the arguments addressed limit the acknowledgment of the existence 
of solidarity duties of customary law, specific obligations of solidarity can be 
negotiated between States through a treaty or even decided upon by an 
international organisation. In particular, regional contexts – and above all the EU 
which is so far a unique integration project at international level – are perfect 
examples of regimes where solidarity can play an extraordinary role not only as 
interpretative tool, but also as normative content. Indeed, when a community 
sharing same values and principles which grow sympathies between the partners 
is created, the said community can choose to be based upon solidarity thus making 
it a combination of lex lata and lex ferenda.  
This is exactly what may happen in the field of disaster relief, that is an area of 
international law where the actors endeavour to act in favour of another State not 
for immediate profit, but rather because motivated by what could be called 
solidarity. Indeed, situations of disaster as those described in the following 
paragraph trigger not only individuals, but also States, NGOs and other 
international actors to provide for immediate assistance to local communities 
because of primarily driven by empathy and proximity.  
 
                                                          
29
 See, E. Jouannet, “What is the use of International law? International law as a 21st century 
guardian of welfare”, cit., p. 815.  
30
 In this regard, see UN Special Rapporteur Eduardo Valencia-Ospina, Preliminary Report on the 
Protection of Persons in the Event of Disasters, Doc. A/CN.4/598 of 5 May 2008, para.14.  
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2.2 Defining the term ‘disaster’: a complex issue 
 
The root of the word ‘disaster’ derives from Latin dis astrum and can be translated 
as ‘evil star’. In general, it implies a sudden overwhelming and unforeseen event. 
However, a disaster is not a single material reality, but a concept by which 
qualifies various events that can go from the derailment of a train in an 
earthquake, the explosion of a chemical plant, the epidemic affecting entire 
populations to a landslide that intersects a highway.  
In the minds of many, hazardous events which may cause disasters are divided 
into those originating either from forces of nature or from the effects of humans, 
but actually the classification is much more complex. As a result, even though the 
following sections will follow the traditional categorisation, it will be also clear 
that, given the amount of phenomena which have a hybrid origin, the strict 
separation between natural and man-made catastrophes represents just one aspect 
of a larger differentiation among disasters which may include also health 
emergencies.  
 
a) Natural disasters 
Natural disasters are naturally occurring physical phenomena caused either by 
rapid or slow onset events which can be geophysical (earthquakes, landslides, 
tsunamis and volcanic activity), hydrological (avalanches and floods), 
climatological (extreme temperatures, drought and wildfires) and meteorological 
(cyclones and storms surges). A widely accepted definition characterizes natural 
hazards as “those elements of the physical environment, harmful to man and 
caused by forces extraneous to him”31. Notwithstanding the term ‘natural’, a 
natural hazard has an element of human involvement. A physical event, such as a 
volcanic eruption, that does not affect human beings is a natural phenomenon but 
not a natural hazard. A natural phenomenon that occurs in a populated area is 
a hazardous event. A hazardous event that causes unacceptably large numbers of 
                                                          
31
 See, I. Burton, R. W. Kates, G. F. White, The Environment as Hazard, Oxford University Press, 
New York, 1964, p. 413. 
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fatalities and/or overwhelming property damage is a natural disaster32. In areas 
where there are no human interests, natural phenomena do not constitute hazards, 
nor do they result in disasters. This implies that the calamitous consequences of 
such an event concern just the human and/or material dimension, but not the 
environmental one. Actually, in case of natural calamity the environment is able 
to recreate a new equilibrium.   
The catastrophes of non-human origin must be divided into those which have a 
sudden character and those which are durable or creeping. In the first 
circumstances, humans are generally seen as having no responsibility in creating 
natural hazards and impotent to do anything, or very little, to mitigate them, as 
these are events marked by suddenness and unforeseeability. In the second one, a 
series of hazards which can strike along a continuum, from instantaneous impact 
to the gradual or long prolonged effects of the so-called creeping disasters. For 
instance, drought offers a typical case of natural calamity recorded starting from 
the origins of human history and it is linked to the natural cycle. When pushed, 
however, this narrow definition begins to expand and it appears clear the human 
responsibility in the existence or extent of the catastrophe: a voluntary 
deforestation or an excessive use of the soil may quicken drought. According to 
this view, disasters such as famine and global climate change could be considered 
‘slow-onset’ disasters. 
As observed by former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan, “the term ‘natural 
disasters’ has become an increasingly anachronistic misnomer. In reality, it is 
human behaviour that transforms natural hazards into what should be called 
unnatural disasters”33. Indeed, from a legal point of view, it is fundamental to 
understand that human intervention can increase the frequency and severity of 
natural hazards. In some circumstances, disasters arising from natural hazards 
would not have occurred or would have had a smaller impact on communities had 
it not been for actions by people: deforestation for firewood or building materials 
has resulted in landslides during heavy rainfall in Central and South America; 
                                                          
32
 For a more specific explanation of the terminology used, see D. Alexander, Confronting 
catastrophe: new perspectives on natural disasters, Oxford University Press, 2000, pp. 14-29. 
33
 See, UN Secretary General, Report to the United Nations General Assembly on the Work of the 
Organization, U.N. Doc. No. A/54/1, 1999, para. 11.  
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overgrazing of cattle has allowed desertification in the Sahel; uncontrolled 
housing construction close to beaches increases risks from tsunamis and storms; 
removal of wetlands has eliminated a natural mitigating factor for the damage 
caused by tropical storms. In addition, human intervention may reduce the 
mitigating effect of natural ecosystems. Destruction of coral reef, which removes 
the shore’s first line of defence against ocean currents and storm surges, is a clear 
example of an intervention that diminishes the ability of an ecosystem to protect 
itself.  
As a consequence, for some events classified as natural disasters, the potential 
risks could be dramatically reduced through a careful planning of construction 
codes for reducing loss from earthquakes; food security programmes to protect 
against food crises; social programmes for reducing vulnerability to disasters 
which otherwise could not be controlled. Besides, human responsibility rises for 
what concerns the realization of early warning systems providing information on 
an emerging dangerous circumstance where that information can enable action in 
advance to reduce the risks involved. For instance, alerting costal populations of 
approaching tsunamis can give populations time to be evacuated from danger 
areas. Similarly, zoning codes, where enforced, can keep populations from 
building in flood-prone areas and a responsible land use can reduce the risk of 
landslips caused by unchecked felling of trees34. As a result, a deep knowledge of 
the risk of the natural event is essential to mitigate the extent of harm which may 
follow a calamitous event.  
 
b) Anthropogenic disasters 
Though weather and geologically-related disasters are considered to have 
generated the greatest number of deaths and economic loss, disasters deriving by 
human activities are increasing in importance. Anthropogenic disasters are 
                                                          
34
 See, C. Leben, “Vers un droit international des catastrophes”, in Académie de droit international 
de La Haye (ed.), The International Aspects of Natural and Industrial Catastrophe, Brill, 2001, pp. 
39-41. In addition, see J. W. Samuels, “The relevance of international law in the prevention and 
mitigation of natural disasters”, in L. H. Stephens, S. J. Green (eds.), Disaster Assistance: 
Appraisal, Reform and New Approaches, New York University Press, 1979, pp. 245-266. 
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heterogenic and collect different types of events which have some peculiar 
elements.  
The first group of disasters caused by human beings have technological or 
industrial nature. The Chernobyl affair, which is considered the world’s worst 
nuclear power plant accident in the history in terms of costs and casualties, 
represents the typical example of technological disaster35. Of course, 
technological risks can be further aggravated when combined with the risks of 
natural disasters, as demonstrated by the more recent Fukushima Daiichi nuclear 
disaster resulting from an earthquake and a subsequent tsunami36.  The impact of a 
natural disaster on a facility storing or processing chemical substances can result 
in the release of hazardous materials with possibly severe off-site consequences 
through toxic-release, fire or explosion scenarios. Experts refer to this as a 
‘synergistic’ disasters or Na-Techs37. One of the main problems of Na-Tech 
accidents is that, considering the simultaneous occurrence of a natural disaster and 
a technological accident, both require simultaneous response efforts in a situation 
in which lifelines needed for disaster mitigation are likely to be unavailable, as 
they may have been downed by the natural disaster.  
The second group of catastrophes to be mentioned in this section are the so-called 
‘complex emergencies’ which represent the worst disasters that may affect a 
population not only because they are complex combinations of both natural and 
anthropogenic causes, but also because there is an intentional component. In fact, 
in this category it is possible to include civil or international conflicts, as well as 
                                                          
35
 For further information on the Chernobyl accident, see Report of the United Nations Scientific 
Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation, Health effects due to radiation from the Chernobyl 
accident, 2008, available at http://www.unscear.org/docs/reports/2008/11-
80076_Report_2008_Annex_D.pdf.   
36
 See, H. Funabashi, “Why the Fukushima Nuclear Disaster is a Man-made Calamity”, in 
International Journal of Japanese Sociology, Vol. 12, 2012, pp. 65-75. 
37
 The expression “Na-techs” (natural and technological disasters) has been adopted during the 
Yokohama Conference on Natural Disaster Reduction held in Japan in 1994. In particular the 
technical committee on “Natural disaster reduction: interrelationships between technological and 
natural hazards” affirmed that the concept of Na-techs should be fully recognized and that it 
should be fully included in environmental aspects of disasters. See, Report of the World 
Conference on Natural Disaster Reduction, Yokohama, Japan, 23-27 May 1994, A/CONF.172/9 
[P], pp. 36-37. 
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terroristic attacks which provoke humanitarian catastrophes resulting from 
deliberate violence. Actually, for what concerns armed violence in the form of 
conventional warfare, for a long time it has not been equated to natural or 
industrial disasters. These were ‘horrors of war’ that could not approximate 
traditional catastrophic events because they were conceived as inevitable products 
of a major political and social phenomena. However, some core principles of 
action invoked in case of natural and industrial disasters have progressively been 
extended to humanitarian catastrophes caused by conflicts as outbreaks of war not 
only determine civilian casualties, but they may pose also large-scale medical 
problems such as epidemics, lack of water, accumulation of rubbish, displaced 
persons, refugees, food shortage and hunger. In addition, the effects of a conflict 
continue for decades as a result of the remaining landmines and displaced 
populations, as well as of the economic consequence to the countries affected and 
the entire region. Moreover, as with natural or technological disasters, both 
internal and international conflicts have consequences not only on the local 
population, but also on the surrounding environment and on cultural heritage38. 
However, it is worth to underline that, notwithstanding such evaluations, yet there 
is not any international consensus on the potential inclusion of armed conflicts 
and terrorist attacks within the concept of ‘disaster’ as such.  
 
c) Health emergencies 
While epidemics or other health problems may be the consequences of natural or 
man-made catastrophes, sometimes they may also represent the origin of a 
disaster. Biological disasters are causative of processes or phenomena of organic 
origin or conveyed by biological vectors, including the exposure to pathogenic 
micro-organisms, toxins and bioactive substances that may cause loss of life, 
                                                          
38
 Theft, war, civil disorder, terrorism, neglect and vandalism are human factors in the accidental 
or wilful destruction of heritage. International community has experienced more than once how 
shocking the effects of a violent struggle can be on the heritage of countries such as the former 
Yugoslavia, Afghanistan and Iraq. Statues are blown up because they are considered an insult to 
the “only and right religion”, archaeological sites are occupied by foreign troops and destroyed in 
the process, and archives are deliberately obliterated as part of an ethnic cleansing policy. For 
further information, see Managing Disaster Risks for World Heritage. World Heritage Resource 
Manual, UNESCO, 2010. 
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injury, illness or other health impacts, property damage, loss of livelihoods and 
services, social and economic disruption, or environmental damage. Examples of 
biological disasters include outbreaks of epidemic or pandemic diseases, plant or 
animal contagion, insect or other animal plagues and infestation. While the term 
‘epidemic’ is generally used to indicate the occurrence of a disease affecting a 
disproportionately large number of individuals within a population, a community, 
or a region at a particular time, such as Cholera or Ebola, pandemics are 
epidemics that spread across a large region, a continent, or even worldwide, such 
as the influenza H1N1 (Swine Flu). The United Nations have contributed to 
include health crises as emergencies able to jeopardise the functioning and the 
stability of the affected societies. In this regard, it is noteworthy the position 
adopted in 2014 with reference to the Ebola outbreak which was defined by the 
General Assembly as a public health crisis of international concern39 and by the 
UN Security Council as a threat to international peace and security40.  
Even though these phenomena have generally a natural origin, since human being 
is involved just in the phase of transmission of the disease, there are some cases in 
which human agency may be the trigger element, it is the so-called bioterrorism. 
A biological attack is the deliberate release of germs or other biological 
substances that can make people sick. The three basic groups of biological agents 
that would likely be used as weapons are bacteria, viruses and toxins. These 
agents are typically found in nature, but it is possible that they could be changed 
to increase their ability to cause disease, make them resistant to current medicines, 
or to increase their ability to be spread into the environment. Biological agents can 
be spread through the air, through water, or in food. Terrorist groups may use 
biological agents because they can be extremely difficult to detect and do not 
cause illness for several hours to several days. The contribution of human activity 
can be, hence, particularly relevant mainly in the phase of prevention.  
 
                                                          
39
 See, UN General Assembly, Measures to contain and combat the recent Ebola outbreak in West 
Africa, Resolution A/RES/69/1, 19 September 2014. 
40
 See, UN Security Council, Peace and Security in Africa, Resolution S/RES/2177, 18 September 
2014.  
21 
 
2.2.1 The definition of ‘disaster’ in some international legal instruments: what 
clarity? 
 
The realities described above vary so widely because the notion of ‘disaster’ is 
understood in the different ways depending on whether one is a geologist, 
physician, politician, sociologist, economist or a lawyer41. Such a complexity is 
also the reason why so far the term ‘disaster’ lacks a univocal and generally 
accepted legal definition at international level42. 
Indeed, as it will be clear after the reading of the following definitions provided 
by some international legal instruments relevant to disaster response, they are far 
from being identical in terms of scope of application.  
The first remarkable example is the explanation contained in the 1998 Tampere 
Convention on the Provision of Telecommunication Resources for Disaster 
Mitigation and Relief Operations, whose Article 1, para. 6, states that a disaster is: 
a serious disruption of the functioning of society, posing a significant, 
widespread threat to human life, health, property or the environment, 
whether caused by accident, nature or human activity, and whether 
developing suddenly or as the result of complex, long-term processes. 
Similar wording is found in Article 2 of the 1998 Agreement among the 
Governments of the Participating States of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation 
(BSEC) on collaboration in Emergency Assistance and Emergency Response to 
natural and man-made disasters, according to which a disaster is: 
an event in a definite area that has occurred as a result of an accident, 
hazardous natural phenomena, catastrophe, natural or man-made, which may 
or have caused significant physical, social, economic and cultural damage to 
human lives or environment43. 
                                                          
41
 On the debate on what “disaster” means, see R. W. Perry, E. L. Quarantelli (eds.), What is a 
disaster? New Answers to Old Questions, International Research Committee on Disasters, 2005. 
42
 See, UN Special Rapporteur Eduardo Valencia Ospina, Preliminary report on the protection of 
persons in the event of disasters, cit., p. 16; C. Focarelli, “Duty to Protect in Cases of Natural 
Disasters”, in Encyclopaedia of Public International Law, Oxford University Press, 2013.  
43
 See, Agreement among the Governments of the Participating States of the Black Sea Economic 
Cooperation (BSEC) on collaboration in Emergency Assistance and Emergency Response to 
natural and man-made Disasters, 1998, Article 2. The full text is available at 
http://www.ifrc.org/Docs/idrl/I260EN.pdf.  
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According to Article 1(d) of the Agreement establishing the Caribbean Disaster 
Emergency Response Agency (CDERA)44,  
disaster means the exposure of the human habitat to the operation of the 
forces of nature or to human intervention resulting in widespread destruction 
of lives or property but excludes events occasioned by war or national 
policies to prevent and mitigate the effects of disasters.  
The Agreement on Disaster Management and Emergency Response Vientiane 
adopted by the Member States of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations 
proposes a very general definition of “disaster”, by affirming that: 
“Disaster” means a serious disruption of the functioning of a community or a 
society causing widespread human, material, economic or environmental 
losses45.  
The Member States of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation 
(SAARC) adopted an Agreement referring just to natural disasters given the 
increasing frequency and scale of natural calamities in the region. According to 
Article 1, para. 3:  
“Natural disaster” means a natural hazard event causing serious disruption of 
the functioning of a community or a society involving widespread human, 
material, economic or environmental losses and impacts, which exceeds the 
ability of the affected community or society to cope using its own resources.  
Still in the Asiatic region, some Central Asian States have tried to improve 
cooperation among themselves by adopting the Cooperation Agreement for 
Prevention and Liquidation of Emergencies. According to it, an “emergency” is: 
a situation in the definite territory of State Parties resulted from accident, 
hazardous natural disaster, catastrophe, casualty or other disaster that may 
cause or have caused human losses, damage to human health or 
                                                          
44
 See, Agreement establishing the Caribbean Disaster Emergency Management Agency, 1991. 
The full text is available at 
http://www.caricom.org/jsp/secretariat/legal_instruments/agreement_cdera.jsp.  
45
 See, ASEAN Agreement on Disaster Management and Emergency Response Vientiane, 2005, 
Article 1(3). Available at http://www.asean.org/communities/asean-political-security-
community/item/asean-agreement-on-disaster-management-and-emergency-response-vientiane-
26-july-2005-4.  
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environment, considerable material loss and disruption of vital activities of 
people46. 
For what concerns bilateral treaties, it is interesting to note how the Agreement 
between the Government of the French Republic and the Government of Malaysia 
on Cooperation in the Field of Disaster Prevention and Management and Civil 
Security defines a disaster:  
“Catastrophe” : un événement autre que la guerre, survenant instantanément, 
de nature complexe, qui se traduit par des pertes de vies humaines, la 
destruction de biens ou de l'environnement et ayant des répercussions 
négatives sur les activités des collectivités locales. Ces événements 
requièrent une action spéciale nécessitant des moyens considérables, des 
équipements spéciaux et des personnels spécialisés provenant de divers 
organismes à l'intérieur ou à l'extérieur du pays47. 
In the second place, it is worth to analyse what “disaster” is according to the most 
relevant soft-law instruments. On 30 November 2007, the State parties to the 
Geneva Conventions and the International Red Cross Red Crescent Movement 
unanimously adopted the “Guidelines for the domestic facilitation and regulation 
of international disaster relief and initial recovery assistance” (also known as the 
“IDRL Guidelines”) at the 30th International Conference of the Movement. For 
the purposes of these Guidelines: 
“Disaster” means a serious disruption of the functioning of society, which 
poses a significant, widespread threat to human life, health, property or the 
environment, whether arising from accident, nature or human activity, 
                                                          
46
 See, Agreement between Governments of Member States of Shanghai Cooperation Organization 
on Cooperation in Delivery of Assistance for Emergency Liquidation, 2005, Article 1. The text of 
the agreement is available at 
http://www.ifrc.org/Global/Photos/Asia%20Pacific/201412/AGREEMENT%20between%20Gove
rnments%20of%20Member%20States%20of%20Shanghai%20Cooperation%20Organization%20
on%20Cooperation%20in%20Delivery%20of%20Assistance%20for%20Emergency%20Liquidati
on.pdf.  
47
 See, Accord entre le Gouvernement de la République française et le Gouvernement de la 
Malaisie sur la coopération dans le domaine de la prévention et de la gestion des catastrophes et de 
la sécurité civile, 1998, Article 1. The full text is available at 
http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichTexte.do?cidTexte=JORFTEXT000000208367. 
24 
 
whether developing suddenly or as the result of long-term processes, but 
excluding armed conflict48. 
The United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction (UNISDR) has defined 
disaster as: 
a serious disruption of the functioning of a community or a society causing 
widespread human, material, economic or environmental losses which 
exceeds the ability of the affected community or society to cope using its 
own resources49.  
For what concerns the EU context, Decision 1313/2013/EU of the European 
Parliament and the Council on a Union Civil Protection Mechanism labels a 
disaster as: 
any situation which has or may have a severe impact on people, the 
environment, or property, including cultural heritage50.  
Besides, the Institut de Droit International has adopted a very broad definition51:  
“Disaster” means calamitous events which endanger life, health, physical 
integrity, or the right not to be subjected to cruel, inhuman or degrading 
treatment, or other fundamental human rights, or the essential needs of the 
population, whether 
• of natural origin (such as earthquakes, volcanic eruptions, windstorms, 
torrential rains, floods, landslides, droughts, fires, famine, epidemics), or 
• man-made disasters of technological origin (such as chemical disasters or 
nuclear explosions), or 
• caused by armed conflicts or violence (such as international or internal armed 
conflicts, internal disturbances or violence, terrorist activities). 
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 See, Guidelines for the domestic facilitation and regulation of international disaster relief and 
initial recovery assistance, Definitions. The full text is available at 
http://scm.oas.org/pdfs/2010/CEPCD02642e.pdf 
49
 See, International Strategy for Disaster Reduction (ISDR), UNISDR Terminology on Disaster 
Risk Reduction, available at www.unisdr.org/eng/library/ UNISDR-terminology-2009-eng.pdf.  
50
 See, Decision 1313/2013/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council on a Union Civil 
Protection Mechanism, OJ L 347/924 of 20 December 2013, Article 4(1).  
51
 See, Resolution of the Sixteenth Commission on Humanitarian Assistance, Institut de Droit 
International, 2 September 2003, Article 1.2. The text of the Resolution is available at 
http://www.idi-iil.org/idiE/resolutionsE/2003_bru_03_en.PDF.  
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At the same time, it is worth to highlight the extremely precise definition of 
hazard reported in the Hyogo Framework for Action 2005-2015 adopted during 
the 2005 World Conference on Disaster Reduction. 
Hazard is defined as “A potentially damaging physical event, phenomenon 
or human activity that may cause the loss of life or injury, property damage, 
social and economic disruption or environmental degradation. Hazards can 
include latent conditions that may represent future threats and can have 
different origins: natural (geological, hydrometeorological and biological) or 
induced by human processes (environmental degradation and technological 
hazards)”52. 
Finally, the International Law Commission confirms the trend by affirming in the 
Draft Articles on Protecting People in the Event of Disasters that: 
“Disaster” means a calamitous event or series of events resulting in 
widespread loss of life, great human suffering and distress, or large-scale 
material or environmental damage, thereby seriously disrupting the 
functioning of society53. 
Even if it is apparent that the definitions reported have some common elements, 
they are clearly divergent mainly on two issues. First of all, while almost all the 
mentioned legal instruments adopt an all-encompassing approach by making 
reference to the impact on people as well as on property, cultural heritage and 
environment that a disaster may have, there is no convergence on the origins of 
the disaster54. In particular, as made evident in the definitions of the Institut de 
Droit International and of the International Law Commission, an important 
distinction resides on the inclusion or not of armed conflicts and violence as 
examples of disaster.  Secondly, not all agree on the unexpected and time-limited 
nature of disasters: while some Conventions focus just on disasters occurring 
without warning, the Tampere Convention as well as the International Law 
                                                          
52
 See, Hyogo Framework for Action 2005-2015: Building the Resilience of Nations and 
Communities to Disasters, 2005, p. 1, footnote 2. Available at 
http://www.unisdr.org/2005/wcdr/intergover/official-doc/L-docs/Hyogo-framework-for-action-
english.pdf 
53
 See, International Law Commission, Protection of persons in the event of disasters, Draft 
Articles 1-5, Document A/CN.4/629, Article 3. 
54
 See, C. Leben, “Vers un droit international de catastrophes?”, in International Aspects of 
Natural and Industrial Catastrophes, cit. 
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Commission recognise that calamitous events may be the result of complex and 
long-term processes55. In addition, both the Hyogo Framework and the EU 
Decision 1313/2013 cover also those events that can even potentially provoke 
severe damages. Despite all these distinctions find their source on the different 
areas of application of each instrument reported, they also make clear the 
difficulty to outline a univocal and comprehensive definition of the term ‘disaster’ 
without raising some critical issues.  
 
3. The scope of investigation of the present work: some clarifications 
 
The survey on the diverse definitions of ‘disaster’ that it is possible to encounter 
within the main international legal instruments serves not only as demonstration 
of the complexity of subjecta materia, but also as starting point for specifying the 
field of investigation of the present work. 
The multiplicity of elements and variables that the concept of ‘disaster’ may 
encompass makes essential a clarification of what kind of situations the present 
work covers and what it excludes. First of all, on the basis of what established in 
the main legal instruments of disaster response law and specified by the 
International Law Commission56, it has been decided to consider just those 
instruments to be activated in the event of man-made (intended as technological, 
nuclear and industrial) or natural disasters thereby excluding other situations of 
emergency such as the migration crisis as well as armed conflicts. Therefore, 
despite over the years at the EU level the notion of ‘disaster’ has been quite 
extended and the instruments that will be illustrated may be activated also in other 
                                                          
55Long-term processes include the so-called “creeping disaster” which are formed by the 
accumulation of partial damaging effects but that in the long term can lead to major and 
irreversible damage; as well as by those durable phenomena that hit some regions in a repeated 
and constant way. Into this question, some scholars have doubts on the opportunity to consider 
progressive deforestation in some parts of the world, the extension of drought, soil depletion, 
flooding and other phenomena like air pollution by discharge of carbon dioxide from factories and 
traffic can lead, in the long term, the upheavals of the most fundamental balance of “ecosystems” 
of the planet raising fears of possible occurrence of “global disasters”. See, D. Alexander, “The 
Study of Natural Disasters, 1977 - 1997: Some Reflections on a Changing Field of Knowledge”, in 
Disasters, Vol. 21 (4), 1997, pp. 284-304. 
56
 See, infra, Chapter I, para. 3.  
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kinds of emergency57, neither the instruments established according to Article 80 
TFEU, nor the tools that are part of the Common Foreign and Security Policy 
(CFSP), nor those aimed at responding to the financial crisis will be taken into 
account. However, it has been chosen to use also terms like ‘emergency’ and 
‘crisis’ as synonyms of the term ‘disaster’.  
Secondly, as made evident by the investigation plan, the research will be limited 
to the instruments designed to immediately (or almost) respond to the effects of 
onset disasters, thereby leaving aside those operating in the prevention and long-
term recovery phases. Moreover, since for the purposes of the present work it is 
not relevant the transnational character of the emergencies to be tackled, it is 
essential to stress that the analysis will focus in general on all those situations that 
go beyond the capabilities of the affected State and that, therefore, require an 
external response. With regard then the specific scope of application of the present 
work, it will be dedicated to explore the impact of solidarity in the instruments of 
EU law dealing with the occurrence of disasters within the territory of the EU 
Member States. Having specified that, some references to the external dimension 
of the EU intervention in this field will be made in order to complete the whole 
framework of analysis.  
Thirdly, given the heterogeneous and complex nature of the legal tools that will be 
analysed as well as of the very concept of solidarity as conceived within the EU 
legal order, the present work will not be limited to underline the impact of 
solidarity at interstate level, but will consider its legal effectiveness also in the 
relations between the Union and Member States.       
Finally, it is necessary to underline that, with regard to the Union Civil Protection 
Mechanism, in the present work some references to recent legislative 
developments have been included, but not deeply analysed because they concern a 
Commission proposal currently under examination of the Council and the 
European Parliament.  
                                                          
57
 In this regard, it is suffice to say that armed conflicts and terrorist attacks may be considered as 
specific situations triggering the activation of the Union Civil Protection Mechanism. Moreover, it 
is remarkable that the emergency support instrument has been established exactly to provide for 
financial assistance to those Member States seriously affected by the migration crisis even though 
it could be used also on occasion of other calamitous events strictly speaking.  
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CHAPTER I 
 
REVISITING SOLIDARITY IN INTERNATIONAL  
DISASTER RESPONSE LAW 
 
 
1. Preliminary remarks  
 
In the last century, imperatives of humanity and solidarity have prompted massive 
international interventions to assist the victims of disasters. But, in recent times, 
the need for a framework that clearly addressed the responsibilities of States and 
of other international actors in disaster settings emerged for responding to the 
increasing requirements of international solidarity.  
One of the first attempts to develop a specific framework for international disaster 
response was undertaken in the 1920s under the auspices of the League of 
Nations, leading to the adoption of the Convention and Statutes Establishing an 
International Relief Union58. Unfortunately, it has never become effective and, 
ultimately, failed due to a lack of funding. The next effort to create a 
comprehensive international legal regime for international disaster assistance did 
not come until fifty years later, when the Office of the United Nations Disaster 
Relief Coordinator59 proposed a Draft Convention on Expediting the Delivery of 
Emergency Assistance to the UN Economic and Social Council. Despite such a 
Draft Convention sought to solve a number of crucial issues, it was never taken up 
                                                          
58
 The International Relief Union was designed to be a centralized operational agency aimed at 
channelling international funds and support in disaster settings, coordinating other actors, and 
promoting study and research on disaster management. However, it was never able to effectively 
carry out its mission, due mainly to the crippling lack of funds incident and to its inability to 
command regular contributions from participating States. For further information on the 
International Relief Union, see, P. Macalister-Smith, International Humanitarian Assistance: 
Disaster Relief Action in International Law and Organization, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1985.  
59
 The Office of the United Nations Disaster Relief Coordinator was the predecessor to the present-
day Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA).  
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by the United Nations General Assembly60. Notwithstanding these failures, 
international law on disaster management has developed at the global level on 
separate ways in many treaties dealing with different branches of international 
law61, as well as in a number of soft law instruments, such as resolutions, 
declarations, codes, models, and guidelines, that are not formally binding but that 
are evidence of an overall international consensus62. Besides these, in recent 
decades, a number of universal, regional, and even bilateral treaties strictly related 
to disaster response have been adopted.  
At universal level two different trends have emerged. On one hand, ad hoc rules 
were included to prescribe the specific duties for States in the event of a natural or 
man-made disaster in several universal treaties which regulate general issues, such 
as the transport of goods by sea or air, customs, health regulations, human rights, 
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 The Draft Convention on Expediting the Delivery of Emergency Assistance was proposed in 
1984. See, UN Doc. A/39/267/Add.2. See also, C. Clement, “International disaster response laws, 
rules and principles: a pragmatic approach to strengthening international disaster response 
mechanism”, in D. D. Caron, M.J. Kelly, A. Telesetsky (eds.), International Law of Disaster 
Relief, Cambridge University Press, 2014, pp. 70-71. For further information see, E. Tokunaga, 
“Evolution of International disaster response law: towards codification and progressive 
development of the law”, in D. D. Caron, M.J. Kelly, A. Telesetsky (eds.), International Law of 
Disaster Relief, cit., pp. 46-64. 
61
 It is relevant to underline the strong relationship between international disaster response law and 
some other branches of public international law that contribute to shape its form and substance. In 
particular, international humanitarian law stipulates how persons in need of assistance are to be 
treated according to the fundamental principles governing humanitarian assistance, namely 
humanity, impartiality and neutrality. International human rights law, as corpus of basic rules 
applying to all situations, provides a catalogue of binding rights. International environmental law 
and international law on health contribute to the avoidance of health emergencies and 
environmental harm, by stating State obligations regarding public health and environmental 
protection. See, G. Venturini, “International Disaster Response Law in relation to other branches 
of International Law”, in A. De Guttry, M. Gestri, G. Venturini (eds.), International Disaster 
Response Law, Springer, 2012, pp. 45-64. 
62
 There is a significant number of non-binding documents dealing with various aspects of 
International Disaster Response Law (IDRL) and adopted by International Organisations, the 
IFRC, NGOs, groups of experts and technical bodies. It is appropriate to recall some examples of 
soft law instruments such as the Declarations of principles on cooperation in case of disasters, the 
Code of Conduct for the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and Non-
Governmental Organizations in Disaster Relief, 1995 and the International Federation of the Red 
Cross, Guidelines for the Domestic Facilitation and Regulation of International Disaster Relief and 
Initial Recovery Assistance, 2007. For further information, see A. De Guttry, “Surveying the Law” 
in A. De Guttry, M. Gestri, G. Venturini (eds.), International Disaster Response Law, cit., pp. 3-
44.  
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waste management and especially the protection of the environment. On the other 
hand, sectoral multilateral treaties have been concluded only to deal with very 
specific issues related to disaster management or to categories of actors 
intervening in emergency situations63. At regional (and sub-regional) level there 
are then numerous treaties regulating in a comprehensive manner all the relevant 
issues related to disaster prevention, mitigation, management and early recovery64. 
Finally, the international community has more recently assisted to an impressive 
accumulation of bilateral treaties regulating disaster management and enshrining 
generic commitments to cooperate in fields of common interest, as well as more 
detailed rules concerning the rights and duties of State when a major natural or 
man-made disaster occur65.  
The combination of soft and hard law instruments has led to the emergence and 
significant development of the so-called International Disaster Response Law 
(hereafter IDRL), that is a corpus of international rules and standards describing 
the role of States and other relevant actors in the response to (and recovery from) 
natural or man-made disasters, as well as in the area of disaster management66. 
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 Sectoral multilateral treaties contain norms concerning the prevention of and response to certain 
specific kinds of disasters, such as Convention on the Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident and 
the Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency (both 
26 September 1986) and the International Convention Relating to Intervention on the High Seas in 
Cases of Oil Pollution Casualties (29 November 1969). Besides, they can include norms 
concerning specific aspects of disaster assistance, like the Convention on the Provision of 
Telecommunication Resources for Disaster Mitigation and Relief Operations (18 June 1998). For 
further information, see A. De Guttry, “Surveying the Law”, cit., pp. 33-38. 
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 Regional and sub-regional agreements and arrangements have been concluded in different 
continents and have a similar structure. In many cases, ad hoc institutional mechanisms and bodies 
have been established to foster cooperation and to implement the provisions of the treaties. For a 
brief overview see paragraph 4 of the present Chapter. 
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 Among bilateral treaties it is appropriate to include the Agreement between the Republic of 
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accidents (26 April 1996), the Agreement between the Government of the Republic of South 
Africa and the Government of the Republic of Namibia, regarding the Coordination of Search and 
Rescue Services (8 September 2000), the Agreement between the Republic of Italy and the 
Republic of France concerning cross-border co-operation in case emergencies occurring in 
mountainous areas (19 March 2007). For further information, see A. De Guttry, “Surveying the 
Law”, cit., pp. 11-17. 
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 For a complete list of disaster-related agreements, see the UN Treaty Collection 
(http://treaties.un.org/); the International Federation of Red Cross website 
http://www.ifrc.org/en/what-we-do/idrl/publication/); the websites of the national authorities in 
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However, such a corpus of norms has not yet been universally codified nor any of 
the mentioned legal instruments has the universal scope to which the 1984 Draft 
Convention aspired, thereby making IDRL pertaining more to soft law and 
conventional law rather than to international customary law. Moreover, a closer 
investigation of the existing international legal instruments makes it clear that they 
are far from being uniform and coherent in regulating the various aspects of 
disaster response67. Accordingly, the absence of a comprehensive and centralised 
legal framework has contributed to the fragmentation of international law on 
disaster relief68. As such, it is not contributing as much as might be hoped to the 
many legal problems that arise in the operations in the field, but, instead, is likely 
to limit, from a practical point of view, the effectiveness of the response to the 
suffering of disaster-affected populations.  
But, for the purposes of the present work, the most relevant gap is that, apart from 
what prescribed by bilateral and multilateral specific treaties, customary 
international law fails to properly regulate the very general responsibilities of the 
affected State and those of the potential assisting actors. This is due to, inter alia, 
the centrality that the principle of State sovereignty has traditionally had thus 
                                                                                                                                                               
charge of disaster management like for example the data bank of Italian Civil Protection 
Department listing the bilateral agreements signed by Italy: 
http://www.protezionecivile.gov.it/jcms/it/accordi_internazionali.wp;jsessionid=97F26DEA445C2
A38A66A20869F891FE1); the ECOLEX Databank, operated jointly by FAO, IUCN and UNDEP, 
providing the most comprehensive, global source of information on environmental law which lists 
most of the relevant emergency management treaties (http://www.ecolex.org/start.php), including 
those related to the management of forest fire.  
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 In particular, it has to be stressed that existing treaties have a limited scope of application both 
from a geographical and material point of view and that they do not coherently regulate the various 
aspects of transboundary disaster management and humanitarian assistance. See, H. Fischer, 
“International disaster response law treaties: trends, patterns, and lacunae”, in V. Bannon (ed.), 
International Disaster Response Laws, Principles and Practice: reflections, prospects, and 
challenges, International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, 2003, Geneva, 
pp. 24–44; I. Reinecke, “International Disaster Response Law and the Coordination of 
International Organisations”, in ANU Undergraduate Research Journal, 2010, pp. 143-163. In 
addition, see C. Adinolfi, Humanitarian Response Review, Office for the Coordination of 
Humanitarian Affairs, 2005; J. Bennett, Coordination of international humanitarian assistance in 
Tsunami-affected countries, Tsunami Evaluation Coalition, 2006; M. Hoffman, “Towards an 
international disaster response law”, in World Disasters Report 2000, International Federation of 
the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, pp. 144-157. 
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 See, International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, Law and Legal Issues in 
International Disaster Response: A Desk Study – Summary Version, 2007, p. 6.  
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justifying, on the one hand, the affected State’s reluctance to seek for external 
assistance and, on the other hand, the occasional third countries’ inaction for 
providing for assistance beyond that put at disposal by NGOs and other 
international organizations thereby de facto limiting the effective 
“operationalisation” of solidarity in disaster response. 
 
2. States’ responsibilities in responding to disasters: between sovereignty and 
solidarity 
 
State sovereignty has always been one of the cardinal principles of international 
relations and still resides in the nucleus of customary international law. Since 
Aristotle, the term ‘sovereignty’ has had a long and varied history during which it 
has been given different meanings, hues and tones, depending on the context and 
the objectives of those using the notion.  
For a long time sovereignty has been defined as the right to exercise the supreme, 
absolute and uncontrollable power of regulating internal affairs without external 
interference. The Bodin formula, which defines sovereignty as potestas legibus 
soluta and describes the monarch as being legibus solutus that is ‘not bound by 
law’, has been often invoked to corroborate the understanding of sovereignty as 
absolute power. The new international order formed with the Peace of Westphalia 
has marked the transition from the Middle Ages to the modern world, by creating 
a system in which the main actors are equal and sovereign States. The premise of 
this new order is State sovereignty itself, perceived in two different ways: 
internally, sovereignty implies the exercise of a supreme jurisdiction over its 
territory and its population; outside, it denotes the status of equality among 
States69. It implies, that their actions are not, and should not be, influenced by any 
higher power, especially in the management of economic, political, cultural and 
social affairs and that they are free to decide how to interact with other equal 
subjects.  
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 See, G. Nolte, “Sovereignty as Responsibility?”, in American Society of International Law, 
Proceedings of the 101st Annual Meeting, Vol. 99, 2005, pp. 389-392.  
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Against this background, State sovereignty has gradually grown stronger and soon 
it has become synonymous, on the one side, of State’s independence from and 
legal impermeability in relation to foreign powers, and of State’s exclusive 
jurisdiction and supremacy over its territory and inhabitants on the other70. In this 
way, sovereignty has been a source of stability for more than two centuries and 
the principle of non-intervention in domestic affairs has developed in parallel by 
becoming “corollary of every State’s right to sovereignty, territorial integrity and 
political independence”71. Such an orientation has been then confirmed by the 
concept of domain réservé enshrined in Article 2, par. 7, of the Charter of the 
United Nations, according to which: “Nothing contained in the present Charter 
shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially 
within the domestic jurisdiction of any State or shall require the Members to 
submit such matters to settlement under the present Charter”72.  
As part of the international case law, the influence of the position expressed by the 
Permanent Court of International Justice in Wimbledon and the Lotus Case is 
evident73. In 1949 the International Court of Justice also noted that “between 
independent States, respect for territorial sovereignty is an essential foundation of 
international relations”74 and forty years later, in the historic Nicaragua judgment, 
the International Court of Justice ruled that “matters which each State is 
permitted, by the principle of State sovereignty, to decide freely. One of these is 
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 See, A. Cassese, International Law, Oxford University Press, 2004, pp. 71-81. 
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 See, R. Jennings, A. Watts KCMG QC (eds.), Oppenheim’s International Law, Oxford 
University Press, 2008, p. 428. 
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 This approach has been repeated also by the General Assembly which, in Resolution 46/182 has 
stressed that “sovereignty, territorial integrity and national unity of States must be fully respected 
in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations”, see UN General Assembly, Resolution 
46/182, 19 December 1991, Annex – Guiding Principles, para. 3. The text is available at 
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 See, Permanent Court of International Justice, United Kingdom and ors v Germany (Wimbledon 
case), PCIJ Series A., No. 1, 1923; Permanent Court of International Justice, France v. Turkey 
(Lotus case), PCIJ Series A., No. 10, 1927. In particular at point 44 of the Lotus judgement, the 
Court stated “that restrictions upon the independence of States could not be presumed”. 
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 See, International Court of Justice, The Corfu Channel Case, Decision of 9 April 1949, p. 35. 
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the choice of a political, economic, social and cultural system, and the formulation 
of foreign policy”75.  
Such a perspective is valid also, and especially, for what concerns the 
management of post-disaster situations. In the absence of an universal legal 
framework for international disaster response, the point of reference on this topic 
is represented by customary international law which suggests that, on the basis of 
the principle of State sovereignty, disaster response falls within the jurisdiction of 
the State in whose territory the catastrophic event has occurred and that, par 
contre, third States have just the right to provide assistance to the affected 
territory upon request or approval of the concerned State.  
 
2.1 Duties and responsibilities of the affected State 
 
According to the landmark UN General Assembly Resolution 46/182 of 1991, 
“each State has the responsibility first and foremost to take care of the victims of 
natural disasters and other emergencies occurring on its territory. Hence, the 
affected State has the primary role in the initiation, organization, coordination, 
and implementation of humanitarian assistance within its territory”76. It is 
interesting to note that in this quote the General Assembly used two different 
terms in order to explain the different tasks of the victim State. On the one hand, 
the affected State has been conferred with the full responsibility to protect the 
victims in its territory, that means to attribute to the victim State the greater 
burden that cannot be delegated to others. On the other hand, each State has the 
primary role in managing humanitarian assistance at any stage77.  
The General Assembly confirmed this orientation in two following Resolutions 
where it asserted that the affected States have the “primary role in the initiation, 
organization, co-ordination and implementation of humanitarian assistance within 
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 See, International Court of Justice, Case concerning the military and paramilitary activities in 
and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America), Judgment 27 June 1986, p. 108 
para. 205. 
76
 See, UN General Assembly, A/RES/46/182, cit., Article 1.4. 
77
 See, J. Kokott, “States, Sovereign Equality”, in R. Wolfrum (ed.), Max Planck Encyclopaedia of 
Public International Law, Oxford University Press, 2007. 
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their respective territories”78. References to these tasks are drawn, inter alia, from 
Article 4 of the Tampere Convention which affirms that “nothing in this 
Convention shall interfere with the right of a State Party, under its national law, to 
direct, control, coordinate and supervise telecommunication assistance provided 
under this Convention within its territory”79. 
Even though there has been an increasing trend for self-management in many 
recent disasters, sometimes it may be highly demanding for the State to react to a 
severe catastrophe by using just its own resources. If the magnitude and duration 
of the emergency goes beyond the response capacity of the country, international 
cooperation to address emergency situations and to strengthen the response 
capacity of affected countries may be necessary. However, neither a duty to seek 
for nor a duty to accept international assistance have been so far established at 
level of customary international law which, instead, regulates the external access 
to the territory of a disaster-affected State just by stressing the necessity to respect 
its sovereignty and primacy. Accordingly, as stated again in Resolution 46/182, 
international humanitarian assistance should be provided just “with the consent of 
the affected country and in principle on the basis of an appeal by the affected 
country”80. Hence, assuming that disaster response falls within the jurisdiction of 
the State in whose territory the catastrophic event has occurred and that the 
exercise by a State of any form of sovereignty in the territory of a foreign State is 
a wrongful act81, whenever assistance from foreign States or international 
organizations is needed, it has to be requested or at least consented. Consent – as 
expression of State’s willingness – is thus conditio sine qua non for the initiation 
                                                          
78
 See, UN General Assembly, Humanitarian assistance to victims of natural disasters and similar 
emergency situations, Resolution A/RES/45/100, 14 December 1990, para. 2; UN General 
Assembly, Humanitarian assistance to victims of natural disasters and similar emergency 
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 See, Tampere Convention on the Provision of Telecommunication Resources for Disaster 
Mitigation and Relief Operation, 18 June 1998, p. 5. 
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addition, see Ki Gab Park, La protection des personnes en cas de catastrophe, Recueil des cours, 
2013, p. 348. 
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 See, International Law Commission, Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for 
Internationally Wrongful Acts, Fifty-third session, 2001, Article 20.  
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of a humanitarian operation and the territorial State should always manifest its 
agreement in some way82.  
Consequence of the affected State’s sovereignty is, moreover, the freedom to 
select the legal framework governing the provision of assistance: after the 
admission to the territory of the affected State, the national authorities determine 
extension and termination of the interventions by selecting those who can access 
to the territory as well as by specifying the goods and services required83.  
Furthermore, State sovereignty is reflected not only in the fact that national 
authorities have a positive right to request/accept external assistance, but also in 
their right to refuse offers of help. To date, it is still unclear whether customary 
international law prohibits arbitrary refusals of humanitarian assistance and, even 
though it could appear odd, there have been cases where national authorities have 
refused external intervention, albeit the needs clearly outstripped domestic 
capacities. Generally, this may happen when the affected State wants to preserve 
its image of national pride84 or to avoid potential interferences in their internal 
affairs. In this regard, it is noteworthy to recall that, after the passage of the 
Cyclone Nargis in late June 2008 and despite the scale of the emergency, the 
government of Myanmar imposed severe restrictions on humanitarian 
interventions and refused international offers of aid, insisting that only national 
authorities were supposed to guarantee assistance85.  
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 It is worth to underline that acquiescence, that is the acceptance by not arguing or formally 
requesting, is considered as a form of consent. See also, N. Ronzitti, “Use of Force, Jus Cogens 
and State Consent”, in A. Cassese (ed.), The Current Legal Regulation of the Use of Force, 
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 See, M. Costas Trascasas, “Access to the Territory of a Disaster-Affected State”, in A. De 
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 For further information, see R. Barber, “The Responsibility to Protect the Survivors of Natural 
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2009, pp. 3-34. 
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Notwithstanding it is legally reasonable that the affected State is the first and 
leading handler in ensuring protection since disaster response falls within its 
jurisdiction, a disproportionate State discretion risks, however, to increase the 
uncertainty on the capability to ensure appropriate interventions and, ultimately, 
to provide adequate humanitarian assistance to the victims. For a very long time, 
and in particular in the aftermath of the Nargis cyclone, the question on how to 
establish a duty to seek for external assistance for States in the context of disasters 
has thus been at the centre of the legal debates without, however, finding wide and 
deep consensus neither among the scholars nor among the States.   
Albeit the extreme discretion of the affected State acquires special relevance since 
the population to be protected is present in its territory, it cannot be neglected that 
some negative consequences may rise also because of the absence also of a clear 
duty to provide for assistance on the States of the international community once 
external aid is requested.  
 
2.2 Providing for assistance as a right of the States 
 
The principle of State sovereignty shapes not only the prerogatives of the national 
authorities of the affected State by establishing the mere right to seek for external 
assistance, but also those of third countries. Indeed, according to current 
customary international law, the latter do not have any duty to offer or provide for 
assistance when their intervention is requested by the affected State. Rather, they 
may freely decide whether or not to intervene without any constraint: ultimately, 
by excluding other international actors’ activities, the provision of international 
assistance is essentially based on the will of the States. Hence, for framing the 
present reasoning in the State sovereignty–international solidarity scheme, the 
concept of solidarity has not been so far translated into a legal obligation to 
intervene when a serious disaster occurs, but just into a right, or at least a moral 
duty, which cannot be legally challenged86.  
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Cross, Vol. 86, 2004, pp. 853-878. 
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From a practical point of view, the absence of a duty to provide for assistance can 
be reasonably motivated by the fact that, when a serious disaster occurs, not all 
the States of the international community have sufficient and adequate resources 
to be put at disposal of the affected State. From a legal point of view, the lack of a 
well-established duty to offer and to provide for assistance is indicative of the 
sovereignty-centred, rather than solidarity-centred, perspective adopted at 
international level. Moreover, the right to refrain from providing assistance is the 
natural consequence of the principle of primary responsibility of the affected State 
which makes the right of the non-affected States complementary to the duty of the 
affected one.  
This approach clearly reflects the traditional interpretation of international law as 
instrument to regulate the international community by imposing some obligations 
on a State vis-à-vis another State to which is attributed a corresponding right in a 
perspective of perfect reciprocity of rights and duties. Accordingly, under 
customary international law, the fundamental principle of State sovereignty does 
not operate just in relation to the affected State, but also to the other States of the 
international community thus preventing from acknowledging the existence of a 
legal duty to help another State following a natural disaster. It is, however, evident 
that this approach based on complementary is not actually fully balanced and the 
domination of the principle of State sovereignty in choosing whether and how to 
deal with a serious disaster risks to be in great tension with the need to guarantee 
humanitarian assistance and solidarity to the victims.  
This notwithstanding, practice shows that the existence of a simple right to 
intervene upon request of assistance has never prevented States from making 
significant donations of financial and in-kind resources. Conversely, when the 
national authorities seek for external assistance, States do generally provide for 
aid either for reasons of humanity or to advance their own national interests. It is, 
therefore, quite rare that potential assisting actors other than international 
organisations and NGOs do not intervene when the situation requires an 
immediate intervention. Besides, from a perspective of international law, it is 
worth underling the increasing acknowledgment of the liable nature of inter-States 
relations and the consolidated principle of cooperation enshrined also in the 
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Charter of the United Nations and in the declaration on Friendly Relations87. And, 
according to some authors, exactly the principle of cooperation which translates 
into a duty to cooperate with the authorities of the affected State could pave the 
way for the progressive establishment of a legal obligation to offer and to provide 
for assistance to the victims of a disaster. 
Assuming that in the last century there has been a sharp shift from an international 
landscape characterised by a mere coexistence among States to a more 
cooperative structure, the very International Law Commission (hereinafter ILC) 
has questioned on the existence of a duty to cooperate and, more specifically, 
whether it could imply a duty on States to provide assistance when requested by 
the affected State88. In fact, as Paolo Picone suggests, in some branches of 
international law – such as in international environmental law – the duty to 
cooperate already exists and contains some ‘instrumental’ obligations89. However, 
there is to say that such a result appears quite unrealistic because the duty to 
cooperate in the event of a disaster could establish not a proper duty to deliver 
assistance, but rather a set of secondary obligations on those States that have 
already decided to provide for assistance, such as the obligation to effectively 
cooperate with the national authorities and to respect the primary role of the 
affected State in the control over the delivery of assistance.  
Against this uncertain legal background, the vivid human rights doctrine which 
has developed over the last decades could be a proper starting point for reframing 
the principle of State sovereignty by placing at the centre the necessity to provide 
for urgent humanitarian assistance to the victims of a disaster. 
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 See, Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and 
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Assembly Resolution 2625 (XXV) of 24 October 1970. 
88
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 40 
 
2.3 A human rights-based approach for remodelling State sovereignty 
 
Over the last decades, many hypotheses have emerged to reconcile State 
sovereignty with the necessity to protect people in the event of a disaster, by 
resorting, inter alia, to human rights instruments90. Indeed, disaster-like situations 
“endanger life, health, physical integrity, or the right not to be subjected to cruel, 
inhuman or degrading treatment, or other fundamental human rights, or the 
essential needs of the population”91. As a consequence, as strongly stressed by the 
UN General Assembly, “the abandonment of the victims of natural disasters and 
similar emergency situations without humanitarian assistance constitutes a threat 
to human life and an offence to human dignity”92. 
The Covenant on Civil and Political Rights states that no one shall be arbitrarily 
deprived of his life and notes that this right may not be suspended even in case of 
a “public emergency that threatens the life of the nation” – which has been 
recognised to include “a natural catastrophe”93. The Human Rights Committee has 
thus interpreted the right to life as having both a positive and negative dimension, 
implying that States have an obligation to respect and above all to ensure respect 
for the right to life of all the individuals within their territory and subject to their 
jurisdiction94.  
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For what concerns socio-economic rights, the Covenant on Economic, Social, and 
Cultural Rights articulates, inter alia, the right “to an adequate standard of living 
(...) including adequate food, clothing and housing” as well as “the right to be free 
from hunger,” and the right to “the highest attainable standard of physical and 
mental health”95. In the General Comment No. 12 of 1999, the Committee on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights stated that: 
“the right to adequate food, like any other human right, imposes three types 
or levels of obligations on States parties: the obligations to respect, 
to protect and to fulfil. In turn, the obligation to fulfil incorporates both an 
obligation to facilitate and an obligation to provide. The obligation 
to respect existing access to adequate food requires States parties not to take 
any measures that result in preventing such access. The obligation 
to protect requires measures by the State to ensure that enterprises or 
individuals do not deprive individuals of their access to adequate food. The 
obligation to fulfil (facilitate)means the State must pro-actively engage in 
activities intended to strengthen people’s access to and utilization of 
resources and means to ensure their livelihood, including food security. 
Finally, whenever an individual or group is unable, for reasons beyond their 
control, to enjoy the right to adequate food by the means at their disposal, 
States have the obligation to fulfil (provide) that right directly. This 
obligation also applies for persons who are victims of natural or other 
disasters”96.  
The acknowledgement of this complex and substantial set of needs and rights 
which may acquire relevance in the event of a natural or man-made disaster has 
led to discuss on the opportunity to recognise a distinct right to humanitarian 
assistance in this kind of situations which would reframe States’ prerogatives in 
the field of disaster response.  
A number of international humanitarian organizations, like the Red Cross 
Movement, have struggled for its recognition, by affirming that “the right to 
receive humanitarian assistance, and to offer it, is a fundamental humanitarian 
                                                                                                                                                               
American Convention on Human Rights - “Pact of San José” (Articles 1 and 2). In addition, see, 
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 See, International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Arts. 11 and 12, 16 
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principle which should be enjoyed by all citizens of all countries”97. In addition, a 
high number of soft-law instruments expressly mention the right under 
examination, from the 1987 Resolution approved during the Première Conférence 
Internationale de Droit et Morale Humanitaire98, to the Principles on 
Humanitarian Assistance adopted by the San Remo International Institute of 
Humanitarian Law in 199299, the 1994 Code of Conduct for International Red 
Cross and Red Crescent Movements100 and the 2003 Bruges Resolution on 
Humanitarian Assistance101.  In particular, the latter proposed a definition of the 
concept of humanitarian assistance by stating that it “means all acts, activities and 
the human and material resources for the provision of goods and services of an 
exclusively humanitarian character, indispensable for the survival and the 
fulfilment of the essential needs of the victims of disasters”102. Moreover, some 
recent human rights treaties go in the direction of affirming such a right for 
victims of natural disasters. Clear outputs in this regard are represented by Article 
11 of the 2006 International Convention on the Rights of Persons with 
Disabilities103 which does affirm a right for internally displaced persons to seek 
humanitarian assistance and protection, and the African Charter on the Rights and 
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Welfare of the Child ensures humanitarian protection to internally displaced 
children in the wake of a disaster104. 
Nonetheless, the number of multilateral treaties making explicit reference to a 
right to humanitarian assistance is very limited and, with reference to customary 
law, despite States practice shows their willingness to render assistance, the 
existence of a right for victims of natural disasters to receive humanitarian aid is 
still far away. Thus, the de lege lata existence of a right to humanitarian assistance 
within international disaster law is not supported by general treaty or customary 
recognition and still remains unclear105. As summarized by the UN Secretary 
General “notwithstanding assertions of the existence of a generalised right to 
humanitarian assistance, such position, to the extent that is it imposes a duty on 
the international community to provide assistance is not yet definitely maintained 
as a matter of positive law at the global level”106. Accordingly, while a right to 
humanitarian assistance is well-anchored in hard law when it relates to civilians in 
situations of armed conflicts, the same cannot be said for those victims of 
disasters in times of peace. Even in the absence of a right to humanitarian 
assistance per se, there is no question that humanitarian assistance enjoys the 
support of the illustrated broad human rights law which makes it possible to create 
a corpus of positive obligations linked to humanitarian assistance applicable both 
on the affected State and on third countries.  
In general terms, the respect of those human rights upon which the notion of 
humanitarian assistance is based implies that the disaster-affected States maintain 
the peremptory obligation to respect, protect and fulfill all these rights, by 
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abstaining from any discrimination founded on “race, colour, sex, language, 
religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or 
other status”107. In a more specific way, the duty to take positive actions to protect 
the rights of the victims implies that States have a duty to ensure that the 
population affected by a crisis is adequately supplied with goods and services 
essential for its survival108. By consequence, if they are unable to do so or their 
efforts fail, the national authorities should allow third parties to provide the 
required relief supplies and not refuse bona fide offers. The European Court of 
Human Rights has also delivered some significant judgements in this respect by 
stating that the victims of a disaster may invoke vis-á-vis their State a right to 
protection deriving from the fundamental right to life109. Similarly, third countries 
would have a duty to ensure the respect of the victims’ rights by responding to 
requests of assistance and deploying the resources that they have at disposal in 
order to provide adequate support to the victims.  
In a broader perspective, some scholars have also invoked the doctrine of the 
Responsibility to Protect (RtoP)110 in order to establish a duty to protect the 
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affected population thereby implicitly pushing for the acknowledgement of a duty 
to seek and to provide for assistance, but its limited scope of application has 
prevented RtoP from being considered of any help in clarifying the issue of 
humanitarian intervention in the event of a catastrophe. Moreover, in order to 
justify a possible external intervention without the consent of the affected State, 
more than one commentator has proposed to resort to the existence of erga omnes 
obligations which, according to the Barcelona Traction case111, relate to concerns 
of the whole international community thus legitimating States to intervene in their 
protection112. This is also revealed in the content of the Maastricht Principles on 
Extra Territorial Obligations of States that, despite having a not binding nature, 
represent a very important soft-law instrument to defining and clarifying the 
positive extraterritorial obligations of States on the protection of human rights113. 
One of the key conceptual foundation of the Maastricht Principles is that the 
human rights obligations of States are not applicable only within their own 
borders but extend also to extraterritorial situations. The acknowledgement of 
such extraterritorial obligations would be as well a practical way to comply with 
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the elementary considerations of humanity that have been recognised by the ICJ in 
the Corfu Channel case114.  
In order to verify whether such a human rights-based approach has somehow 
remodelled the principle of State sovereignty thereby establishing duties of 
solidarity which translate into specific duties of assistance, it is now appropriate to 
go through the work of the International Law Commission (hereinafter ILC) on 
the protection of persons in the event of a disaster adopted on second reading in 
2016.  
 
3. The work of the ILC on the “Protection of Persons in the Event of 
Disasters”: in search of duties of solidarity 
 
After the launch of the International Disaster Response Laws, Rules, and 
Principles (IDRL) Programme by the IFRC in 2001, the UN General Assembly 
has encouraged its use as means able to improve the international cooperation in 
disaster relief115. The first proposal to study the topic at issue was recommended 
to the attention of the ILC in 2006 and included within the category ‘new 
developments in international law and pressing concerns of the international 
community as a whole’ starting from the following year116. In 2007, the 
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Commission decided to include the issue in its programme of work and to appoint 
Mr. Eduardo Valencia-Ospina as Special Rapporteur117.  
The plan was to elaborate a set of provisions establishing a legal framework for 
the conduct of international disaster relief activities, by clarifying the core legal 
principles and concepts and thereby creating a legal ‘space’ in which such disaster 
relief work could take place on a secure footing. However, since the beginning, 
the Commission has been well aware that it would have proved to be an exercise 
de lege ferenda, as many aspects of disaster response are subject to dissimilar 
practice by States. This meant that the establishment of clear rules could be put in 
place through a progressive development of the law, and not only by the strict 
codification of lex lata118.  
After about ten years of work and the adoption of a first set of articles on first 
reading in 2014, in August 2016 the Commission completed on second reading a 
full set of eighteen Draft Articles (hereinafter also DAs) with commentary on the 
“Protection of persons in the event of disasters” and, in accordance with article 23 
of its statute119,  recommended to the UN General Assembly the elaboration of a 
convention based on the draft articles thereof120. Consequently, the work of the 
ILC appears relevant not only for its attempt to overcome the legal uncertainties 
which still characterise international disaster law by proposing elements of 
progressive development, but also because it represents the concrete starting point 
for the elaboration of a universal flagship treaty in this field. 
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3.1. Content of the Draft Articles as adopted by the ILC on second reading 
 
The Draft Articles endeavour to provide a legal systematization of the main issues 
and “to facilitate the adequate and effective response to disasters, and reduction of 
the risk of disasters, so as to meet the essential needs of the persons concerned, 
with full respect for their rights” (DA 2). In a nutshell, this provision encompasses 
some of the main topics addressed and challenges faced in the law-making 
process due to diverging perspectives.  
First of all, the Commission had to tackle the hard task to frame the field of 
analysis and, thus, to identify the legal definition of the term ‘disaster’121. Initially, 
it was proposed to limit the scope ratione materiae to natural disasters or to 
natural components of broader emergencies, since perceived as more immediate 
need122. However, it was soon recognised that to establish a clear-cut distinction 
between natural and man-made catastrophes was both practically and logically 
difficult, given the lack of a generally accepted definition of the term ‘disaster’ in 
international law. Therefore, in his Preliminary Report, Mr. Valencia-Ospina 
proposed a broader approach by observing that, since it is not always possible to 
maintain a clear delineation among causal factors, it was inappropriate to 
distinguish among various types of disasters because of their different origins. 
Besides, he stressed that “the need for protection can be said to be equally strong 
in all disaster situations”123 and, as a consequence, it was approved to widen the 
scope of the analysis, by considering all different kinds of disasters, including 
‘complex emergencies’, with the exception of armed conflicts per se124. By taking 
into account these elements, the definition of the term ‘disaster’ adopted by the 
ILC reads as follows: “a calamitous event or series of events resulting in 
                                                          
121
 See, G. Bartolini, “La definizione di disastro nel progetto di articoli della Commissione del 
diritto internazionale”, in Rivista di Diritto Internazionale, Vol. 98, 2015, p. 156.  
122
 See, UN Doc. A/61/10, cit., Annex C, para. 2.  
123
 See, UN Doc. A/CN.4/598 para. 49.  
124
 Indeed, Article 18 of the Draft Articles denies any application of the dispositions in question in 
case of armed conflict by laying down that “the present draft articles do not apply to situations to 
which the rules of international humanitarian law are applicable”. For comments, see G. Bartolini, 
“Il progetto di articoli della Commissione del diritto internazionale sulla « Protection of Persons in 
the Event of Disasters »”, in Rivista di Diritto Internazionale, Vol. C, Fasc. 3, pp. 667-719. 
 49 
 
widespread loss of life, great human suffering and distress, mass displacement, or 
large-scale material or environmental damage, thereby seriously disrupting the 
functioning of society”125.  
At first sight, while encompassing only particularly significant events, this 
definition welcomes a very broad approach, by indicating separated but 
substantially all-embracing types of possible adverse effects, including 
environmental damage. The reference to a ‘calamitous’ event has then served to 
establish a threshold, by referring to the nature of the event, whereby only extreme 
events are covered, as embodied in the Resolution on Humanitarian Assistance 
adopted by the Institute of International Law. However, no limitation is included 
regarding the origin of the event, i.e. whether they are natural or man-made, thus 
recognizing the fact that disasters are often caused by a complex set of causes that 
can include both natural elements and contributions of human activities. 
Moreover, nothing is said about the necessity that the event has a cross-border 
character for the purpose of the Draft Articles. The Commission, therefore, 
wanted to avoid the limitations imposed by some treaties applicable only in cases 
of disasters due to human activities such as technological ones, or, on the 
contrary, just in case of natural events, such as the South Asian Association for 
Regional Cooperation (SAARC) Treaty126. It is then relevant to note that the ILC 
comprises also those calamitous events which do not cause necessarily human 
suffering, but also just destruction or loss of goods, property and environmental 
damage. Indeed, also a strict environmental disaster requires the protection of 
individuals because, as stated by the International Court of Justice, “the 
environment is not an abstraction, but represents the living space, quality of life 
and the same health of humans, including unborn generations”127. Material and 
environmental losses are thus inextricably linked to human life and health so that 
protection of individuals is justified following the occurrence of such events.  
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Ratione temporis, the scope of the DAs covers not only disaster response, but also 
the pre- and the post-disaster phases thus paying attention to the legal dimension 
of the overall disaster-cycle as enshrined by the 2015 Sendai Framework for 
Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR) endorsed by the UN General Assembly128. It is 
not a coincidence that DA 9 identifies the obligation for each State to “reduce the 
risk of disasters by taking appropriate measures”, and to act primarily at the 
domestic level “to prevent, mitigate, and prepare for disasters”. This provision 
represents therefore a cornerstone of the text, rendering it capable of 
complementing non-binding approaches pursued at the international level such as 
the very Sendai Framework.  
Such an extended temporal perspective is also visible in the scope ratione loci of 
the DAs which is not limited to the activities performed in the areas where the 
disaster occurs, but also covers those within assisting States and transit States, and 
more in general the international community as a whole when DDR measures 
must be implemented. Finally, concerning the scope ratione personae, the DAs do 
not limit their application to States, but do take into account also all the different 
actors that may be involved in the whole disaster-cycle management, such as 
intergovernmental organizations, as well as NGOs and other non-State entities 
which enjoy specific competences in providing relief and assistance129.  
According to the Commentary provided by the ILC, the legal core of the Draft 
Articles is built on a strong human rights-based approach which frames and 
interprets the relationship between rights and obligations according to a vertical 
and horizontal perspective: rights and obligations of States towards persons in 
need of protection on the one hand, and rights and obligations among States on 
the other hand.  
In dealing with the vertical approach, the ILC has intended to establish a general 
framework of reference which embodied the increasing positive tension towards 
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 See, Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015-2030, A/CONF.224/CRP.1, 18 
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 In this regard it is noteworthy the outstanding role played by the EU which, from its very first 
comments, insisted on and obtained the explicit inclusion of the expression ‘other assisting actors’ 
to identify those international bodies offering assistance in the aftermath of a disaster alongside 
States. See, International Law Commission, Sixth report of the Special Rapporteur on the 
protection of persons in the event of disasters, UN Doc. A/CN.4/662, 2013, para. 101-108. 
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the need to respect and protect some fundamental human rights. Accordingly, DA 
4130 addresses the principle of human dignity as the core principle that underpins 
international human rights law. In the context of the protection of persons in the 
event of disasters, human dignity is situated as a guiding principle both for any 
action to be taken in the context of the provision of relief, and in the ongoing 
evolution of laws addressing disaster response. Its complexity is then reflected in 
the combined use of the terms ‘respect and protect’ which connote both the 
negative obligation to refrain from injuring the inherent dignity of the human 
person and the positive obligation to take action to protect human dignity.  
The intimate connection between human rights and the principle of human dignity 
resides in DA 5131 which seeks to reflect the broad entitlement to human rights 
protection held by those persons affected by disasters. Moreover, in the 
Commentary to the Draft Articles it is underlined that the general reference to 
‘human rights’ indicates the intention to refer to the broad field of human rights 
obligations, without seeking to specify, add to, or qualify those obligations. This 
is also confirmed by the inclusion of the expression “in accordance with 
international law”, that includes those provisions set in international treaties and 
reflected in customary international law, as well as assertions of best practices and 
soft law instruments concerning the protection of human rights132. Last but not 
least, DA 6133 conveys the rationale underpinning the Draft Articles, i.e. the 
protection of persons during humanitarian assistance operations in the event of 
disasters by extending the key humanitarian principles applicable to humanitarian 
interventions, that are the principles of humanity, neutrality and impartiality, also 
to disaster situations. Besides these cardinal principles, the Commission has also 
included the principle of non-discrimination on the grounds of ethnic origin, sex, 
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 See, Draft Article 4: “The inherent dignity of the human person shall be respected and protected 
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 See, Draft Article 5: “Persons affected by disasters are entitled to the respect for and protection 
of their human rights in accordance with international law”. 
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 See, UN Doc. A/71/10, cit., p. 31. 
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 See, Draft Article 6: “Response to disasters shall take place in accordance with the principles of 
humanity, neutrality and impartiality, and on the basis of non-discrimination, while taking into 
account the needs of the particularly vulnerable”.  
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nationality, political opinions, race, and religion134 as already stated by the 
Institute of International Law in its 2003 resolution.  
In order to ensure adequate protection to the victims of a disaster according to the 
above-mentioned requirements, the ILC has thus introduced some specific 
provisions on States’ duties by making international solidarity and cooperation 
functional elements of the whole legal architecture. As proof of this, the first and 
foremost duty on States enshrined in the work of the ILC is that to cooperate (DA 
7)135. Even though the identification of a specific international obligation in this 
area has not been welcomed by some States that have challenged the very 
existence of a duty to cooperate under international law, the ILC did not take into 
account their concerns. In fact, as made evident in its Commentary, cooperation, 
as well-established principle of international law, is a conditio sine qua non to 
successful relief actions because of the multiple actors involved in international 
disaster relief efforts, usually including several States as well as potentially 
numerous relief organizations136. Draft Article 8137 seeks then to clarify the 
various forms which cooperation among assisting actors may take in the context 
of the protection of persons in the event of disasters by providing a non-
exhaustive list of illustrative instruments. Clearly, the forms of cooperation to be 
deployed depend on a range of factors, including, inter alia, the nature of the 
disaster, the needs of the affected persons, and the capacities of the affected State 
and other assisting actors involved.  
                                                          
134
 It is worth to underline that, according to the ILC, this list is not exhaustive as can include other 
grounds of discrimination, as affirmed inter alia in the 1949 Geneva Conventions, common Art. 3, 
para. 1; Universal Declaration of Human Rights, General Assembly resolution 217 (III) of 10 
December 1948, Art. 2; International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Art. 2, para. 1; 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Art. 2, para. 2. See, UN Doc. 
A/71/10, cit., p. 34. 
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 See, Draft Article 7: “In the application of the present draft articles, States shall, as appropriate, 
cooperate among themselves, with the United Nations, with the components of the Red Cross and 
Red Crescent Movement, and with other assisting actors.”. 
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 See, UN Doc. A/71/10, cit., p. 36. 
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 See, Draft Article 8: “Cooperation in the response to disasters includes humanitarian assistance, 
coordination of international relief actions and communications, and making available relief 
personnel, equipment and goods, and scientific, medical and technical resources”. 
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Such a horizontal perspective, which inextricably links all the subjects involved in 
disaster response, is evident also in the following provisions which, according to a 
‘check and balances’ structure138, establish duties both on the affected State and 
on the assisting actors.  
In particular, DA 10139, para. 1, reflects the obligation of an affected State to 
protect persons and to provide disaster relief and assistance in accordance with 
international law and, in para. 2, entrusts the affected State with the primary role 
in disaster relief assistance. But, for the purposes of the present work, the most 
relevant provision is contained in DA 11140 which prescribes on the affected State 
a clear duty to seek for assistance when it is unable to cope with the consequences 
of an overwhelming disaster. In order to rebalance this strong obligation, DA 
13141 introduces the crucial requirement of consent of the affected State to 
external assistance thereby creating a qualified ‘consent regime’ in the field of 
disaster relief operations. However, it also stipulates that consent to external 
assistance shall not be withheld arbitrarily thus trying to overcome the general 
unclear position of international law in this issue. Therefore, as specified in the 
ILC Commentary to the Draft Articles, an eventual withholding of international 
assistance may be justified when it is exercised in good faith, i.e. whether the 
affected State is capable and willing to provide an adequate and effective response 
to a disaster on the basis of its own resources, when the affected State has 
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 See, G. Bartolini, “The Draft Articles on “The Protection of Persons in the Event of Disasters”: 
Towards a Flagship Treaty?”, in EJIL Talk, 2 December 2016, available at 
https://www.ejiltalk.org/the-draft-articles-on-the-protection-of-persons-in-the-event-of-disasters-
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 See, Draft Article 10: “1. The affected State has the duty to ensure the protection of persons and 
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2. The affected State has the primary role in the direction, control, coordination and supervision of 
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 See, Draft Article 11: “To the extent that a disaster manifestly exceeds its national response 
capacity, the affected State has the duty to seek assistance from, as appropriate, other States, the 
United Nations, and other potential assisting actors”:  
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 See, Draft Article 13: “The provision of external assistance requires the consent of the affected 
State. 2. Consent to external assistance shall not be withheld arbitrarily. 3. When an offer of 
external assistance is made in accordance with the present draft articles, the affected State shall, 
whenever possible, make known its decision regarding the offer in a timely manner.” 
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accepted appropriate and sufficient assistance from elsewhere or, lastly, in case of 
no bona fide offers142.  
As a complement to the provisions concerning rights and duties of the affected 
State, the Draft Articles try also to clarify the position of the assisting actors. In 
particular, DA 12143 introduces the opportunity for States, the United Nations, and 
other potential assisting actors to offer assistance and, whenever a request of help 
is made by the affected State, the obligation to give due consideration to the 
request and inform the national authorities about their decision. As for the rules 
dealing with ‘operational provisions’ regarding international assistance, the 
subsequent DAs provide general points of reference. Indeed, they combine the 
interests of affected States, with regard to issues such as the quality of 
assistance144 with those of the assisting actors, whose activities should be 
facilitated by the very affected State145, as well as in terms of the protection of 
relief personnel, equipment and goods146. Finally, DA 17147 explores the 
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 Moreover, Draft Article 15 addresses the establishment of conditions by affected States on the 
provision of external assistance on their territory. It affirms the right of affected States to place 
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protection of relief personnel and of equipment and goods present in its territory, or in territory 
under its jurisdiction or control, for the purpose of providing external assistance.” 
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termination of assistance, by improving the content of the provision adopted on 
the first reading in order to favour the appropriate management of this critical 
phase, which might negatively affect the victims of disasters. 
 
3.2 A critical assessment of the ILC Draft Articles 
 
The project of the ILC certainly represents an important contribution to the 
development of a corpus iuris applicable in case of disasters, either as a tool for 
the determination of rules of law or, possibly, as a formal source of international 
law. However, the future outcome of the DAs is difficult to predict and everything 
will depend on the comments that will be received by States in view of the 2018 
UN General Assembly sessions. As matter of the fact, the UNGA’s long-
established reluctance to adopt treaties on the basis of the draft articles elaborated 
by the ILC discourages this possibility. Moreover, not all the States are fully in 
agreement with the final content of the DAs which, apparently, seems to downsize 
the principle of State sovereignty by imposing stringent duties on States. But, 
even though the DAs are characterised by a great deal of lights and positive 
elements, it is impossible to ignore that the very content of the DAs reveals that 
the traditional approach which places sovereignty at the centre of the whole legal 
architecture is still very strong.   
The first point to be tackled concerns the definitional elements adopted by the 
ILC. Indeed, although it looks at already established treaty and customary law, 
DA 3 presents some important weaknesses. On one hand, unlike the Tampere 
Convention, the project adopted makes no distinction with the so-called sudden-
onset emergencies, identifiable in the classic hypothesis of an earthquake or 
volcanic eruptions, as well as with the slow-onset calamities such as drought and 
famine. It is thus left unexplored the applicability of its rules to situations other 
than one single episode. Therefore, a more precise explanation could be useful to 
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 See, Draft Article 17: “The affected State, the assisting State, the United Nations, or other 
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termination of external assistance and the modalities of termination.” 
 56 
 
have a wider panorama of the circumstances the DAs apply on. On the other hand, 
nor the text of DA 3 nor the Commentary make clear the meaning of the 
additional criterion to the simple occurring of a calamity, that is the serious 
disruption of the functioning of the society. Although already present in some 
international legal instruments, such as the notable Tampere Convention, the 
concept of ‘society’ may arise some doubts and different assessments. In this 
regard, it should be clarified whether this term refers to the national community 
or, conversely, to the more restricted geographical areas and communities directly 
affected by the event148. Even though it could seem just a detail, from a juridical 
and practical point of view this distinction is extremely relevant to determine 
when and, consequently, how to organise the intervention. It is clear that if the 
term ‘society’ refers to the entire national population, the margin of 
implementation of the DAs is particularly narrow.  
Besides these critical points relating to the definitions, a more attentive analysis of 
the DAs reveals a number of shortcomings which necessarily are the result of the 
ILC’s efforts to give due consideration to the positions of all the involved actors. 
As already pointed out, the project approved on second reading is clearly 
structured in a logical way, starting from a rights-based approach and going 
through some obligations which are strictly linked to this general standpoint. 
However, the Draft Articles do not seem to address all the issues that many 
scholars deemed as relevant.  
First of all, despite in its preliminary report, Mr. Valencia-Ospina acknowledged 
the importance of the existence of a right to humanitarian assistance, in order to 
preserve the long-established understanding of sovereignty and non-
intervention149, the Commission has not mentioned it in the last version thereby 
missing the opportunity to make reference to humanitarian assistance as a right 
                                                          
148
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per se150. In addition, the assertion that people affected by disasters shall be 
protected and respected in their dignity and rights appears too vague, by 
remaining more a declaration of principles than a binding rule. Indeed, it is not 
clear which kind of rights are more significant than others for the ultimate purpose 
of the DAs that is to provide a secure legal space for ensure protection to the 
victims of a disaster.  
There is no doubt that, as stressed in para. 2.3 of the present chapter, it is possible 
to deduce, in general terms, a list of rights applicable in case of catastrophe from 
other international legal instruments. But, with a view to the intention of 
elaborating a universal treaty on disaster law, it would have been better if the 
work of the ILC had been more comprehensive in illustrating the role played by 
human dignity and rights in a more practical way. Moreover, the adopted drafting 
technique leaves some issues unresolved, i.e. regarding human rights derogations 
and limitations, rights relevant in case of disaster, extraterritoriality, as well as 
their application vis-à-vis international organizations and NGOs which could be 
properly addressed in the Commentary151. An inevitable result of such a weakness 
is the lack of any indication about the viable consequences that may flow from a 
violation of such rights, including the ability of rights holders to claim their own 
rights, thereby leaving this central issue completely unregulated. Therefore, 
despite the purpose of the draft articles is the facilitation of an adequate and 
effective response to disasters by taking in account the essential needs and rights 
of the persons concerned, it cannot be said that the result follows a strictly rights-
based approach or that at least it clarifies its legal implications.  
With reference to the second part of the DAs concerning the horizontal 
relationship between the affected State and the assisting actors, it is noteworthy 
the way found by the ILC for balancing ‘the stick and the carrot’. As for the 
affected State, the ILC has adopted a reasoning essentially based on the principle 
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of State sovereignty but perceived according to another perspective. Indeed, 
alongside the primary role of the national authorities in directing, controlling, 
coordinating and supervising relief assistance, DA 10 introduces a positive duty to 
protect the persons within the affected territory thus making sovereignty source of 
duties and not just of prerogatives. Similarly, while DA 11 introduces the crucial 
obligation to seek for assistance when the disaster manifestly exceeds the national 
response capacity of the affected State, it retains the power to refuse, even though 
in bona fide, external assistance. As for third countries and other assisting actors, 
while they have the right to offer assistance before the affected State requires for 
it, at a later stage they have to give due considerations to the requests made by the 
affected State thus apparently implying that just in reasonable situations they are 
justified not to provide help.  
Apart from these positive innovations which mark a very important step forward 
in the field of international disaster law, the mentioned provisions contain some 
elements that should need further explanation. On the first place, despite the 
notable introduction of a duty to seek for assistance as primary obligation of 
international law, DA 11 fails to deal with three dimensions of this obligation. 
First of all, the criteria to establish the gravity of the disaster and whether the 
internal capacity of a State has been exceeded should be expounded thus avoiding 
rely just on a self-determinative test which excludes any potential external 
evaluation. In some occasions the UN agencies or relevant international 
organisations could be, instead, in a better position than the affected State to make 
such an assessment because of their technical capacity and expertise. Secondly, it 
would have been welcomed some kind of reference to the existence of a room of 
manoeuvre for the ILC to progressively argue for an implicit request or implicit 
acceptance of international assistance by the affected State in some extreme cases. 
Even more important, it turns out the problem arisen with regard to the human 
rights provision, that is the lack of some elaboration on the legal consequences 
stemming from the violation of the duty to seek for assistance.  
Moreover, even though the ILC has acknowledged that States’ domestic sphere is 
by no means absolute, State consent remains a necessary requirement and 
prerequisite for external interventions of disaster relief. A similar provision is 
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contained in the UN General Assembly Resolution 46/182152, but while it 
affirmed that assistance should be provided with State’s consent, DA 12 
establishes a clear requirement. Hence, the problem of State consent and 
discretion, that in principle is justifiable and understandable but that may de facto 
limit the provision of assistance to the victims of a disaster in countries reluctant 
to open the doors to external actors, has not been overcome. On the contrary, it 
has been reinforced and put as limit to the scope both of the duty to cooperate and 
of the duty to seek for assistance. The only restriction is contained in DA 12, para. 
2, which establishes that consent to external assistance shall not be withheld 
arbitrarily, thereby reflecting “the dual nature of sovereignty as entailing both 
rights and obligations”153. Despite in the Commentary the ILC underscores that 
both the refusal of assistance and the failure of an affected State in mala fide 
constitutes a violation of the DAs, major problems remain again with reference to 
who can legitimately evaluate the arbitrariness of a refusal and, ultimately, what 
may be the possible legal consequences arising out from its violation. This means 
that, despite the events in Myanmar, the Commission has failed to go beyond the 
well-established construction of international law which focuses on State 
sovereignty.  
Against this background, it is doubtful also what the international community can 
do and what kind of measures can take if the State stricken by a disaster is unable 
or unwilling to ask for external assistance. In this regard, it is necessary to stress 
that DA 12 is quite vague for a number of details which concern both the offer 
and the provision of assistance that, naturally, set themselves on two different 
stages. As established and described in DA 12, para. 1, the contribution of the 
international community in the first stage relies just on a right, exemplified by the 
expression “may offer”, and is thus left to the discretion of the assisting actors. 
Moreover, the wording of para. 2 does not clarifies whether they have or not a 
duty to provide assistance when requested by the affected State. Actually, the 
structure and the content of DA 12 suggest that the assisting entities continue to 
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have just a right, or at least a moral duty, “to give due consideration” and provide 
for assistance. This is also substantiated by very confused character of DA 12 with 
regard the identification of the assisting entities. Indeed, not all the actors 
involved are on the same foot under international law, especially when the 
principle of sovereignty is concerned: only States and International Organizations 
could be responsible for unlawful acts against a State, whereas the same could not 
be said for NGOs. As a consequence, it would be unrealistic to interpret DA 12, 
para.2, as introducing a legal duty to provide assistance on all the mentioned 
assisting actors.  
This conclusion confirms the asymmetric structure which, actually, characterises 
the whole DAs: while on the one hand, the affected State has to respect a number 
of obligations, including that to seek for assistance, the other international 
subjects, and in particular third countries, have just a right to respond to the 
requests of assistance provided by the affected State itself. Hence, despite the 
introduction of a clear duty to seek for assistance as additional element of State 
sovereignty, it cannot be ignored that the project of the ILC reflects a strong 
imbalance between rights and obligations on States which ultimately risks, in this 
game of consent and sovereignty, to limit the provision of an effective and 
adequate assistance to the affected people needing help. Whenever the draft 
articles were used to embark in a treaty-making process, the final outcome would 
not entail well-balanced duties of solidarity on States.  
Against this uncertain international legal framework which is still anchored to the 
principle of State sovereignty over solidarity, regional integration organisations, 
which have been included, by the way, within the scope ratione personae of the 
DAs, may play a very relevant role not only from a practical, but also from a legal 
point of view. Indeed, as regulatory regimes based on cooperation, they might be 
perfect hubs both for establishing instruments of interventions in the event of a 
disaster, and in extreme cases for reshaping States prerogatives and introducing, 
inter alia, specific duties of solidarity among the Member States for the sake of 
the very cooperation process. Moreover, if they are in possession of adequate 
instruments, regional organisations could play in the future a relevant role in the 
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field of disaster response thereby becoming themselves subjected to obligations of 
solidarity.  
 
4. Regional cooperation in responding to disasters: a stairway to solidarity? 
 
Over recent decades, regional and sub-regional organisations have increased their 
role in lawmaking for supporting States as well as external actors on disaster 
preparedness and response. Clearly, they differ in terms of effective capacities and 
systems of coordination, but their contribution is becoming noteworthy with 
particular reference to the opportunity to establish regional mechanisms of 
coordination as well as specific regulatory frameworks on financial and in-kind 
assistance.  
 
a) Disaster response in the Americas 
 
There are many regional organisations in Latin America and the Caribbean 
focused on a variety of issues such as governance, development, health, education 
and poverty alleviation, that have also long supported comprehensive disaster 
management policies and tools. The first one to be presented is the Organisation 
of American States (OAS)154 which in 1991 adopted the Inter-American 
Convention to Facilitate Disaster Assistance that entered into force in 1996155. 
The Convention sets out modalities for requests and offers of assistance between 
Member States in the event of a disaster, by committing them to designate 
national coordinating authorities to manage humanitarian assistance within their 
jurisdiction, and calling for, inter alia, the affected States to provide a number of 
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facilities to assisting States, including easing the entry of personnel, goods and 
equipment, providing for their security, and shielding them and their personnel 
from liability in national courts156. Moreover, the Convention requires assisting 
States and their personnel to cover their own costs, respect any designated 
restricted areas and abide by national law157. The Inter-American Convention is 
not, however, addressed just to States but also to non-State actors, such as 
humanitarian NGOs, if they have an express agreement with the affected State or 
if they are ‘included’ within the mission of an assisting State. Notwithstanding the 
great potentiality of this Convention, to date, just six parties (Panama, Peru, 
Uruguay Colombia, Dominican Republic and Nicaragua) have ratified it158. 
Furthermore, apparently it has never been implemented, despite in 2007 the 
representatives of the OAS secretariat recommended the States to consider 
reviving their interest in the convention, with regard to both its ratification and 
implementation159.  
At sub-regional level, the most notable example of normative instrument dealing 
with disaster management is the Agreement Establishing the Caribbean Disaster 
Emergency Response Agency (CDERA)160 from the Member States of the 
Caribbean Community (CARICOM). The Agreement entrusts the Agency to build 
national capacities for disaster response, but also to coordinate regional assistance 
efforts by serving as intermediary with other governmental and non-governmental 
organisations providing for relief161. For their part, Member States commit 
themselves to undertake a number of steps to ensure that their national disaster 
response systems are adequately prepared, both institutionally and legally, to deal 
with disasters within their borders and also to provide external assistance upon 
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request by CDERA’s coordinator162. To guarantee more effective inter-State 
assistance, the parties are expected to reduce legal barriers to the entry of 
personnel and goods, provide protection and immunity from liability and taxation 
to assisting States and their relief personnel, and facilitate transit to third countries 
affected by disasters163. Moreover, assisting States and their personnel shall 
comply with national law, thus maintaining the confidentiality of sensitive 
information, deploying military forces only with the express consent of the 
affected State, and covering their own costs164. Finally, the 1991 agreement 
provides for the establishment of an Emergency Assistance Fund for use to 
finance the expenses in disaster assistance. Currently, the CDERA Agreement 
counts sixteen Member States165 and is comprised of a Council of heads of State, 
a board of directors consisting of the directors of national disaster agencies, four 
regional focal points and a secretariat as coordinating unit. In recent years, its 
work has turned increasingly towards disaster risk reduction and, as a result, 
discussions are now underway to amend the CDERA Agreement to give it a 
greater orientation also in that direction.  
In the same vein, in 1999, the Association of Caribbean States (ACS), adopted its 
own treaty for regional cooperation on natural disasters (hereinafter, ACS 
Agreement)166. In comparison to the CDERA Agreement, the ACS Agreement 
contains much more aspirations and ideal achievements rather than concrete 
binding norms. Indeed, according to the text of the agreement, Member States are 
encouraged to promote “the formulation and implementation of standards and 
laws, policies and programmes for the management and prevention of natural 
disasters, in a gradual and progressive manner” and identify “common guidelines 
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and criteria”, inter alia, on the classification and management of humanitarian 
supplies and donations. From a practical point of view, the agreement would 
assign the already existing ACS’s Special Committee responsible for natural 
disasters with a number of tasks to facilitate information sharing and technical 
assistance between Member States. But, notwithstanding the encouragement to 
reach the necessary ratifications for its entry into force (that, according to Article 
of the ACS Agreement shall be seventeen), the ACS Agreement currently has 
fifteen ratifications and, therefore, it is still lacking binding force.  
 
b) Disaster response in Asia 
 
Given the vastness of the Asiatic region, which includes also the Pacific, and the 
tendency to suffer from devastating natural disasters there is no a single region-
wide instrument, but several important sub-regional instruments and mechanisms 
which have been promoted to reinforce co-operation in the area of disaster 
management167. Among the others, it is firstly relevant to recall the Asian Disaster 
Reduction Centre located in Kobe that have been created in 1998 with the mission 
to enhance disaster resilience of the twenty-nine Member States168 to build safe 
communities, and to create a society where sustainable development is possible. 
Another instrument which has proved to be quite successful at continental level is 
the biennial Asian Ministerial Conference on Disaster Risk Reduction 
(AMCDRR) which meets since 2005 and is open to participation by national 
governments, international interested institutions and other stakeholders, 
including representatives of relevant NGO and civil society organizations. Over 
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the years, it has been effective in promoting public awareness of the need for 
increased cooperation and speeding up the preparation of national action plans. 
At sub-regional level, the most remarkable instruments have been developed 
within the Association of South-east Asian Nations (ASEAN) which in 1976 
made their first joint commitment to “extend, within their capabilities, assistance 
for relief of Member States in distress”169. In the same year, they adopted the 
Declaration on mutual assistance on natural disasters, by committing to take the 
necessary administrative steps to facilitate the movement of relief vehicles, 
personnel, goods and equipment towards the affected State170. Similarly, three 
years later, ASEAN adopted the binding Agreement on the Food Security 
Reserve, committing Members to maintaining dedicated food stocks in case of 
emergency in another Member State171. In order to give more effectiveness to the 
1976 Declaration, in 2003 the Committee on Disaster Management (ACDM) has 
been created for assuming overall responsibility for coordinating and 
implementing regional activities. One of the major results achieved by the ACDM 
has been the launching of an ASEAN Regional Programme on Disaster 
Management (ARPDM) to provide a framework for cooperation and to create a 
platform for collaboration between ASEAN and other relevant international 
organizations, such as the Pacific Disaster Centre, the United Nations Office for 
Co-ordination of Humanitarian Affairs, UNHCR, UNICEF and IFRC.  
In July 2005, ASEAN adopted a second and more comprehensive treaty in this 
area, the Agreement on Disaster Management and Emergency Response 
(hereinafter, ‘the ASEAN Agreement’)172. The ASEAN Agreement sets out six 
overarching principles which deserve to be mentioned because reflect the whole 
international approach illustrated in the present chapter: respect for national 
sovereignty; the overall direction and control of relief by the affected State; 
strengthening regional cooperation; priority to prevention and mitigation; 
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mainstreaming disaster risk reduction in development; and involving local 
communities and civil society disaster planning. Against this background, it is 
particularly significant that the ASEAN Agreement establishes a number of 
specific measures related to smoothing barriers to international response that 
include the identification of available assets, specific procedures for requests and 
offers of disaster assistance, provisions on the direction and control of both 
civilian and military assistance, as well as important new institutional measures, 
including the establishment of an emergency fund and a new ASEAN 
Coordinating Centre for Humanitarian Assistance on Disaster Management173. 
Moreover, under the Agreement, affected States commit themselves to “facilitate 
the entry into, stay in and departure from its territory of personnel and of 
equipment, facilities and materials involved or used in the assistance”; protect 
assistance personnel, goods and equipment; and provide them other “local 
facilities and services for the proper and effective administration of the 
assistance”174. Assisting entities – which include both States and international 
organisations – are committed to ensure that their relief goods “meet the quality 
and validity requirements of the Parties concerned for consumption and 
utilization;” and to refrain from “any action or activity incompatible with the 
nature and purpose” of the Agreement175.  
The ASEAN Agreement entered into force on 24 December 2009 and a number of 
measures of implementation have already begun. Similar instruments have been 
adopted by the members of the SAARC which in 2006 have created the Disaster 
Management Centre in New Delhi. Moreover, the SAARC has worked on an 
agreement outlining a Natural Disaster Rapid Response Mechanism that has been 
signed in the Maldives, on November 2011, but that has not yet entered into force.  
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c) Disaster response in the African continent 
 
The African continent has not yet been very active in fostering regional or sub-
regional legal instruments to promote a wider and deeper cooperation in the 
prevention and management of natural and man-made disasters. The sole 
exception is the Dar es Salaam Declaration on Feeding of Infants and Young 
Children in Emergency Situations in Africa adopted in 1999. However, the 
African Union and several sub-regional organizations have express mandates in 
their founding instruments related to developing policies on disaster issues, by 
focusing mainly on risk reduction and prevention. As early as 2003–2004, the first 
African Regional Strategy for Disaster Risk Reduction was developed by the 
African Union, which actually does not establish a regional institutional 
mechanism for cooperation but is rather meant to facilitate initiatives at the sub-
regional and national level176. After a long period of silence, a Ministerial 
Conference in Disaster Risk Reduction was convened in Kenya in April 2010 thus 
approving an Extended Programme of Action for the Implementation of the Africa 
Regional Strategy for Disaster Risk Reduction (2006–2015) which have been 
reproduced at sub-regional level177.  
As for cooperation specifically in the event of a disaster, the Southern African 
Development Community (SADC) represents an example within the African 
continent. Indeed, in 1999 the SADC members adopted a Community Protocol on 
Health, which requires participating States to “cooperate and assist each other in 
the coordination and management of disaster and emergency situations” including 
through the development of “mechanisms for cooperation and assistance with 
emergency services” and regional plans for risk reduction and preparation178. 
Moreover, in 2001, the SADC planned a comprehensive disaster management 
strategy, by recommending that the development of regional emergency standby 
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teams for disaster response were taken into consideration and that a dedicated 
regional protocol on disaster response was developed.  
Such a brief overview of the main instruments adopted at regional level has made 
evident that, while in some cases they remain essentially political bodies for 
diplomatic purposes, others are becoming more operational and genuinely 
effective in connection with other regional organisations and the broader 
international system. When a disaster strikes, regional organisations are in 
principle better placed to support affected States. In the first place, a regional 
entity can provide a suitable forum for building that trust and familiarity which is 
not possible on a global scale, as well as for developing innovative and effective 
forms of collaboration in prevention, preparedness and risk management actions 
with specific and effective instruments of response. Moreover, regional 
mechanisms may not only respond more quickly than international ones, but their 
intervention may also be politically more acceptable for Member States. Regional 
organisations in natural disasters could thus be the effective ‘bridge’ between the 
international and national systems. It has, however, to be said that, apart from the 
specific instruments illustrated aimed at fostering cooperation activities among the 
participating States, to date the regional organisations explored are not 
characterised by a consolidated and multilayered system of instruments from 
which to derive clear duties of solidarity insisting on Member States. 
 
5. Concluding remarks 
 
This chapter meant to compose an introductive overview and to describe the state 
of the art of current IDRL in order to present the evolution on the subject. It was 
thus found that so far there is no universal treaty comprehensively regulating 
disaster situations even though there are certain rules that have been codified in 
some multilateral treaties, at the global and regional level, and in bilateral treaties 
and memoranda of understanding. This fragmentation makes the current system of 
international law in this area dispersed and incoherent for what concern the 
material scope of application. In particular, it was tackled the thorny issue relating 
to the protection of individuals in the event of disasters, by stressing the hard 
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relationship between sovereignty and humanitarian assistance in the awareness 
that disaster response falls within the jurisdiction of the State in whose territory 
the catastrophic event has occurred. Indeed, State sovereignty is still a long-lasting 
principle which prevents customary international law from establishing a duty to 
seek for assistance and a duty to provide it when requested. Moreover, also the 
principle of cooperation is not perceived as producing a correspondent duty to 
cooperate among States.  
The emergence of positive obligations from human rights doctrine and of the still 
debated concept of humanitarian assistance in times of peace has partially 
remodelled the notion of State sovereignty thereby establishing a sort of duty to 
protect the people affected by a disaster. It has led a change of perspective, by 
shifting from a State-State relationship to a vertical one based on a human rights 
protection. Despite this and the provisional attempts made by the ILC, the draft 
articles on the “Protection of persons in the event of a disaster” adopted in 2016 
clearly reflect the rigid standpoint of States which are sceptical to renounce to 
their prerogatives. Moreover, the comments provided by States on the Draft 
Articles suggest that most of them are not inclined to accept the codification of a 
duty to seek for assistance179. As a consequence, as far as the UN General 
Assembly will not discuss a universal and comprehensive treaty in the area of 
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humanitarian assistance in situation of disaster, the opportunity to regulate the 
reciprocal responsibilities of States in these circumstances appears really 
problematic and subjected to the traditional principle of State sovereignty. 
In situations of disaster, the principle of solidarity illustrated in the introduction of 
the present work has not yet given rise to a comprehensive set of rules of 
international law, but rather to disarticulated rights on States: the right to seek for 
assistance, the right to offer and the right to provide assistance. Since the alleged 
existence of corresponding obligations is still of harder recognition, it is clear that 
the full implementation of the positive dimension of solidarity, which would 
require a perfect balance between rights and obligations for all the parties 
concerned, has not been definitely reached at international level.  
Against this background, regional organisations could represent the more concrete 
starting point for reframing such incoherent international legal framework by 
establishing regional corpora of rules dealing with the most debated issues and 
establishing specific legal instruments capable of imposing clear and balanced 
duties of solidarity on States. In this perspective, the European Union, that has not 
been voluntarily included in the previous examination on the regional 
organisations because it will be the focus of the next chapters, represents a unicum 
in this field. Indeed, it has a number of instruments which enable the very Union 
and its Member States to react in the event of serious disasters. Moreover, the new 
legal framework inaugurated with the adoption of the Lisbon Treaty has 
introduced some important novelties which could render the response to disasters 
more effective and making the so-called EU disaster response law evidently based 
on solidarity. The challenge is to verify whether, in legal terms, theory meets 
reality and whether the EU Member States and the Union can be considered 
bound by specific obligations of solidarity.  
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CHAPTER II 
 
THE MULTIFACETED CONCEPT OF SOLIDARITY  
WITHIN THE EU LEGAL ORDER  
 
 
The centrality of State sovereignty in international relations as described in the 
previous chapter has been challenged, inter alia, by the creation of the European 
Union180. In 1963 the European Court of Justice (hereinafter, CJEU) stated that 
the (then) European Community constituted “a new legal order of international 
law for the benefit of which the States have limited their sovereign rights”181. 
Moreover, as stated by the CJEU in Commission of the European Economic 
Community v. Grand Duchy of Luxembourg and Kingdom of Belgium, “the Treaty 
is not limited to creating reciprocal obligations between the different natural and 
legal persons to whom it is applicable, but establishes a new legal order which 
governs the powers, rights and obligations of the said persons, as well as the 
necessary procedures for taking cognizance of and penalizing any breach of it”182. 
However, there is to say that it is a legal order constantly evolving and, therefore, 
the best way to define the European Union is the expression ‘process of 
integration’. And, as will be clearer from the following paragraph, it is a process 
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fuelled, inter alia, by the notion of solidarity which justifies, develops and adjusts 
the powers of the EU institutions and those of the Member States with a view to 
an “even closer union”183.  
The present chapter serves as a sort of ‘feeder’ between the international and 
European law frameworks by presenting the main characters, the legal nature and 
the effectiveness of the notion of solidarity as pivotal and multifunctional concept 
of the EU integration process. Indeed, as central notion and keystone of the whole 
political and legal structure of the EU project, solidarity represents the parameter 
of reference for the following analysis on the instruments of disaster response 
progressively developed within EU law.  
 
1. Mainstreaming solidarity within EU law 
 
The idea of solidarity in the European culture can be traced back for more than 
two centuries, when it was associated with the notion of fraternité at the time of 
the French revolution and explicitly included in the 1804 Code Civil. Given such 
solid and historical roots, solidarity has always been an important and inspiring 
idea of the European integration movement since the very beginning when, 
however, the unification of Europe was planned to pursue just economic interests 
and, therefore, to prevent future wars between European countries. Yet, the 
founding fathers were well aware that once politics had forced common economic 
interests on the European nations, these interests would form the best basis for 
further integration.  
According to the Schuman’s declaration “Europe will not be made all at once, or 
according to a single plan. It will be built through concrete achievements which 
first create a de facto solidarity”184. Moreover, Jean Monnet stated that “la 
Communauté avait un objet limité aux solidarités inscrites dans les traités […] 
ces solidarités en appelaient d’autres, et de proche en proche entraineraient 
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l’intégration, la plus large des activités humaines”185. In 2001, the presidency 
conclusions of the Laeken European Council placed solidarity on centre stage by 
defining Europe as “the continent of solidarity”186. Besides in 2008, the European 
Commission claimed that “solidarity is part of how European society works and 
how Europe engages with the rest of the world”187. More recently, on occasion of 
the 60th anniversary of the Rome Treaties, the leaders of the remaining 27 
Member States, the European Council, the European Parliament and the 
Commission signed the Rome Declaration by affirming their commitment to 
“make the European Union stronger and more resilient, through even greater unity 
and solidarity amongst us and the respect of common rules”188.  
In the EU, solidarity has thus been always seen as fuel of the European 
construction and principle which distinguishes the EU and its members from other 
parts of the world and international organisations where solidarity is value and 
principle for sovereign and independent States189. Despite also international 
solidarity is based on the foundation of shared responsibility and cooperation 
between individuals, groups and States190, the level of solidarity reached through 
the European integration seems far from being replicated in other international 
fora or organisations191. Indeed, the choice to delegate part of the national 
prerogatives for the benefit of the supranational level has implied the creation of 
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specific allegiances which make the general interest of the Union prevailing over 
the single national interests192. Accordingly, as autonomous concept, solidarity 
among Member States represents the guarantee and the cornerstone of the 
effective European construction193. However, in comparison to international law, 
the principle of solidarity in EU law has a broader application as it represents the 
foundation not only of the horizontal cooperation between Member States, but 
also of the vertical one between the States and the very Union.  
In the course of time, the notion of solidarity has been interested by a significant 
evolution due to the changes brought by primary and secondary law as well as by 
the CJEU case law. Despite the role of solidarity as founding and existential value 
had been already stressed by the Treaty of Rome, in the early years, solidarity was 
conceived mainly in its negative essence, that is at the institutional level, thereby 
integrating and overlapping the principle of loyalty within the distribution of 
powers between EU institutions and Member States. But, the evolving process of 
integration has triggered also the develop of the positive dimension of solidarity 
linked to the notion of general interest thus progressively leading to the 
establishment of mechanisms of support as well as to a renewal of the Treaties 
from a material point of view194. This has impacted on the different sectors of 
competence, and notably on fields of action addressing elements of solidarity, 
which have been expanded in favour of the common interest. In more recent 
times, the notion of solidarity has then acquired a certain autonomy from that of 
general interest thereby fuelling itself the expansion of the scope of some existing 
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powers when acting as objective to be achieved. However, there are still some 
important obstacles in providing for a univocal and uniform definition of 
solidarity which is thus currently characterised by a fundamental legal ambiguity. 
Moreover, it is rather complex to analyse the concrete and general application of 
this concept without taking into account the different fields of intervention and the 
heterogeneity of the competences attributed to the Union. The legal literature has 
thus attempted to propose different reconstructions of solidarity within EU law, 
but its legal status is still far from being clear and, as it will be stressed on 
multiple occasions in the present work, the centrality it acquires in abstract is not 
fully reflected into practice195. The following paragraphs will be dedicated to 
deepening such findings and to bring out the main uncertainties on the legal status 
of solidarity in EU law.  
 
1.1 Evolution of the concept of solidarity within the EU legal order  
 
On May 9th, 1950 the French Minister of the foreign affairs, Robert Schuman 
delivered the well-known declaration that has been indicated as the starting point 
of the integration process and the manifestation of the indivisible link between 
such a process and the notion of solidarity196. In fact, it led to the conclusion that 
solidarity between the Member States and between the peoples of the European 
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Community constitutes a living aim which should be pursued and expanded 
continuously for the purpose of peace197.  
By following such a path, the 1951 Treaty constituting the European Coal and 
Steel Community (ECSC) stated in its preamble that “Europe can be built only by 
concrete actions which create a real solidarity and by the establishment of 
common bases for economic development”. It was also taken for granted that the 
age-old rivalries which prevailed in post-war Europe could be substituted not only 
by merging the essential interests of the European States, but also by creating a 
broader and deeper Community among the peoples of the continent. Such a 
Community would have served as a precondition for the gradual establishment at 
the level of society of a psychological impetus towards a destiny to be shared 
henceforward198. Interestingly, the 1957 Treaty did not refer to solidarity among 
Member States, but widened it by referring to the solidarity which binds Europe 
and overseas countries.  
These few references to solidarity in the preambles of the founding Treaties have 
been progressively matched to more concrete and substantive provisions. In 
particular, while also the Single European Act just mentions solidarity in its 
preamble199, both the Maastricht Treaty and then the Amsterdam Treaty included 
much more references to solidarity as foundation of the European integration200. 
By following the time framework, the most important innovation with regard to 
the principle of solidarity in primary law is probably its multiple mentions in the 
context of the Treaty on European Union signed in 1992. According to the 
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wording enshrined in the new Treaty, solidarity has become legally binding task 
not only for the European Community, but also for the European Union itself thus 
extending the requirement for solidary relations also to the peoples of the Member 
States201. Moreover, solidarity has been expressly included among the objectives 
of the (then) European Community enshrined in Article 2 of the EEC Treaty, as a 
result of the amendment introduced by Article G of the Treaty of Maastricht. 
Under that provision, as amended, the Community had the task of promoting, 
through the establishment of a common market and of an economic and monetary 
union, and through the implementation of the common policies and actions 
referred to in Article 3 and 3A of the very EC Treaty “a harmonious and balanced 
development of economic activities, sustainable and non-inflationary growth 
respecting the environment, a high degree of convergence of economic 
performance, a high level of employment and of social protection, the raising of 
the standard of living and quality of life, and economic and social cohesion and 
solidarity among Member States” [emphasis added].  
As a result, solidarity has been included within the new Treaties both as raison 
d’être and as final purpose of the very European Union. In introducing such a 
wording, it is likely that the drafters had taken into account the jurisprudence of 
the Court of Justice of the European Communities which, as will be reported in 
the following paragraph, between the end of the sixties and the following decade, 
has acknowledged the centrality of solidarity within the European construction.  
 
a) (following) in the jurisprudence of the CJEU 
 
The CJEU was established in 1951 with the purpose of interpretating the Treaty of 
Rome and, since then, the Court has constantly refined and expanded its 
parameters, thereby becoming an important catalyst for the integration process of 
the European Community. The Court’s case law is a manifestation of its creative 
and extensive interpretation of the Treaties and has created two of the most 
influential legal concepts within the history of the Community, the doctrine of 
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direct effect and the notion of supremacy of EU law202. The CJEU’s jurisprudence 
has thus had a privileged role also in shaping and clarifying the scope of legal 
ideas and principles such as the notion of solidarity which has been approached in 
different ways substantially mirroring its negative and interstate dimension.  
In the first place, the early relevant judgement can be traced back to 1969 on 
occasion of an action brought by the Commission against France203, which was 
accused of not complying with two decisions concerning the limits to the national 
preferential rediscount rate on export credits. In its reasoning, the CJEU 
concluded that “[t]he solidarity which is at the basis of these obligations as of the 
whole of the Community system in accordance with the undertaking provided for 
in Article 5 of the Treaty, is continued for the benefit of the States in the 
procedure for mutual assistance provided for in Article 108 where a Member State 
is seriously threatened with difficulties as regards its balance of payments”204. 
Accordingly, France behaviour constituted a breach of the duties accepted by the 
Member States when they had established the Community itself. A similar 
approach to solidarity can be observed in Commission v. Italy205 wherein the 
Court set that solidarity required the Member States to apply the Community rules 
unselectively, even though it was against their national interest206 because the 
“failure in duty of solidarity accepted by Member States by the fact of their 
adherence to the Community strikes at the fundamental basis of the Community 
legal order”207.  
It is clear from these decisions that the Court regarded solidarity as a cooperative 
action that was essential for the functioning of the Community system. Such a 
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perspective has then been used and reinforced in some following judgements. 
Among these, it is relevant the orientation of the Court in the case Commission v. 
United Kingdom208 whereby it confirmed that the non-compliance with the 
provisions of instruments of secondary law undermined the Community solidarity 
which had been included within the foundations of the Community in a previous 
judgement209. Besides fixing solidarity within the “constitutional” context of the 
Community law, such a position is particularly significant in view of the 
following well-known creative role played by the CJEU with reference to the non-
written principles of EU law in the context of its hermeneutic activity. Indeed, 
these first reasoning expressed by the Court almost seem to address solidarity not 
only as theoretical foundation of the integration process, but also as principle 
capable of establishing clear duties of mutuality on the Member States because of 
their membership to the Community.  
Starting from these premises, the CJEU has then applied such a notion to more 
practical situations by linking solidarity to that of “common interest”. In this 
regard, it ought to be firstly recalled Opinion 1/75210 which, albeit it does not 
contain an explicit reference to solidarity, has been considered by many scholars 
as a relevant example for evaluating the Court’s extensive reference to solidarity. 
In replying to the questions submitted to it by the Commission, the Court held, 
inter alia, that the common commercial policy prescribed by Article 113 of the 
EEC Treaty, was conceived for the defence of the common interests of the 
Community to which the individual interests of the Member States had to 
adapt211. As a result, Member States could not satisfy their own interests 
separately via unilateral actions and accordingly undermine the effective defence 
of the common interests of the Community. The Court concluded that the exercise 
of parallel powers by the Member States in fields covered by the common 
commercial policy would have resulted “in distorting the institutional framework 
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of the very Community, calling into question the mutual trust within it and 
preventing the Community from fulfilling its task in the defence of the common 
interest”212. These words show that the need the common interest prevails is not 
merely a theoretical one, nor a mere factual assumption of the same Community 
construction, but constitutes a true originating principle for the relations between 
Member States, as well as between the latter and the Community. Furthermore, it 
would be a principle capable of affecting the most relevant areas of such relations 
and, mainly, the division of competences between Member States and the 
Community, that is, one of the most delicate and sensitive issues from the 
perspective of national interests. However, it is also evident that solidarity as here 
conceived was not an autonomous source of positive obligations, but rather of 
negative duties requiring Member States to abstain from behaving against and to 
act in favour of the common interest of the Community.  
Such an orientation has then been confirmed by the following Opinion 1/76 
concerning a draft agreement establishing a EU laying-up fund for inland 
waterway vessels where the Court has recalled the necessity to comply with the 
requirements of unity and solidarity already emphasized in previous cases213. 
Moreover, in early cases under the ECSC Treaty, the Court appealed to solidarity 
in substantiating the legality of Community legislation with regard to the 
obligation of the market actors to undertake some responsibilities that were 
against their short-term interests for the subsistence of the sector as a whole. Late, 
in Valsabbia, which concerned the legality of a Community intervention in price 
fixing in order to counter the overproduction of steel, the Court referred to 
solidarity among undertakings as a fundamental principle on which the anti-crisis 
policy measures in the iron and steel sector were based214. According to the Court, 
the priority accorded to the common interest under Article 3 of the ECSC Treaty 
presupposed that the market actors had to give up their short-term interest for the 
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sake of the common good215. In general terms, the Court has usually read the 
solidarity principle in a very concrete way by justifying the adoption of measures 
implying sacrifices in favour of the market equilibrium. In the view of the CJEU, 
the principle of solidarity operated according to reciprocity: Member States 
gained benefits as part of the Union, and in return, they were expected to 
contribute to the Community interest by making sacrifices when needed. 
Solidarity was thus used as a functional instrument in pursuing the collective 
interest. And, as reported in more recent cases, this will be valid with regard to the 
accession of future candidates: “the special interests thus invoked can, in 
particular, be appropriately balanced against the general interest of the 
Community and that the considerations relating to the principles of equality, good 
faith and solidarity among current and future Member States”216. Hence, solidarity 
is founded on mutual trust among the Member States thus creating an equilibrium 
for the Member States between rights and obligations. And, this let to introduce 
the last expression of solidarity as conceived by the CJEU in its jurisprudence, 
that is its legal dimension. 
In this regard, there is to say that the Court has never expressly referred to 
solidarity per se in its compulsory dimension, but rather has linked it to other 
kinds of duties governing both the interstate relations and those between the 
Community and its Member States. Positive solidarity is expressed as the 
adoption of measures that ensure solidarity among the Member States and 
promote the objectives of the Community and, therefore, it is strictly connected to 
the duty to cooperate. In France v. the United Kingdom217, the Court held that 
when the Member States acceded to the Community they assumed, under Article 
5 of the Treaty, the respect of the duty of cooperation whose performance was 
necessary especially in cases where it was not possible to establish a common 
policy. Negative solidarity, instead, has been expressed by referring to the 
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principle of loyal cooperation218. In this regard, in the well-known case 
Commission v. Council219, the Court held, inter alia, that again under Article 5 of 
the EEC Treaty the Member States were required on the one hand to take all 
appropriate measures in order to fulfil their Treaty obligations and on the other 
hand to abstain from adopting measures which might jeopardize attaining the aims 
of the Treaty220. Solidarity is, therefore, a complex of positive and negative 
procedural obligations which mainly concern the framework of cooperation and 
mutual conduct of the Member States. 
Despite the present work cannot report the whole CJEU jurisprudence citing 
solidarity issues, there is to say that, following the entry into force of the 
Maastricht Treaty, this principle has not been applied in a large number of cases. 
Rather, the CJEU has started referring to solidarity in a more indirect way by 
using many other concepts and expressions of the same general importance, such 
as loyal cooperation, integration, unity and “ever closer union among the peoples 
of Europe”221. As a result, one can argue that the Court has not been particularly 
devoted to further clarify the legal scope of this complex notion thereby 
negatively contributing to rise some doubts concerning the exact legal status of 
such a concept which, albeit the adoption of the Lisbon Treaty, continues to be 
extremely ambiguous and therefore hardly justiciable 222. 
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1.2 Solidarity after the Lisbon revision: a manifold notion 
 
In the aftermath of the failed Constitutional Treaty, the climate for a reform was 
described as the “least favourable and least promising moments for optimistic 
outbursts regarding the future of European solidarity”223. But, the discussions that 
followed such a moment of deadlock and, finally, the entry into force of the 
Lisbon revision have given new impetus to solidarity by including some of the 
innovations proposed by the failed Constitutional Treaty. 
In comparison to the previous treaties, the Lisbon Treaty has attributed particular 
prominence to the concept of solidarity by citing the term in numerous provisions 
and by valuing, inter alia, the expression “in a spirit of solidarity” that was quoted 
just once in the Maastricht Treaty224. Besides confirming and reinforcing the 
demands for solidarity contained in the preamble to the Treaties also in the 
provision devoted to the Union’s objectives currently enshrined in Article 3 TEU 
as well as within the framework of the Common Foreign and Security Policy, the 
revision has also inserted this principle in many specific provisions225. 
Furthermore, one could argue that the attribution of the “same legal value as the 
Treaties” to the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU has elevated to the rank 
of primary law also the references to solidarity contained in the Charter, with 
particular reference to preamble and Title IV, entitled ‘Solidarity’ where the 
principle is clearly understood in its social dimension226.  
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Within current treaties, solidarity has been officially recognised “pierre angulaire 
du système juridique de l’Union européenne”227 and has experienced a semantic 
evolution and a normative ascension that has made it value, objective and 
principle of the EU integration process. In the following sub-paragraphs, 
therefore, attempts will be made to distinguish as much as possible between these 
different meanings of solidarity and then to briefly discuss the various areas in 
which it is expressly mentioned in the Treaties for introducing the second part of 
the present chapter concerning solidarity in EU disaster response law. 
 
a) Solidarity as value of the European Union construction 
 
Despite solidarity is at the basis and engine of the European integration process as 
demonstrated by the early references to the main political statements, to frame its 
exact connotation as value within the Lisbon Treaty is a hard task.  
A list of the values that inspire the Union and whose respect notably represents 
one of the conditions for grating access to candidate States ex Article 49 TEU228, 
is contained in Article 2 TEU, according to which: 
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“The Union is founded on the values of respect for human dignity, freedom, 
democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights, including 
the rights of persons belonging to minorities. These values are common to 
the Member States in a society in which pluralism, non-discrimination, 
tolerance, justice, solidarity and equality between women and men prevail”. 
 
Even if at first sight such a provision is clear, its wording contributes to make the 
definition of solidarity as a value in the Union system more complex. Indeed, it is 
not explicitly mentioned among the values on which the Union is founded, but 
only among the elements that characterize the societies in which these values 
common to the Member States may be found229. Moreover, as stressed by some 
scholars, while the values reported in the first sentence are really fundamental and 
have a clear and uncontroversial legal content, the second ones cannot be properly 
consecrated as values such as to constitute the legal basis for activating the 
procedure provided ex Article 7 TEU in case of a serious and persistent breach by 
a Member State of the values referred to in Article 2230. On the other side, there is 
however who argues that solidarity would be implicitly listed within the first 
sentence as unwritten element exactly because of its extraordinary role in the 
creation, development and enlargement of the Union231. Such a reading could be 
then justified by the fact that the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights lists 
solidarity among the “indivisible and universal values” on which the Union is 
founded232.  
Actually, such an ambiguity concerning the enlist of solidarity within the values 
the European Union is based on could appear solvable by taking into account 
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what previously mention with regard to the CJEU jurisprudence which has 
recognised that solidarity is at the basis of the (then) Community system. But, 
even in this regard, some issues may rise with particular reference to the 
distinction between values and funding principles which does not appear so clear-
cut. Indeed, while Article 2 TEU seems to include solidarity as value, Article 21 
TEU conceives it as principle by stating that:  
 
“The Union’s action on the international scene shall be guided by the 
principles which have inspired its own creation, development and 
enlargement, and which it seeks to advance in the wider world: democracy, 
the rule of law, the universality and indivisibility of human rights and 
fundamental freedoms, respect for human dignity, the principles of equality 
and solidarity, and respect for the principles of the United Nations Charter 
and international law”.  
 
The contradiction can be explained, according to some authors, by downsizing the 
apparent difference between values and principles by considering that the 
inclusion of certain values in a legal text would transform them into principles of 
interpretation and creation of a system. In this way, it could be possible to speak 
about solidarity as principle-value of the European construction233 or, as suggested 
by Levade, as esprit constitutif234.   
 
b) Solidarity as objective of the EU integration process 
 
As already reported in the previous paragraph, solidarity as objective to be 
achieved, a concrete mission of a policy to be pursued, has been included within 
primary law by the Maastricht Treaty235. And, the Lisbon Treaty has de facto 
                                                          
233
 See, Berramdane, “Solidarité, loyauté dans le droit de l’Union européenne”, cit., p. 57. 
234
 See, A. Levade, “La valeur constitutionnelle du principe de solidarité”, in C. Boutayeb (ed.), La 
solidarité dans l’Union européenne : éléments constitutionnels et matériels, cit., p. 48 ff.  
235
 See, Berramdane, “Solidarité, loyauté dans le droit de l’Union européenne”, cit., p. 56. It is 
moreover interesting that, after the inclusion of solidarity among the objectives of the then 
Community, the Court of first instance had referred to solidarity in one of its judgements 
concerning State aids in the following terms: “the derogations from free competition in favour of 
regional aid under Article 92(3)(a) and (c) are based on the aim of Community solidarity, a 
fundamental objective of the Treaty, as may be seen from the preamble. In exercising its 
discretion, the Commission has to ensure that the aims of free competition and Community 
87 
 
taken back and reinforced what previously stated by including solidarity as 
objective of any kind of relation established by virtue of the EU legal order236.  
In the first place, a clear reference to solidarity as objective is included in the sixth 
recital of the Treaty of the European Union (TEU) by recalling Member States’ 
desire “to deepen the solidarity between their peoples while respecting their 
history, their culture and their traditions”. In this way, the Treaty confirms the 
extension of the scope of application of solidarity also to the relations between 
individuals thereby consecrating the concepts of European citizenship237 and 
solidarité démocratique238. To improve interstate relations in the light of 
solidarity remains, however, the key mission of the EU integration process. 
Indeed, as already mentioned, Article 3 TEU refers to “solidarity among Member 
States”. Clearly, as stressed by some authors, the requirement of solidarity has 
been balanced with the reference to the respect of the national identities of the 
Member States as well as of their national and regional diversities by respecting 
the principle of subsidiarity in the interest of the citizens239. Furthermore, 
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solidarity as objective works also in the external dimension of the Union: Article 
3(5) TEU specifies that “in its relations with the wider world, the Union shall (...) 
contribute to peace, security, the sustainable development of the Earth, solidarity 
and mutual respect among peoples (...)”.  
The inclusion of solidarity among the objectives of the European Union seems a 
particularly significant step towards its consecration, also because the EU system, 
as well-known, is characterized by a strong teleological connotation. Indeed, the 
founding treaties have been always imbued with a purpose-driven functionalism 
and, generally, the objectives have played a significant role in the legal process of 
integration, above all in view of the distinctly interpretation employed by the 
Court aimed at ensuring the greatest practical effectiveness of EU law240.  
Despite the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty has reshaped the previous 
interaction between objectives and competences241, the objectives included in 
Article 3 TEU still have three functions within the EU legal framework. First of 
all, they serve as interpretative tool of the specific provisions enshrined in the 
Treaties. In the second place, they continue to enrich the scope of application of 
EU law. Finally, they establish special constraints both on the EU institutions and 
on Member States by conditioning – without establishing legal obligations242 – 
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their actions at the Union level. According to a reconstruction made by Azoulai of 
the CJEU jurisprudence in this field243, there are three requirements that have to 
be respected by these subjects, and especially by States, when acting on the basis 
of the mentioned objectives of the Union. In the first place, they have to be aware 
that acting within the framework of those objectives implies the need to respect 
the principles and mechanisms of control of EU law244. Secondly, they have to 
take into account the supranational dimension and context245. Thirdly, as pointed 
out by the CJEU, Member States must refrain from adopting and maintaining in 
force any kind of measure capable of eliminating the effet utile of the common 
rules established at the Union level246.  
The functions attributed to the objectives of Article 3 TEU can be thus extended 
also to solidarity which, as objective in a perspective of short and long term, 
contributes to define the purposes which justify the existence of the very Union 
and, moreover, to fuel the teleological reading of the Treaties which should guide 
the EU institutions and the Member States247.  
 
c) Solidarity as principle of the EU legal order 
 
In general terms, principles, because of their essentially unpublished nature and 
heterogeneity which distinguishes them, are particularly difficult to define in the 
Union’s system so that are often marked by some vagueness248. According to 
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some authors, principles may be classified in (i) axiomatic, when inherent in the 
very notion of a legal order and represent the superior needs of the collective 
conscience; (ii) structural, when they animate and characterise a specific legal 
system; (iii) common, intended as the general principles of law recognised by the 
constituent parts of the legal system249. Despite such a classification may be 
useful, problems remain in particular with reference to the notion of general 
principles of EU law, defined also as systemic principles, from which some 
concrete rules may derive and that operate by transcending specific areas of law 
and underlying the legal system as a whole250. In any case, principles having a 
well-defined legal status are justiciable and thus may be invoked for evaluating, 
inter alia, the conformity of the EU legal acts as well as of the conduct of the 
Member States251.  
Because of its prominent position within the Treaties, solidarity is often 
considered a principle of the EU legal order. But, albeit over the years there have 
been several attempts to reconstruct its value as principle and many hypotheses 
have been issued, the exact legal status of the corresponding principle remains of 
hard recognition.  
The range of definitions rendered to solidarity as principle is quite wide. Some 
authors focus mainly on the role of solidarity from a relational point of view by 
referring to it as principle governing and modulating the relations between the 
different actors of the Union252. In this context, States are asked to find a synthesis 
between their respective national interests in order to ensure the effective 
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functioning of the Union thereby focusing on the dimension of “solidarity-
loyalty” as elaborated by the CJEU jurisprudence253. In order to conceive 
solidarity from a more autonomous perspective, some other scholars include the 
principle of solidarity among the founding and structural principles of the Union, 
by attributing to it a “supra-constitutional” or even just a constitutional rank 
capable of forcing itself on primary law254. However, such an orientation is not 
supported by those who explicitly exclude that solidarity may rank among the 
founding principles because of its unclear contours255. Moreover, it has been put 
forward the proposal to define solidarity as general principle of Union law256, but 
about this the doctrine is still divided: some scholars consider solidarity as 
principle of EU law of structural nature and attribute a normative effect to it by 
acknowledging its constitutional dimension257, while others are still sceptical 
about its bounding legal implications by recalling that, according to the CJEU 
jurisprudence, a general principle of law cannot be deduced from a provision of 
programmatic character which does not contain a well-defined obligation258. 
Moreover, any element confirming such an orientation is apparent neither in the 
case-law of the Court nor in specific areas of Union law259. In effect, there is to 
say that ranking solidarity among the general principles of EU law would mean to 
attribute to it a strong legal value and, mainly, the capability of establishing 
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concrete rules across the different policies thus marking an important step forward 
in the EU integration process260.  
Bearing in mind that principles are often deduced by a process of interpretation on 
the basis of the legislative text from the CJEU, the recent caution of the very 
Court in using solidarity arguments and engaging in any debate around the legal 
nature of this notion is symptomatic of the difficulty to deal with such a 
challenging issue. For instance, in Pringle, dealing with the competence of the 
Member States to adopt the European Stability Mechanism in response to the 
sovereign debt crisis, solidarity was at the very heart of the matter261. Unlike 
Advocate General Kokott – who stated that, however, it cannot be inferred from 
the concept of solidarity that there exists a duty to provide financial assistance of 
the kind that is to be provided by the European Stability Mechanism262 – the Court 
did not stress on solidarity in its reasoning. In its judgment it preferred to 
emphasise the risk for the euro area as a whole rather than explicitly invoking the 
principle of solidarity in the interpretation of Article 125 TFEU263. In this case, 
the Court has thus been unclear over its position on solidarity as principle capable 
of extending the benefits of crisis mechanisms. Similarly, the Court has refrained 
from citing solidarity in several occasions in which Article 80 TFEU – which 
imposes a clear and unconditional obligation of solidarity on the Member States in 
asylum, immigration, and border check activities – could have been used. For 
instance, in N.S./M.E264 and Halaf265, the Court mentioned the principle just in a 
quick way and appealed only to fundamental rights when interpreting Article 3(2) 
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of the Dublin II Regulation266, which allows Member States to assume 
responsibility for processing asylum applications on humanitarian grounds267. 
In any case, as it will be clearer in the following paragraph, from a constitutional 
perspective, solidarity is not just a moral or political imperative268. Indeed, 
although in many cases both the CJEU and the Treaties have omitted to qualify 
solidarity as principle per se, within the Lisbon Treaty there are multiple 
references to the idea of solidarity as inspiring principle of the policies and actions 
performed by the Union and Member States in specific areas of intervention, 
renamed by Hilpold as ‘islands of solidarity’269.  
In the following paragraph, the references to solidarity as explicitly mentioned in 
the Treaty of the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) will be briefly 
examined with regard to specific policies in order to provide for an overview 
which, albeit not exhaustive, will be useful to introduce the relationship between 
solidarity and disaster response within the EU legal order. Therefore, in this first 
reconstruction, it will be voluntary left out Article 222 TFEU, that is the so-called 
“solidarity clause”, which will be deeply explored in the following section.  
 
1.3 Solidarity in practice: some references to the sectors wherein it intervenes 
 
As already reported, with the Lisbon revision solidarity has been embodied in 
many primary EU law provisions. For instance, Article 174 TFEU defines the 
objectives of economic, social, and territorial cohesion and requires the Union to 
adopt measures promoting its harmonious development for reducing disparities. 
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The objective of the promotion of solidarity is then underlined with reference to 
asylum, immigration, and external borders control: Article 67 TFEU requires the 
Union to frame a common policy in these fields based on solidarity between the 
Member States and Article 80 TFEU provides that the Union policies – also at the 
financial level – shall be governed in accordance with the principle of solidarity 
and the fair sharing of responsibility. Even though Article 80 TFEU has not so far 
constituted a legal basis per se for the enactment of solidary instruments, it has 
been interpreted as provision requesting the EU institutions to give effect to the 
solidarity principle when legislating in these areas270.  
Solidarity is also accorded a prominent role in the energy sector in which the 
Union holds powers to adopt measures in situations of economic emergency 
(Article 122 TFEU)271 and to attain objectives of sustainability and security in the 
supply of energy “in a spirit of solidarity between Member States” (Article 194 
TFEU)272. With reference to this last provision, it is interesting that the reference 
to solidarity has been included exactly by the Lisbon revision thereby fully 
acknowledging the management of the energy sector as an issue of common 
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concern and legitimising the Union to act in a unitary way in this field273. Since 
the energy sector remains subjected to strong nationalistic and protectionist 
tendencies and the Union’s action in this area is still fragmented, the role played 
by solidarity as engine of integration could be extremely relevant in the 
inspiration of a common policy on energy.  
In the realm of security, the mutual defence clause envisaged under Article 42(7), 
TEU requires the Members States to provide for assistance to each other in the 
event of armed aggression. Finally, as for the Common Foreign and Security 
Policy (CFSP), Article 24(3) TEU imposes solidarity obligations upon the 
Member States, requiring them to support the Union’s external policy in a “spirit 
of loyalty and mutual political solidarity”, and to comply with the Union’s actions 
in this area274. Interestingly, legal doctrine has often framed interstate solidarity 
within the framework of the Union’s external action in its operational dimension 
and as a value to be promoted. In particular, Neframi indicates two different 
categories of solidarity in the EU external dimension: while in the first one 
solidarity is conceived basically as assistance, and therefore closer to international 
law because aimed at unilaterally provide for help, the second one attributes to 
solidarity the enhanced value of lien, understood as sharing of a common 
project275.  
The fundamental requirement of solidarity within the Union – that was initially 
requested just as for harmonised fields of EU law276 – has been thus progressively 
applied beyond the sphere of restrictive powers attributed to EU institutions by 
compelling national governments to cooperate and coordinate their policies also in 
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fields retained by States. Enshrined in the progressive development of an “ever 
closer Union between peoples”, the ‘long term solidarity’ appears, hence, as a real 
engine for this rapprochement, for which ‘active solidarity’ impregnates the 
specific instruments organising ‘material solidarity’277.  
As already anticipated, the Lisbon Treaty has, moreover, strengthened the three-
fold internal dimension of solidarity which concerns not only the relationship 
between Member States278, but also that between Member States and individuals 
as well as that between the Union and Member States279. Accordingly, it could be 
said that also solidarity is characterised by a horizontal and vertical dimension. 
The former regulates obligations of solidarity between Member States, by 
attributing to the EU the role of mediator and facilitator for an “even closer union” 
and for the creation of collective solidarity mechanisms. Instead, the latter focuses 
on a top-down reconstruction of the solidary relationship between the Union and 
Member States: the EU institutions shall demonstrate solidarity and Member 
States shall bear co-responsibility and prove to be actively involved and willing to 
play their part. As remarked by the Reflection Group on the future of the EU 
2030,  
“for the EU to become an effective and dynamic global player, it will also 
need to shift solidarity to the heart of the European project. Solidarity is not 
an unconditional entitlement – it depends on individual and collective 
responsibility. As such, it can and must inform EU policymaking and 
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relations at all levels, between individuals and generations and between 
localities, regions and Member States”280.  
As a consequence, in this perspective, the Union shall be, one the one hand, 
instrument of ‘solidary integration’ between Member States and, on the other one, 
addressee of the material solidarity enshrined in the Treaties which shall permeate 
also the action of the EU institutions.  
 
1.4 The interplay between solidarity and loyalty as engines of integration 
 
Alongside solidarity, the concept of loyalty has marked – and continues to mark – 
the dynamic of the EU integration process281, and has been revisited by the Lisbon 
Treaty in a very significant way. Indeed, it has been decided to export it from the 
Treaty establishing the European Community into Title I, TEU on common 
provisions to be applied to all EU policy areas and, more precisely, into Article 4 
TEU completely dedicated to the interaction between Member States and the EU 
itself282. In this way, loyal cooperation has fallen within the normative category of 
general principles of EU law as natural consequence of the pre-existing legal 
framework and the CJEU’s case law which has expanded the boundaries of this 
concept283. The principle of sincere cooperation is thus ‘of general application’ in 
the EU legal order: as constitutional principle, it does not depend on whether the 
EU’s competences are exclusive or shared and equally applies with regard to the 
EU institutions as to its Member States. More specifically, Article 4(3) TEU – 
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which embodies the so-called ‘loyalty clause’ – codifies the mutual legal 
obligation for the EU and its Member States “to assist each other in carrying out 
the tasks which flow from the Treaties” and sets that the Member States “shall 
refrain from any measure which could jeopardise the attainment of the Union’s 
objectives” and should “facilitate the achievement of the Union’s tasks”.  
At first sight, the loyalty clause could be described as analogous to the bona fide 
typical of international law, but at EU level it actually entails not only negative 
obligations, but also positive duties the infringement of which is penalised by the 
Court284. Such a legal concept is, indeed, capable of operating in different ways 
depending on the nature of the action at issue: it can give rise both to a substantive 
positive obligation to give primacy to EU law and to procedural obligations which 
manifest themselves in a duty on Member States to cooperate with the EU 
institutions for the implementation of the Treaty provisions285. In addition, the 
CJEU has suggested that the scope of application of the loyalty principle should 
guide also the conduct of the EU institutional actors in a full mutual respect286. 
But, such a principle does not operate just in the relationship between the Union 
and its Member States, but also horizontally, as the latter have to cooperate with 
each other for ensure the realisation of the Union objectives. Therefore, as far as 
the nature of the obligations imposed by Article 4(3) TEU is concerned, it 
combines the procedural duty of cooperation with an obligation of result thus 
operating as constitutional safeguard for the protection of the general interest of 
the European community 287.  
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The interplay between loyalty and solidarity exactly falls within such a 
perspective thus making them the two sides of the same coin and as principles 
taking part to the same function: the EU integration process288. This intrinsic 
connection is certainly not a novelty in the EU framework not just because it has 
been found more than once by the Luxemburg judges that have elaborated the 
expression ‘solidarity-loyalty’, but also because the very foundations of the 
European solidarity are based on a stronger reciprocal and selfish character rather 
than on pure altruism289. Indeed, as States agreed at the beginning to constraint 
their prerogatives and sovereign rights in order to create a new legal framework, 
they acted on the basis of the principle of reciprocity and loyalty by expecting 
same behaviours on the part of the other contractors290. The significant degree of 
cohesion gained within EU law, its extension to further areas and the influence 
acquired by Union citizens as actors and subjects of rights have mitigated the 
predominant reciprocal side of solidarity, but its implementation rests within and 
relies on the Member States. Moreover, to borrow from economics, some national 
governments fear free-rider behaviours from other Member States benefitting 
from integration without contributing to it.  
Against this background, the existence of mutual obligations of loyalty are of 
utmost importance on two grounds. First of all, in the absence of altruistic or 
moral underpinnings, reciprocal loyalty is the only driver of solidarity thereby 
ensuring major predictability and certainty of actions. Instead, when no 
perspective and guarantees of long-term sincere cooperation is given – such as in 
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the field of asylum and refugee policy – solidarity does not materialise and States 
are left at their own devices291. Secondly, loyalty allows to adjust the single 
interests in the light of the general one thereby achieving that European solidarity 
which represents the raison d’être of the EU legal order itself. As a result, both 
the principles are able to regulate the implementation of all the competences, be 
they exclusive, shared or supporting, by acting on three levels: between States, 
between States and EU institutions and between EU institutions292. Indeed, while 
solidarity, as unwritten constitutional principle, mainly reflects the aspiration to 
advance in the European integration process, the principle of loyalty expresses the 
way such a process should effectively be implemented. So here, at institutional 
level, the principle of loyalty is at the service of solidarity thereby establishing an 
inextricable de facto connection between the obligations flowing from the ‘loyalty 
clause’ and the principle of solidarity.  
This notwithstanding, there is to say that, by reformulating the words used by the 
CJEU, the Lisbon Treaty is more than an agreement which merely creates mutual 
obligations between the contracting States. As a consequence, there are some 
circumstances where reciprocity cannot be valid and a more intense cooperation is 
required regardless of the traditional mutual relations between Member States. In 
particular, this may happen in situations of emergency when such an ordinary 
interplay between loyalty and solidarity makes way for actions based on 
solidarity, and autonomous duties of solidarity can be derived. Indeed, despite 
legal literature suggests that the obligations potentially deriving from the 
requirement to act in a spirit of solidarity in times of crisis are actually meant to 
reinforce the cooperation required under the loyalty principle, some scholars argue 
that it is not enough to conclude that only Article 4(3) TEU govern their 
functioning from a procedural point of view293. On the contrary, in emergency 
scenarios (mass influx of migrants, economic crises, disasters, terrorist attacks) 
specific obligations of solidarity could exist thus making the principle of loyalty 
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just functional for ensuring the effectiveness of the relative implementing 
measures294. Accordingly, one of the purposes of the present work will be to 
evaluate whether, in disaster scenarios, duties of loyal cooperation may leave 
room to specific duties of solidarity on Member States and on the EU institutions.  
 
2. Solidarity in the event of a disaster within EU law: starting premises 
 
The increase of large-scale natural or man-made disasters occurring within the 
European continent or originating outside but having repercussion on it has 
progressively convinced individual governments that often they do not recognise 
national borders. Such a keen awareness about the plight of disaster victims has 
called the attention to the importance of appropriate national and supranational 
rules and structures for disaster prevention, mitigation and response.  
Not being a harmonised field of law at EU level, solidarity in disaster 
management has always been expressed through transnational cooperation 
between Member States and, therefore, the European Community’s early task was 
just to face internal and external threats in order to secure the economic system. 
But, the acknowledgement of a growing number of areas of common concern has 
assigned to the Union new tasks usually falling within the domain of the States, 
such as the protection of fundamental rights, the right to life and the people as 
such295. Moreover, during the integration process Member States have 
progressively conferred to the EU some competences related to disaster response, 
such as the defence of the environment, social security and civil protection. 
Hence, since the mid- ‘90s, in a trend which accelerated since 2000, specific 
arrangements and strategies aimed at effectively responding to emergencies 
occurring both within and outside the Union’s territory have been created and the 
role of the European Union as a crisis manager has strengthened.  
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Among the worst crises that originated in Europe and in other continents, and that 
the Union has tackled through the instruments at disposal, it is appropriate to 
recall the disaster in a chemical industrial plant in Seveso in Italy 1976; the 
Chernobyl nuclear plant disaster 1986; the outbreak of BSE (‘‘mad cow disease’’) 
in 1996; the flooding in Central Europe in 2002; the outbreak of Severe Acute 
Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) in 2003; the Avian flu; the eruption under the 
glacier of  Eyjafjallajökull (Iceland) in 2010; the recent Ebola virus outbreak in 
Africa and the current migration crisis in Europe. These have represented the 
perfect circumstances in which the ways taken to tackle with crisis phenomena 
have afforded a new understanding of the division of competences between the 
Union and its Member States.  
Against this background, the Lisbon Treaty has consolidated and multiplied the 
references to natural and man-made disasters by giving the European Union new 
responsibilities and instruments to respond to catastrophes in collaboration with 
Member States. First of all, Article 21 TEU, requires the Union to define and 
pursue common policies and actions in order “to assist populations, countries and 
regions confronting natural or man-made disasters”. Such provision can be easily 
related to the EU’s humanitarian aid policy governed by Article 214 TFEU and 
aimed at granting “ad hoc assistance and relief and protection for people in third 
countries who are victims of natural and man-made disasters, in order to meet the 
humanitarian needs resulting from these different situations”.  
With regard to the internal dimension, under the provisions of Article 122 TFEU 
the Council may take a decision on measures to offer financial assistance during 
“exceptional occurrences” or “natural disasters” that may affect Member States. 
Thus, under this provision, solidarity does not force the Council to decide to act, 
but if the Member States do decide to act, they must do so in a spirit of solidarity: 
all the actions undertaken must be governed by the principle. The Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) has also introduced new powers for 
the EU to take action to combat serious cross-border health threats, 
complementing national policies (Article 168 TFEU). Furthermore, Article 196 
relates to the area of civil protection and emphasises the importance of 
“cooperation between Member States in order to improve the effectiveness of 
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systems for preventing and protecting against natural or man-made disasters”. In 
particular, such a new legislation on civil protection represents an attempt to 
cleaning up the previous variegated and heterogeneous legal regimes and moving 
towards pre-planned, predictable and coordinated response through a specific 
operational instrument, that is the EU Civil Protection Mechanism296. 
Last but not least, the Lisbon Treaty now enshrines a specific provision entirely 
dedicated to solidarity in the event of a disaster, that is Article 222 TFEU known 
also as ‘solidarity clause’. This article imposes an explicit and general obligation 
upon the Union and its Member States to act jointly, “in a spirit of solidarity”, if a 
Member State is the object of a terrorist attack297 or the victim of a natural or 
man-made disaster. Moreover, it requires the Union to mobilise all the 
instruments at its disposal, including the military resources made available by the 
Member States, and to Member States to coordinate between themselves in the 
Council. Given its normative impact, as stressed by the Special Rapporteur 
Valencia-Ospina, “this hard-law provision sets the Union apart from other 
regional coordination schemes”298. Indeed, the introduction the solidarity clause 
represents not only the attempt, but also the success, to focus on the need to foster 
‘solidarization’ in the management of emergencies occurring in the Union’s 
territory thus complementing the requirements of solidarity towards third 
countries enshrined in Article 21 TEU.  
 
2.1 The multilayered nature of the EU legal instruments for responding to 
disasters: an introduction 
 
The wording of the above-reported provisions suggests some crucial points for the 
present analysis. In the first place, the general provisions enshrined in Article 21 
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TEU and in Article 222 TFEU make evident that EU law on disaster response 
should not cover events occurring in third countries, but implies some actions of 
solidarity also towards the very EU Member States. And, as it will be clearer from 
the following chapters, over the last two years there has been an important 
improvement as for the instruments of assistance to be deployed within the 
Union’s territory. Moreover, there is to anticipate that, in the event of a disaster, 
solidarity takes shape on a multiplicity of levels thus expressing its 
multidimensional and cross-cutting character which combines policies and goals 
of very different, but interacting, nature. This is the reason why, as anticipated in 
the introduction of the present work, albeit the following chapters will be 
dedicated to analyse the instruments of EU law to be activated in favour of EU 
Member States affected by a disaster and, therefore, the relevance of solidarity in 
its internal dimension, some references to emergencies occurring outside the 
Union will be made for sake of completeness.  
As it will be better illustrated, the mechanisms progressively developed for 
responding to disasters can be activated to provide both financial and in-kind 
assistance. As for the first group, it will be considered the EU Solidarity Fund as 
early instrument of support for Member States affected by disasters as well as the 
EU rules concerning the adoption of public measures by the national authorities 
aimed at aiding companies hit by a calamitous event. Indeed, EU solidarity in case 
of disaster affecting a Member State manifests itself not only through direct 
financing instruments, but also through a number of derogations progressively 
adopted to general legal frameworks concerning State aids and fiscal policies. 
Moreover, it will be made reference to the mechanism for providing immediate 
financial assistance to EU Members established in 2016, that is the EU emergency 
support instrument. As anticipated, in order to indicate the legal features of such 
an instrument in a deeper way, analogies and differences with its ‘twin 
mechanism’, that is the humanitarian aid instrument intended for third countries, 
will be presented. On the other side, the Union Civil Protection Mechanism, 
which is aimed at ensuring the efficient provision of assistance through the 
coordination of the national civil protection systems of the participating States, 
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represents the major expression of in-kind solidarity to be provided to Member 
States and third countries.  
Such a complexity in terms of types of interventions marks the first peculiarity of 
the disaster management system of the Union in comparison to that of other 
regional organisations which, as stressed in the previous chapter, so far do not 
have well-developed mechanisms of assistance. Although such instruments follow 
different logics and therefore parallel levels, they have to be complementary and 
consistent in order to guarantee full effectiveness of the interventions and, 
ultimately, to the principle of solidarity. This is the reason why, as it will be clear 
in the specific analysis pursued in Chapter V, the relevant secondary law 
instruments mention – inter alia – the necessity to promote synergies among them 
and to maximise substantive actions of solidarity.  
The multilayered character of the mechanisms that will be explored involves also 
the relationship between Member States and the Union thereby shaping different 
dynamics of solidarity. Indeed, except for the rules concerning State aid – which 
involve exclusively the European Commission – the other instruments, albeit to 
varying degrees, are characterised by partnerships between the Union and 
Member States that can have a procedural or substantial nature. For example, 
while the actual procedure of activation of the EU solidarity fund is entirely left to 
the Commission, a more detailed analysis suggests that States play a decisive role 
not really for the provision of the funds, but for the preliminary definition of the 
activation criteria of the instrument itself. If conceived in its temporal complexity, 
such an instrument thus requires not only the Union, but also Member States to 
show a de facto solidarity. With regard then the emergency support instrument, it 
will be underlined the centrality of States acting within the Council of the 
European Union. As for the Union Civil Protection Mechanism, the resources 
deployed in the field are voluntarily put at disposal by Member States while the 
Union is required to guarantee coordination and send experts at the site of the 
occurrence. Therefore, the Member States and the Union are asked to be 
complement and reinforce each other: in this case solidarity towards the affected 
State goes through both the actors simultaneously. Finally, the provision of 
assistance through the emergency support instrument, since intended only for 
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exceptional disasters, is proposed by the Commission and decided collectively by 
Member States within the Council. In this field, the Union provides assistance by 
complementing States and without impacting on their individual actions. 
The EU disaster management system is, hence, the result of mechanisms operating 
in different moments, for the provision of financial or in-kind assistance from 
both the Union as independent actor and Member States. The challenge of the 
next chapters will be to verify whether the so-called ‘EU disaster response law’, 
that embodies all the legal instruments which will be reported, effectively 
regulates a coherent ‘system of solidarity’ able, therefore, to comply with the 
solidarity requirements enshrined both in EU primary and secondary law. Finally, 
starting from a deep analysis of the legal value of the solidarity clause enshrined 
in Article 222 TFEU, it will be explored whether in the field of disaster response 
some duties of solidarity, specifically the duty to provide assistance in case of 
disaster, insisting both on Member States and on the Union and having an 
autonomous character vis-à-vis the principle of loyalty exist.  
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CHAPTER III 
 
TRADITIONAL FORMS OF SOLIDARITY:  
EU INSTRUMENTS OF FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE TO COPE 
WITH DISASTERS 
 
 
In the EU, the ad hoc solidarity enshrined in the Treaties is understood above all 
in terms of economic and financial support. Indeed, when a State is affected by a 
major disaster, the immediate and more concrete form of assistance seems to be 
the financial one that, addressed both to the national authorities and to all the 
other intervening relevant actors, raises the donors’ profile of generosity and 
solidarity.  
Starting from such an awareness, various sources of direct financing following an 
emergency occurring within and outside the Union’s territory have been 
established and progressively improved in order to meet the increasing needs of 
solidarity stemming from the Treaties. The overview on these instruments, 
however, cannot be limited to direct forms of financial assistance which are made 
available in accordance with the general budget of the Union, but it shall be 
extended also to other sectors of EU law that become relevant in the event of a 
disaster. In particular, it will be given an account of the EU rules concerning the 
adoption of public measures by the national authorities aimed at aiding companies 
hit by a calamitous event in order to evaluate whether the solidarity expressed by 
the Union towards Member States in this field reflects or differs from that 
embedded by the other financial instruments. Indeed, even though such a 
discipline falls in issues of competition law by implying a control rather than a 
provision of financial assistance, it is strictly linked to the whole regime of EU 
disaster response law that shall not comprise just immediate and targeted 
interventions, but also long-term and comprehensive measures aimed at rebuilding 
the whole economic and social framework of the affected territories. 
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1. Making good the damage: support instruments for affected Member States 
 
1.1 The EU Solidarity Fund as instrument for disaster recovery 
 
The multilevel dimension of solidarity within the EU legal order has been firstly 
made evident in 2002 when it was established the EU Solidarity Fund 
(hereinafter, EUSF)299 aimed at helping Member States against natural disasters. 
Indeed, over that year, devastating and exceptional floods, caused by a period of 
heavy rains, hit Central Europe resulting in casualties and damages amounting to 
billions of euro. The EU and Member States responded relatively quickly to these 
crises, but it was soon signalled the need to establish a financial instrument 
operating at EU level to show solidarity with the population of the affected 
regions. The Commission, therefore, proposed the establishment of a special fund 
according to Article 159 TEC (currently Article 175 TFEU), on the strengthening 
of economic, social and territorial cohesion within the Union, for “reducing 
disparities between the levels of development of the various regions and the 
backwardness of the least favoured regions”300.  
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The Fund has the objective to contribute, in the shortest time possible, in 
mobilizing emergency services to meet the immediate needs of the population and 
to reconstruct short-term damaged key infrastructures in order to facilitate the 
resumption of economic activities. As a consequence, this financial instrument 
covers only essential emergency operations, such as the restoration of 
infrastructures to working order, the cleaning up of disaster-stricken areas and the 
costs of rescue services and temporary accommodation for the population 
concerned and the securing of preventive infrastructures and measures of 
immediate protection of the cultural heritage301. The EUSF may be activated in 
cases of major natural disasters with serious repercussions on living conditions, 
the natural environment or the economy in one or more Member States or 
accessing countries. Therefore, the assistance takes the form of a non-
reimbursable grant302 to the beneficiary State that is fully responsible for its 
implementation303. Since its establishment, the EUSF has been used in seventy 
occasions covering a range of different catastrophic events including floods, forest 
fires, earthquakes, storms and drought thus reaching the total value of more than 
EUR 3.7 billion304. Among all the cases of activation, it deserves to be recalled 
the major support granted in 2012, on the occasion of the earthquake in Italy and, 
precisely in Emilia Romagna, Lombardy and Veneto, for which the Commission 
allocated a record of EUR 670 million305.  
Despite its significant added value in addressing overwhelming emergencies 
within the EU – by alleviating the financial burden on Member States and 
fostering the visibility of the action of the EU among its citizens – the functioning 
of the fund has more than once raised some critiques and suggestions of revision. 
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In particular, the Commission perceived the necessity to strengthen the solidarity 
aspect of EU crisis management by extending the scope and improving the 
operation mechanisms of the EUSF. Indeed, the existing Union programmes and 
funds were inadequate in not dealing with also man-made disasters and major 
emergencies that might threaten public health, such as possible outbreaks of 
SARS or nuclear accidents. As a consequence, in 2005 the Commission proposed 
a new regulation for the EUSF containing a lot of improvements, such as the 
lowering of the thresholds for being granted assistance, more flexible criteria to be 
respected and the opportunity of advanced payments to be granted immediately 
after a disaster306.  
The proposal from the Commission was addressed to the Council and the 
European Parliament which introduced a set of amendments. Albeit the European 
Parliament agreed with the need for a wider scope of the EUSF and the lowering 
of the thresholds for applications, at the same time it did not want to let the 
Commission alone decide whether a disaster could fall within the scope of the 
Regulation307. Such a motivation was used also by the Council, where several 
Member States were reluctant to revise the EUSF because it could lead to other 
not desirable changes and to a strengthening of the EU in this area308. Hence, the 
Commission proposal was definitely blocked because of the persistent reluctance 
of States to favour an ‘Europeanization’ of financial solidarity animated by the 
fear of improper use from other Member States. As a consequence, the demand 
for solidarity in this field collided with that for protection of the EU fortune and, 
indirectly, of the national ones.   
In this situation of impasse, in 2008 the European Court of Auditors made a first 
evaluation of the EU Solidarity Fund, by focusing on the ability to provide 
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assistance in a rapid, efficient and flexible manner309. In its findings the Court of 
Auditors concluded that the EUSF had not lived up to its aim of providing rapid 
assistance, by highlighting that it had taken an average of more than one year for 
the successful applicants to receive financial assistance. It was underscored that 
the most time-consuming phase was the Commission’s assessment of the 
applications, because of administrative rules, Commissions’ working procedures 
as well as the promptness and quality of the applicants’ information and 
requests310.  
The same shortcomings were issued by the Commission in 2011 in its 
Communication on the Future of the European Union Solidarity Fund311, 
whereby it essentially acknowledged that under the regulation in force and the 
budgetary rules it was difficult to significantly shorten the time necessary to make 
grants available. Notably, the Commission underlined the need to find new ways 
for making financial aid to Member States more rapidly available by stressing, 
inter alia, its incapacity to apply equal level of solidarity vis-à-vis an EU Member 
State as compared to a third country to which an immediate financial assistance 
can be granted312. As a result, despite the deadlock of 2005, after the entry into 
force of the Lisbon Treaty, the Commission decided to submit another amending 
proposal to Regulation 2012/2002 which was then negotiated under the ordinary 
legislative procedure ex Article 294 TFEU.  
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1.1.1 Regulation (EU) 661/2014: a step forward in granting financial assistance 
under the EUSF 
 
On 15 May 2014 the amending Regulation (EU) 661/2014 entered into force313. In 
a larger effort to make the Union more efficient and comprehensive in dealing 
with major emergency situations, the Commission made noteworthy and 
substantive changes on the procedure of granting that now deserve to be assessed 
for the purposes of the present work.  
First of all, it must be underlined that, according to the current regulation, the EU 
Solidarity Fund can be activated in the event of a “major disaster”, namely 
whether it has resulted in damage estimated either at or over EUR 3 billion, or 
more than 0,6% of its gross national income of the affected Member State314. 
Under exceptional circumstances, the Fund may also be used for “regional natural 
disasters” involving the major part of its population and resulting in direct damage 
in excess of 1,5 % of that region’s gross domestic product315. As a consequence, 
the request of funding through the EUSF does not imply the existence of a link 
with specific circumstances as previously listed, but just with the serious character 
of the event, regardless its origin – that, however, shall remain natural –, and with 
a minimum threshold of damage.  
Insofar as such preliminary requirements are met, according to the new procedure, 
the national authorities of the affected Member State within twelve weeks – and 
no longer ten – after the occurrence of the damage may submit their request of 
activation of the EUSF to the Commission by including all the “available 
information” concerning: a) the total damage caused by the disaster and its impact 
on the population, the economy and the environment concerned; b) the estimated 
cost of the operations; c) any other sources of Union funding; d) any other sources 
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of national or international funding, including public and private insurance 
coverage which might contribute to the costs of repairing the damage and e) a 
short description of the implementation of Union legislation on disaster risk 
prevention and management related to the nature of the natural disaster316. 
Moreover, Article 2 of Regulation 661/2014 confirms that also a neighbouring 
Member State or country involved in accession negotiations with the European 
Union, which is affected by the same disaster, can benefit from assistance from 
the Fund317.  
On the basis of the information received by the national authorities, the 
Commission has a maximum of six weeks for assessing whether the conditions for 
mobilizing the EUSF are met and, if so, for determining the amount of the grant to 
be proposed both to the European Parliament and the Council318. Once the 
appropriations are made available, the Commission shall adopt an implementing 
decision and pay the grant immediately and in a single instalment to the 
beneficiary State. The funding has to be used within eighteen months from the 
date when the grant has been given and, no later than six months after this period, 
the beneficiary State or region shall present a report on the implementation of the 
financial contribution from the fund by justifying the expenditure and indicating 
any other source of funding received for the operations concerned319.  
Among the main and tangible improvements brought by the amending Regulation, 
it emerges the possibility of granting an advance payment upon request by the 
affected State shortly after the application for a financial contribution from the 
Fund has been submitted to the Commission320. The only condition is that the sum 
does not exceed 10% of the anticipated total amount of the financial contribution 
from the EUSF, capped at EUR 30 million. Such enhancement can be explained 
by the interest of combining the practical need of further accelerating the process 
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with that of respecting the demands of solidarity that has inspired the creation of 
the EUSF, which until 2016 was the only fund available for the immediate relief 
and recovery in the stages after a disaster321. The meaningful and increasing idea 
is, indeed, that solidarity implies not only a substantive element, but also a 
temporal one and, thus, should be matched with the concept of ‘prompt 
assistance’.  
The new legal framework concerning the EU Solidarity Fund is part of a growing 
awareness of the importance of solidarity in crisis management and in particular 
in the post-emergency phase. At present, however, the Fund does have still some 
limits that should be taken into account by the EU institutions.  
In the first place, it is questionable the fact that – notwithstanding the calls of the 
European Parliament and the 2005 Commission proposal – the regulation 
currently in force does not cover man-made disasters or other complex 
emergencies not having a proper natural character. Besides, albeit extremely 
objective, the definition of the events that may trigger the activation of the EUSF 
appears definitely limited, as including only the direct damage suffered, but not 
the loss of profit, which is certainly more difficult to assess. Alongside this, there 
is to say that the granting of the financial support is based on the calculation of the 
damages arising from a single event, while it should be more appropriate to 
consider a cumulative calculation of the damages caused by disastrous events in a 
full calendar year.  
In the second place, the EUSF cannot cover more or less severe damage to the 
economic and productive activities of the territory (especially SMEs, farms and 
tourist activities) in addition to the serious consequences for the social system and 
housing arising from these events. Thus, it emerges the need to resort, if 
necessary, to other instruments that have national origin such as State aids. As 
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well known, the granting of State measures to businesses are strongly controlled 
by the Union as part of the competition policy, but an analysis on the EU 
regulatory framework in this field may contribute to complete – albeit in an 
indirect way – the whole picture on the financial mechanisms of response to 
disasters. Moreover, although the regulatory framework on State aids seems 
unrelated to the issue concerning to the post-emergency situations, it is gradually 
gaining importance in the debates on reconstruction and on the respect of 
solidarity requirements in the event of a disaster. 
 
1.2 The EU’ State aid regime and the EU fiscal rules in the event of a disaster  
 
European solidarity in case of disasters affecting Member States manifests itself 
not only through direct financing instruments, but also through a number of 
derogations progressively adopted to the general legal frameworks concerning 
State aids and fiscal policies.  
In case of serious natural or man-made disasters, the most immediate and obvious 
responses are direct support measures, such as emergency services, assistance to 
the population as well as the securing of buildings and of natural sites. For more 
long-term recovery and reconstruction, depending on the extent of the catastrophe, 
national authorities could take more resolute decisions in favour of local 
entrepreneurship, by giving direct or indirect aid to companies and small 
businesses, such as the suspension of contributions and tax payments as well as 
the granting of social security contributions, grants, subsidies and loans.  
The opportunity to grant State aids to enterprises in difficulty is, thus, one of the 
instruments that national authorities have always used to support them in the 
phases of recovery and reconstruction thereby showing national solidarity322. 
However, in general terms, according to Article 107 TFEU “any aid granted by a 
Member State or through State resources in any form whatsoever which distorts or 
threatens to distort competition by favouring certain undertakings or the 
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production of certain goods shall, insofar as it affects trade between Member 
States, be incompatible with the internal market”. The rationale of this provision 
is that a market territorially limited and circumscribed shall enable any business to 
welcome and attract both domestic and foreign companies without any advantage 
being granted through State resources323. To this end, Article 107 TFEU does not 
distinguish between measures on the basis of the causes that have triggered them 
or of their purposes, but according to their effect, namely producing, either 
directly or indirectly, a selective economic benefit to the recipient undertaking.  
Albeit such a rigidity, even before the notion of solidarity was strongly introduced 
by the Lisbon Treaty, the regulatory framework on State aid permeated the 
general prohibition through the derogations contained in Article 87 TEC (now 
Article 107 TFEU) which provided for a list of aids automatically compatible324 
and a list of those that can be considered compatible by the Commission under its 
own discretion325.  
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The list of aids ex lege compatible includes also those directly intended to make 
good “the damage caused by natural disasters or other exceptional occurrences”, 
thus limiting the discretionary power of the European Commission to authorize 
the aid. It has to be said, however, that it is a general ‘presumption of 
compatibility’ that does not exclude an unlawfulness in the specific case which 
shall be evaluated by the Commission itself. In fact, until recently, the measures 
had to be notified to the Commission that verified if the conditions set up by 
Article 107, para. 2, TFEU were met, thus leading to delays and limited 
effectiveness of the contributions. In addition to the time necessary for making an 
objective assessment, the Commission’s work was also slowed down by the 
absence of a common EU regulatory framework containing guidelines on the 
possible instruments to be adopted.  
To further simplify the procedure, the Council has integrated aids to compensate 
for damage caused by natural disasters in the new General Block Exemption 
Regulation applicable as from 1 July 2014326 which broadens the categories of aid 
that the Commission may exempt from the ex ante obligation of notification. 
Against this new background, it is clear that Member States bear a greater 
responsibility for the implementation of the new rules. In fact, the new categories 
of aid subject to notification exemption are not exempted from an ex-post control 
by the Commission over the respect of specific conditions. In particular, it checks 
whether the occurrence invoked to justify the granting of aid qualifies as a natural 
disaster, whether there is a direct causal link between the damage and the natural 
disaster and finally, if the national measure does not result in overcompensation of 
the damage effectively suffered as a consequence of the natural disaster.  
In this way, it has been acknowledged the need to streamline the monitoring 
procedure, thus ensuring full support and offering further solidarity to Member 
States by giving them the opportunity to react more quickly to make good the 
damage suffered, without jeopardising the monitoring role of the Commission327. 
Accordingly, over In this way, it has been acknowledged the need to streamline 
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the monitoring procedure, thus ensuring full support and offering further 
solidarity to Member States by giving them the opportunity to react more quickly 
to make good the damage suffered, without jeopardising the monitoring role of 
the Commission328. the last years the Commission has made some steps forward 
to support States in the reconstruction process, by acting in line with the demands 
of solidarity enshrined in the Treaties and by giving substance to that vertical 
solidarity between the EU institutions and Member States which characterises the 
EU legal order329.  
 
1.2.1 Negative elements affecting solidarity in the field of State aids regime 
 
Despite this recent positive improvement and the fact that the Commission has 
rarely declared an aid granted by national authorities after a disaster incompatible, 
from a strictly legal point of view, current legislation is still characterized by some 
challenges that deserve attention since they may risk undermining the demands of 
solidarity that should fuel the Union’s approach towards a State in need.  
First of all, it is appropriate to explore to what extent the exceptions contained in 
the 2014 Regulation operate by reporting the meaning attributed over time to the 
concepts of “natural disaster” and “exceptional occurrences” falling within the 
scope of current Article 107, para. 2, TFUE which, according both to the 
Commission and the CJEU, should be interpreted restrictively330. As for the 
notion of “natural disaster”, the Commission has preferred to demarcate the scope 
of application of Article 107, para. 2, point b, TFEU by specifically indicating an 
exhaustive list of events that can fall within the concept, rather than providing a 
more generic and objective definition.  
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As laid down in recital 69 of Regulation 651/2014, the list of situations that can be 
recognised as natural disasters comprises “earthquakes, landslides, floods, in 
particular floods brought about by waters overflowing river banks or lake shores, 
avalanches, tornadoes, hurricanes, volcanic eruptions and wildfires of natural 
origin”331. Despite the situations covered are wide-ranging, the letter of the recital 
does leave no room for new types of assessments or for the introduction of new 
categories of disasters. In addition, the regulation sets that the damage caused by 
adverse weather conditions such as frost, hail, ice, rain or drought, which occur on 
a more regular basis, should not be considered as natural disasters within the 
meaning of Article 107, para.2, point b, TFEU. This exclusion seems quite 
curious since in Guidelines for State aid in the agricultural and forestry sectors 
and in rural areas 2014 - 2020, the Commission explicitly keeps open the option 
of considering compatible with EU law those aids granted in occasion of adverse 
weather situations comparable to disasters which destroy more than 30% of 
average annual production332. Moreover, the intensification of events related to 
climate change might require a more frequent State intervention in favour of 
businesses that have suffered from extensive damage due to extraordinary weather 
events. The exemption from notification without a clear definition of the concept 
of natural disaster could paradoxically lead to an increase number of 
incompatibility cases, and, consequently, of the proceedings to recover the aid 
already bestowed to companies that perhaps without such incentives would not 
have rebalanced their losses.  
With regard to the concept of “exceptional occurrences”, there is no doubt that it 
may comprise a variety of defining options, since it only highlights the 
extraordinary nature of the event, but not other intrinsic characteristics. It could, 
thus, be seen as a residual category potentially including a variety of situations, 
such as internal disturbances, strikes, serious nuclear or industrial accidents, 
severe health emergencies and even terrorist acts. Over the years, the Commission 
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has demonstrated a certain openness in this regard333, by determining the 
compatibility of State aids granted, for example, in occasion of the Erika oil 
tanker accident, the Chernobyl nuclear disaster, the crisis sparked by the dioxin 
contamination in animal feed as well as that of the bovine spongiform 
encephalopathy (commonly known as the disease of “mad cow disease”)334. 
However, Regulation 651/2014 has excluded the so-called “exceptional events” 
from those situations that may be exempted from prior notification.  
Prima facie, this choice is understandable since the inclusion of such a wide 
category would create not only some confusion about the events subjected to the 
new regulation, but also an ex post excessive monitoring work for the 
Commission. In addition, the automatic compatibility of the above-mentioned 
events could encourage the entrepreneurs not to take precautionary measures 
against foreseeable occurrences to limit the damages. Despite this, it seems less 
evident why there has been no mention of specific events whose origin is not 
natural, but that in certain circumstances may be regarded as natural disasters in 
terms of impact and need for intervention. Indeed, also disasters of anthropic 
character like far-reaching industrial or nuclear accidents as well as health or 
environmental emergencies, could have negative consequences on the functioning 
of the society so as to require early interventions by the national authorities 
through measures falling in the guidelines on State aids. As a result, while on the 
one hand the adoption of Regulation 615/2014 represents a positive step in the 
procedure for granting aid, on the other hand it has contributed to accentuate some 
uncertainties the defining framework. 
The second criticism is linked to the requirement whereby a direct causal link 
between the damage suffered and the natural disaster is demonstrated in order to 
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avoid overcompensation335 and, consequently, incompatibility336. Definitely, it is 
reasonable that whether a company has been the beneficiary of an inappropriate 
advantage, the value corresponding to the facilitation obtained should be paid 
back. This notwithstanding, it is necessary to make a further consideration.  
In disaster settings it is not always straightforward to identify a clear dividing line 
between the overall damage – which should also include consequential damage 
and loss of profits – and the amount unduly granted. In addition, the mere location 
of an enterprise necessarily creates an economic damage that may not be evident 
at first sight. The context in which businesses operate after a disaster is certainly 
not equal to that of the normal operation of the market, where any government 
intervention can, effectively, distort competition. On the contrary, the occurrence 
of severe natural disasters, such as earthquakes, tornadoes and floods, can lead to 
the weakening of the entire local economy where the rules of the competition are 
undermined and businesses (especially SMEs) must operate in a competitive 
situation that is distorted. Same, if not worse, problems may then arise for those 
businesses located in large areas affected by serious exceptional events, such as 
nuclear or industrial accidents, whose effects in terms of environmental and 
temporal impact cannot be immediately estimated. Therefore, in such 
circumstances, the order of recovery would further penalize the already highly 
injured businesses and, once again, limit the full effectiveness of solidarity in the 
event of disaster and, consequently, the citizens’ trust in the Union. 
 
1.2.2 Solidarity and national budget balance: some brief reflections 
 
The occurrence of a disaster and the consequent fiscal measures that national 
governments adopt may affect also the whole system of EU public finance and the 
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new rules deriving from the recent Fiscal Compact337. In fact, any measure aimed 
at facilitating the rebuilding of public and private facilities should be included in 
the national Budget Stability Act within the expenditures, thus contributing to 
worsen the annual budget balance. Furthermore, according to the Stability and 
Growth Pact, each country should avoid significant deviation in their annual 
budgets from their medium term budgetary objective.  
Such an imposition is fuelling the debates on how to combine the overall post-
emergency costs with the need to ensure a national balanced budget in the 
framework of the Stability and Growth Pact. In this regard, the document 
containing Specifications on the implementation of the Stability and Growth Pact 
and Guidelines on the format and content of Stability and Convergence 
Programmes further states that “in exceptional cases, the change in the structural 
balance is also adjusted to take account of large-scale unexpected events requiring 
a budgetary response, such as natural disaster”338. Among examples of one-off 
and temporary measures there are “the sales of nonfinancial assets; receipts of 
auctions of publicly owned licenses; short-term emergency costs emerging from 
natural disasters; tax amnesties; revenues resulting from the transfers of pension 
obligations and assets”339. It is, thus, possible to “derogate” to the general rules on 
the balanced budget for interventions of immediate relief and assistance. The 
major problem stems from the fact that the constraints imposed by the Fiscal 
Compact, while contemplating the option to deviate from the medium-term one-
off in case of exceptional events, do not provide the possibility to exclude the 
costs of prevention and securing of the public infrastructure and buildings nor 
those for the reconstruction of private buildings and production activities from the 
calculation of the deficit.  
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Against this background, the European Parliament340 has recently invited the 
Commission to introduce major flexibility in the procedure of evaluation of the 
national deficit. In particular, it has suggested to consider the chance that, in 
serious cases wherein it is clear the intense financial pressure supported by the 
public authorities at national, regional and local level, the investments for 
sustainable reconstruction and prevention, including those co-financed by the 
structural funds, are excluded from the calculation of the public deficit.  
Such a proposal might pave the way for a major compliance with the requirements 
of solidarity between Member States and Union. Indeed, albeit the Commission 
should certainly expect States to act in full compliance with the criteria 
established in these fields in the light of the principle of sincere cooperation, it 
would be appropriate that the Union’s obligation to provide assistance according 
to the principle of solidarity was not limited to the stage of first intervention, but 
that operated in a long-term perspective, by embracing also the reconstruction 
phase and the prevention one in order to offer to citizens the security and stability 
needed to continue living in their territories. 
 
1.3 Solidarity and conditionality: two concealable principles? 
 
The analysis so far reported makes evident that, with regard to the EU Solidarity 
Fund and the State aid regime, solidarity – even though at the basis of the 
improvements made in these fields after the adoption of the Lisbon Treaty – has to 
be balanced with specific conditions to be respected by the Member States. This 
leads to the question of how conditionality may acquire some relevance also in the 
field of disaster response when dealing with financial assistance. Although it is 
not possible to deepen the numerous problems raised by the application of this 
requirement, for the purposes of the present work it is notable, even only shortly, 
to reflect on the relationship between the latter and the principle of solidarity. 
Actually, the issue of conditionality is well-known with reference to the field of 
the EU economic governance and, mainly, to the financial assistance packages 
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and mechanisms that have been put in place to respond to the needs of those EU 
Member States that suffered most from the economic crisis341. In order to receive 
the financial help, recipient States are required to adopt a set of fiscal 
consolidation measures aimed at halting the deterioration in their public finance 
position. In this context, conditionality is a preventative remedy that serves two 
different purposes. First, it aims to reduce moral hazard and to ensure that 
resources are actually used to solve the beneficiary State’s problems. Secondly, 
conditionality is also meant to protect the whole Euro-zone against possible 
negative spill over by safeguarding its long-term financial stability. 
The requirement of conditionality has then been endorsed and confirmed by the 
very CJEU in the already mentioned Pringle case wherein the Court, rather than 
to call on the principle of solidarity342, stressed that financial assistance is 
permissible under Article 125 TFEU provided that “the granting of any financial 
assistance under the mechanism will be made subject to strict conditionality, that 
the mechanism will operate in a way that will comply with European Union 
law”343 and that, in any case, assistance could be granted only in case of danger to 
the euro area as a whole. Such a conclusion has already suggested a first debate on 
the conciliation between a reasoning based on the potential danger to the whole 
euro area (and not to a single EU Member) and the principle of solidarity. In this 
regard, there is to say that – on account of the very CJEU jurisprudence – 
solidarity has been always considered expression of the desire to act in the name 
of the common good, thereby subjecting national interests to the more general 
one. However, in this specific case, the pursuit of the common goal has put in 
disadvantage and worsen the hardship suffered by Member States in the absence 
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of assistance344. The economic and financial crisis has thus exposed the principle 
of solidarity to new challenges that the Court should have clarified and addressed 
in a more detailed way.  
Returning to the topic of the relationship between conditionality and solidarity in 
the field of financial assistance granted in disaster scenarios, both the EU 
Solidarity Fund and the State aid regime introduce some clear conditions that have 
to be respected by the affected Member States in order to fall in the scope of 
application of such instruments.  
With regard to the first instrument of financial solidarity, it is meaningful the fact 
that, in Article 4, para.2, of the Regulation revised in 2014, it is set that the 
Commission  
“may reject a further application for a financial contribution relating to a 
natural disaster of the same nature or reduce the amount to be made 
available where the Member State is the subject of infringement proceedings 
and the Court of Justice of the European Union has delivered a final 
judgment that the Member State concerned has failed to implement Union 
legislation on disaster risk prevention and management, which is directly 
linked to the nature of the natural disaster suffered” [emphasis added]345.  
 
Such a provision shall be read in conjunction with recital 17 that underscores the 
importance to ensure eligible States prevent natural disasters from occurring and 
mitigate their effects, by fully implementing relevant Union legislation on disaster 
risk prevention and management and by using the available Union funding for 
relevant investments, such as the EU Regional Development Fund which can co-
finance preventive actions, productive investments and rebuilding of 
infrastructure346.  
In principle, such a caveat is acceptable because stimulates the EU Members to 
adequate their national structures and laws to the EU legislation on disaster risk 
reduction and management, as well as, ultimately, to the Sendai Framework. 
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Moreover, it confirms the Union’s intention to conceive disaster management in 
its whole dimension by covering not only the phase of disaster response and 
recovery, but also that of prevention thus creating an extensive and coherent 
policy in this field of action. This notwithstanding, subjecting the granting of 
financial assistance in the event of a serious disaster to conditions cannot be 
considered totally compatible with the principle of solidarity which should guide 
the Union action for the final purpose of providing help to the affected population 
as stressed in the Preamble of the very Regulation 2012/2002.  
Similarly, the evident conditions set by the Commission with regard to the 
compatibility of the measures adopted by the Member State in favour to the local 
companies following a disaster seem to rise some unbalances with the principle of 
solidarity. After all, by reformulating the Court statement with regard to State aid, 
“the derogations from free competition in favour of [aid to make good the damage 
caused by natural disasters or exceptional occurrences] are based on the aim of 
Community solidarity”347. And, according to the CJEU, “in exercising its 
discretion, the Commission should to ensure that the aims of free competition and 
Community solidarity are reconciled, whilst complying with the principle of 
proportionality”348. Instead, establishing specific situations which may benefit 
from such derogations (to the exclusion of others) and requiring a strict and exact 
calculation of the damages suffered by each private entity without considering the 
whole economic situation, risks again to jeopardise the effective granting of the 
aid to those who have been deeply affected by the event occurred.  
Behind the choice to include such conditions in the illustrated instruments, there is 
certainly the intention to increase the responsibility attributed to Member States in 
the management of internal crises in order to limit their attempts of moral hazard. 
Borrowing from the arguments dealing with financial and economic issues, also 
with regard to calamitous events national authorities should demonstrate to be 
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aware of their commitments and responsibilities before not only their own 
population, but also the other EU Members and the very Union. Hence, 
responsibility would be the feeder between solidarity and conditionality, and, the 
latter would be a sort of insurance for the right balance between external solidarity 
and national responsibility.  
Notwithstanding the principle of conditionality has been rightly conceived for 
preventing measures of financial assistance from becoming ‘abused’ by Member 
States, it actually appears quite problematic and sometimes hardly reconcilable 
with the final aim of these tools, that is to support the people in need according to 
a people-centred approach (and in this case a EU citizens-centred approach). 
Therefore, it can be doubted that conditionality can be considered an expression 
of the principle of solidarity in its essence of principle guiding the action of the 
Union and the Member States349. Moreover, conditionality may affect solidarity 
also in its social dimension as the imposition of specific requirements for the 
granting of assistance can impinge on the respect of the fundamental economic as 
well social rights, now part of primary law for all intents and purposes, of the 
affected population. 
 
2. The EU emergency support instrument: a new tool for internal 
emergencies? 
 
For a long time, the EU Solidarity Fund has been the main financial instrument 
for supporting Member States in the event of a disaster, but, as already stressed, it 
is mainly aimed at intervening in the phase of recovery and at macro-financial 
level. On the contrary, immediate financial support has always been directed to 
third countries by resorting to the humanitarian aid instrument, that has been the 
first ever tool to be created in order to cope with major disasters. Therefore, one 
can argue that financial solidarity as constitutional paradigm within EU law was 
initially more a manifestation of the Union’s external projection rather than a 
vehicle of internal cooperation. The introduction of an emergency support 
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 With reference to the application of the principle of solidarity during the economic crisis in 
Europe, see J.-V. Louis, “Solidarité budgétaire et financière dans l’Union européenne”, cit.. 
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instrument may represent an important novelty in this field thus filling an 
important gap with regard to financial assistance to Member States in the event of 
a disaster.  
 
2.1 Filling the gap with the international solidarity provided by the humanitarian 
aid instrument  
 
In order to understand whether and to what extent the establishment of the 
emergency support instrument may impact on the provision of financial assistance 
to EU Member States in emergency scenarios, firstly it is essential to offer a brief 
overview of the main legal contours of the humanitarian aid instrument that has 
been the first useful tool in the hands of the EU for responding to crisis occurring 
in third countries.  
The origins of this instrument shall be traced back to the first connections with the 
developing countries during the last years of the 60s’ and, in particular, to the 
second Yaoundé Convention (1969) with the Association of the Associated 
African States and Madagascar (AASM) whose purpose was to provide 
emergency aid to the governments of AASM countries suffering from exceptional 
economic difficulties (e.g. collapsing commodity prices) or natural disasters (e.g. 
floods or famine). One decade later, the first Lomé Convention signed in 1975 
with the ACP group (African, Caribbean and Pacific countries) introduced an 
important innovation350. Humanitarian assistance started to be directly addressed 
to the victims and not to the national governments of the ACP countries, thus 
bringing the European Community’s humanitarian aid policy more in line with the 
international humanitarian principles, by emphasising the apolitical and 
independent nature of humanitarian aid351.  
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Cambridge Polity Press, 2003, pp. 97-101; M. Holland, M. Doidge, The European Union and the 
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Based on the recommendations of a European Commission Task Force on the 
improvement of emergency aid activities, the Commissioners then in charge of 
external relations established ECHO in November 1991352. This new service was 
located within the Commission and was exclusively dedicated to the management 
of humanitarian assistance, but the responsibilities remained scattered among 
different Directorate-Generals depending on the nature of the crisis and the 
destination of the funds.  
For a long time, such an instrument was closely associated with the activities in 
the field of development cooperation as stressed by the fact that the main 
normative instrument (still) regulating humanitarian aid, that is Regulation (EC) 
1257/96353, was adopted ex Article 130W TEC 8 (now Article 209 TFEU) on 
development cooperation354. But, humanitarian aid and development cooperation 
have been gradually conceived as fundamentally different, both in terms of 
application and in terms of guiding principles355. In fact, while development 
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Aid – Time for Revision?”, in H. J. Heintze and A. Zwitter (eds), International Law and 
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policies are based on a long-term perspective aimed at, inter alia, eradicating 
poverty, helping people acquire competences and fostering sustainable 
development, interventions of humanitarian aid are basically oriented to contexts 
of emergency and to a short-term approach356. Furthermore, the provision of 
humanitarian assistance is based on the principles of humanity, neutrality, 
impartiality and independence357, while development cooperation requires an in-
depth political dialogue with national authorities and the civil societies, thereby 
doing away the essential element of independence.  
During the work of drafting of the European Convention, the necessity to 
acknowledge the speciality of humanitarian aid in comparison to development 
cooperation raised358 thereby triggering the introduction of a specific Treaty 
provision exclusively devoted to this sector in order to strengthen the elaboration 
of a more professional and independent humanitarian aid policy at the EU level. 
The failure of the procedure of ratification of the Constitutional Treaty in 2004 
did not represent a step back in the recognition of the specificity of humanitarian 
aid as instrument of EU external policy. Indeed, as with so many issues, the 
Lisbon Treaty re-proposed such intention by including an explicit and separate 
legal basis for the EU’s action in the field of humanitarian aid in Article 214 
TFEU359. Besides, in December 2007, the European Commission, the European 
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 In this respect, it is worth underlining that the scope of application ratione loci covers not only 
countries affected by natural or man-made disasters, interpreted according to a stricto sensu logic, 
but more in general to war contexts.  
357
 It is worth to note that while the principles of humanity, neutrality and impartiality are 
commonly recognised as the leading principles for humanitarian response in disaster situations, the 
principle of independence may be considered as a derived principle insofar as it integrates the 
content of the former by requiring the autonomy of humanitarian objectives from political, 
economic, military or other objectives. 
358
 See, Note from Mr Poul Nielson, member of the European Commission, on Humanitarian 
Assistance, doc. Working Group VII, Working Document 48, 21 November 2002.  
359
 See, Article 214 TFEU: “1. The Union’s operations in the field of humanitarian aid shall be 
conducted within the framework of the principles and objectives of the external action of the 
Union. Such operations shall be intended to provide ad hoc assistance and relief and protection for 
people in third countries who are victims of natural or man-made disasters, in order to meet the 
humanitarian needs resulting from these different situations. The Union’s measures and those of 
the Member States shall complement and reinforce each other. 2. Humanitarian aid operations 
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Parliament, the Council and the Member States jointly adopted the European 
Consensus on Humanitarian Aid360, thus adding a solid political character to the 
legal framework upon which such an instrument is based361.  
As anticipated, even after the adoption of the Lisbon Treaty, the instrument of 
secondary law governing the provision of humanitarian assistance is Council 
Regulation 1257/96 under which the EU finances in the form of grants for about 
€1 billion annually and coordinates projects implemented by NGOs and 
international organisations, as well as “if necessary” by the Commission itself or 
specialized agencies of Member States, for assisting over 120 million people 
every year362. For this purpose, Regulation 1257/96 describes a number of 
                                                                                                                                                               
shall be conducted in compliance with the principles of international law and with the principles of 
impartiality, neutrality and non-discrimination. 3. The European Parliament and the Council, 
acting in accordance with the ordinary legislative procedure, shall establish the measures defining 
the framework within which the Union’s humanitarian aid operations shall be implemented. 4. The 
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eligibility criteria for NGOs’ grantees, including with regard to their experience, 
technical and logistical capacity, willingness to cooperate with coordination 
structures, and empowers the Commission to set additional standards. The 
necessity to select the EU partners according to a strict procedure comes from the 
fact that the Union is obliged to respect the specific characteristics and 
fundamental guiding principles of the EU’s humanitarian aid as revealed by the 
combined reading of Regulation 1257/96, Article 214 TFEU and the European 
Consensus which draw strength from the broader international legal framework 
and the so-called acquis humanitaire363.  
Besides underlining the importance of the respect of some key principles as 
precondition for the implementation of the EU’s humanitarian activities, the 
Lisbon Treaty codifies also the EU’s competence to act in this field, that is 
traditionally linked to the external policy of the States. Pursuant to Article 4, para. 
                                                                                                                                                               
during a given period. In addition, an EU Emergency Aid Reserve can be called upon to respond 
to unforeseen events and major crises and to transfer unused amounts from other EU funding 
programmes to humanitarian aid during the course of the year. 
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Humanitarian aid policy in the EU´s external relations. The post-Lisbon framework, Report No. 3, 
Swedish Institute for European Policy, April 2016, p. 28. 
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4, TFEU the EU is competent “to carry out activities and conduct a common 
policy” in the areas of development cooperation and humanitarian aid, thus 
codifying the shared nature of the EU’s humanitarian aid competence, that is 
special since Member States are not prevented from exercising their competence 
in this sector364. Hence, the EU and the Member States can act in parallel, and 
both can conclude international agreements with third countries and international 
organisations on matters related to humanitarian assistance365. But, the European 
Consensus outlines the “common vision that guides the action of the EU, both at 
its Member States and Community levels”. Therefore, according to the principle 
of loyal cooperation, Member States have the obligation to take each other’s 
activities into account and not to create obstacles to the implementation of EU 
law366. Besides, Article 214, para. 1, TFEU explicitly provides that “the Union’s 
measures and those of the Member States shall complement and reinforce each 
other”, whereas para. 6 endows the Commission with the competence to “take any 
useful initiative to promote coordination between actions of the Union and those 
of the Member States, in order to enhance the efficiency and complementarity of 
Union and national humanitarian aid measures”. This element fits, inter alia, in 
one of the most evident consequences of the Lisbon Treaty innovations which 
grant the responsibility for cooperating with international organisations to the 
High Representative and the Commission367.  
As such, the content of Article 214 TFEU read in conjunction with Article 21 
TEU, which emphasises solidarity as guiding principle, seems to report the 
ambition of the Union as a whole not only to progressively establish itself as an 
independent humanitarian donor, but also to ‘Europeanise’ Member States’ 
activities in this area by making the Union facilitator and coordinator of the 
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provision of aid and relief in emergency situations368. In this respect, it is then of 
utmost importance the inclusion in Article 214 TFEU of the idea to establish a 
European Voluntary Humanitarian Aid Corps (hereinafter, EVHC) as expression 
of the European value of solidarity with people affected by disasters in third 
countries369.  
For a long time, Member States have been excluded from the opportunity to 
benefit from such immediate forms of financial assistance, thereby creating a gap 
between solidarity granted for external and internal emergencies. This discrepancy 
was explicitly acknowledged on occasion of the European Council of 19 February 
2016 that called for concrete proposals from the Commission “to the put in place 
the capacity for humanitarian aid internally”370. 
 
2.2 When Member States need immediate assistance: main legal characters of the 
EU emergency support instrument 
 
On 15 March 2016 the Council adopted Regulation (EU) 2016/369 which 
authorizes the implementation of financial assistance measures to support 
Member States dealing with severe humanitarian difficulties caused by natural or 
man-made disasters371. In particular, the Regulation has been adopted as an 
emergency measure for the management of the ongoing refugee crisis which has 
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put under unprecedented strain the resources of Member States at the southern 
borders of the Union and generated a serious humanitarian crisis372.  
Despite it has been adopted to provide for assistance to those Member States that 
are coping with the arrival of a large number of migrants and asylum-seekers, 
such an instrument has general scope. In fact, the very Regulation 2016/369 
expressly urges the EU institutions to address the basic needs of disaster-stricken 
people within the Union through the provision of emergency support as already 
made in favour of those affected by man-made or natural disasters in third 
countries (recital 7). In this regard, it is appropriate to say that the act under 
examination actually does not provide a definition of the term “disaster”, thereby 
implicitly referring to the definition contained in other EU legal texts and to the 
practice373. As reported in the introduction of the present work and as it will be 
clearer in the next chapter, the EU instruments propose a quite broad meaning of 
the term “disaster”, so differentiating from other international instruments. The 
terms “disaster” or “catastrophes” on the one hand, and “emergencies” and 
“crises” on the other one can be considered as comparable because the 
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qualification of an event as a disaster shall not estimated (just) on the basis of its 
origin but (mainly) with reference to its severe impact on people, environment, 
property and cultural heritage. Otherwise, it could be very hard to justify the 
inclusion of migrants’ inflow within the category of natural or man-made 
disasters.  
Regulation 2016/369 is, thus, potentially applicable to any situation of crisis 
giving rise to “severe wide-ranging humanitarian consequences”374 and this is the 
reason why, before embarking in the analysis of the act of secondary law, it is 
noteworthy to dwell on the legal basis upon which Regulation 2016/369 has been 
adopted, that is Article 122, para.1, TFEU375.  
Such a Treaty provision, that mirrors the text of Article 100 TCE, grants the 
Council, on a proposal from the Commission, “in a spirit of solidarity between 
Member States”, the power to adopt measures aimed at coping with emergency 
situations that the States are not capable to face individually, in particular in case 
of difficulties arising in connection to the supply of products in the area of 
energy376.  
The Council has justified the choice to rely on Article 122, para.1, TFEU by 
essentially referring to the fact that the Union was already in the position to grant 
support of a macro-financial nature to Member States and to express European 
solidarity to disaster-stricken regions through other financial instruments such as 
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the EU Solidarity Fund. Hence, according to some commentators377, the main 
objective of the Council was not to grant simply financial assistance to Member 
States. Rather, the intention was to activate a broader range of other measures in 
order to address the humanitarian needs of disaster-stricken people within the 
Union on a sufficiently predictable and independent basis378. And in effect, as will 
be seen, the support granted under the mechanism established by Regulation 
2016/369 is not confined just to financial contributions to Member States’ 
budgets. As a matter of fact, even though the CJEU has stated that this provision 
cannot encompass instruments other than having financial character379, the Treaty 
provision does not specify what kind of measures could be adopted thus leaving 
some uncertainties as well as leading to different interpretations.  
This reasoning appears, however, scarcely justifiable and quite questionable380.  
In the first place, the idea proposed by the Council on the potential overlapping of 
the emergency support instrument and the EU Solidarity Fund or other existing 
tools having financial character appears quite weird given their different nature. 
Indeed, the aim of the emergency support is not to provide assistance to the State 
following a calculation of the damages occurred upon request of the national 
authorities, but it is to guarantee protection and relief to the victims through 
partner organisations in the immediate aftermath of a disaster.  
An attentive reading of the act at stake makes evident that it moves from the 
premise of the existence of a fundamental analogy of the de quo mechanism with 
the humanitarian aid instrument and, therefore, incorporates its constituent 
elements. Indeed, the new act explicitly sets that the emergency support 
instrument may include “any of the humanitarian aid actions which would be 
eligible for Union financing pursuant to Regulation (EC) No 1257/96”381. As a 
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consequence, as for the humanitarian aid instrument, the eligible interventions 
may encompass assistance, relief and, where necessary, protection operations to 
save and preserve life carried out by the Commission or by partner organisations 
selected by the Commission itself according to specific requirements382, such as 
NGOs, specialised services of the Member States or international agencies and 
organisations having the requisite expertise. In addition, provided that such an 
instrument has been inspired by the principle of solidarity, Regulation 2016/369 
sets that it shall be granted and implemented in compliance with the fundamental 
humanitarian principles of humanity, neutrality, impartiality and independence. 
The ratio is, therefore, that the Union – as for humanitarian aid in third countries 
– shall be ready to promptly cope with any exceptional event that causes and may 
cause serious humanitarian problems that cannot be controlled by the national 
authorities. 
In the light of the potential broad scope of such an act, Article 122, para. 2, 
TFEU383 would have been a much more suitable legal basis. Labelled as one of 
the innovations introduced by the Lisbon Treaty with regard to Article 122 TFEU, 
it authorizes the Council to grant financial assistance to a Member State “in 
difficulties or seriously threatened with severe difficulties caused by natural 
disasters or exceptional occurrences beyond its control”. Whether the intention 
was to establish a new instrument which was parallel to the humanitarian aid 
instrument and that could be activated in many potential circumstances other than 
the current migration crisis, this provision would have been more appropriate. 
Among the other things, also the migration crisis – which has been the trigger for 
the adoption of this act – may be compared in extensive and absolute terms more 
to a ‘disaster’ intended as ‘humanitarian emergency’ rather than to a situation of 
difficulty in the supply of products in the field of energy. Besides, the very 
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Regulation opens by labelling the large inflows of migrants and asylum-seekers as 
“a notable example” of disaster directly affecting Member States384. 
The result of the choice made by the Council is thus two-fold. On the one hand, it 
seems to have broadened the scope of application of Article 122, para.1, TFEU 
thereby making the reference to difficulties in the supply of products only as an 
example and leading to a potential re-interpretation of this provision from the 
CJEU. On the other hand, by excluding Article 122, para. 2, TFEU, it has 
arguably moved beyond the CJEU’s orientation according to which “where the 
Treaty contains a more specific provision that is capable of constituting the legal 
basis for the measure in question, the measure must be founded on that 
provision”385. 
Besides these considerations, it is appropriate to make a brief analysis of the 
specific features of the new instrument starting from its scope of application in 
order to evaluate its potential contribution in the assessment of the existing 
cooperation mechanisms that may be activated in case of disaster as expression of 
the principle of solidarity in the EU.  
As already underlined, the scope of application ratione materiae of this new 
instrument is quite broad as, according to the letter of Regulation 2016/369, it is 
potentially intended to face any serious disaster or exceptional situation which go 
further the Member State’s capacity. In this regard, it is quite interesting the 
decision taken on the scope of application ratione temporis: the Council decided 
to justify the activation of the emergency support in case of “ongoing or potential” 
disaster, so that it could be assumed that the mechanism could be activated also on 
a preventive basis. However, the wording of Article 1, para. 1, of Regulation 
2016/369 may effectively limit the preventive use of the mechanism, where it is 
stated that the instrument can be provided only when the consequences of a 
disaster reach a certain scale of humanitarian impact. It is, therefore, highly 
unlikely that the measures may be authorized on the basis of an ex ante 
assessment on the likelihood of a severe impact.  
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 See, Council Regulation (EU) 2016/369, Recital 2. 
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 See, inter alia, CJEU, Case C-490/10, European Parliament v. Council of the European Union, 
6 September 2012, ECLI:EU:C:2012:525, point 44.  
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By remaining in the scope of application of the emergency support instrument, it 
is essential to critically assess the content of Regulation 2016/369 as for the 
purpose of this mechanism. Indeed, despite the implementation of such an 
instrument is left to partners working in the field of humanitarian assistance and, 
hence, having as main objective the mitigation of human sufferings, the wording 
of the Regulation suggests that there is a second goal to be pursued. It is “to 
implement operations of a potentially life-saving nature in an economic, efficient 
and effective manner, thereby allowing a more effective action by reason of its 
scale and complementarity”.386 As a matter of the fact, man-made or natural 
disasters may be of such a scale and impact that they “can give rise to severe 
economic difficulties in one or several Member States”. More specifically, in the 
Preamble of the Regulation, it is reported the real reason for the adoption of the 
emergency support instrument: “the migration and refugee situation currently 
affecting the Union is a notable example of a situation where, despite the efforts 
undertaken by the Union to address the root causes located in third countries, the 
economic situation of Member States may be directly affected”. It is no 
coincidence that, furthermore, the Regulation requires that the measures adopted 
are “appropriate to the economic situation”, a condition that echoes a 
proportionality assessment, but also that specifically focuses on the economic 
consequences of the event justifying the granting of emergency support. 
Ultimately, besides the doubts concerning the reasoning behind the choice of 
Article 122, para.1, TFEU as legal basis for the creation of the emergency support 
instrument, such considerations, combined with the fact that the European 
Parliament has not been consulted for the adoption of the instrument under 
investigation, may wonder about its effective relevance in relation to other 
emergencies387. Indeed, it seems that the emergency support instrument could be 
activated not only in case of a disaster having exceptional or wide-ranging severe 
consequences from a humanitarian point of view but also from an economic 
perspective, potentially affecting other Member States. In this regard, it has to be 
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 See, Council Regulation (EU) 2016/369, Recital 12 [emphasis added].  
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 See, L. Den Hertog, “EU Budgetary Responses to the «Refugee Crisis». Reconfiguring the 
Funding Landscape”, CEPS Paper in Liberty and Security in Europe, May 2016. 
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said that such a consideration makes the application of the emergency support 
instrument as illustrated by Regulation 2016/369 extremely limited to the current 
“refugee crisis” rather than applicable to other future emergencies. In this way, it 
would be confirmed its temporary character confined to the present and 
contingent situation that some Member States are coping with. To be fair, there is 
to say that in any case the permanent nature of the mechanism created appears 
quite partial since the Commission, after the periodic monitoring, could propose 
to the Council the suspension of the assistance whether the conditions no longer 
exist388. In addition, Article 8 of the Regulation establishes that, by 17 March 
2019, the Commission shall submit an evaluation of the operation of such an 
instrument to the Council, together with suggestions for the future of this 
Regulation and, where appropriate, proposals to amend or terminate it: the 
emergency support instrument has not therefore been conceived as a permanent 
but rather as a temporary mechanism.  
With reference to the activation of the emergency support, the Regulation refers to 
the procedures laid down by Regulation 966/2012 on the financial rules applicable 
to the general budget of the Union389. Once received the Commission proposal, 
the other Member States act collectively through the Council which is asked to 
examine it “immediately” and to take its decision “in accordance with the urgency 
of the situation”390 in order to mobilise the necessary resources coming from the 
EU general budget but also from contributions made by public or private donors. 
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 See, Council Regulation (EU) 2016/369, Article 8.  
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 See, Regulation (EU, EURATOM) 966/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
25 October 2012 on the financial rules applicable to the general budget of the Union and repealing 
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 See, Council Regulation (EU) 2016/369, Article 2: “1. The decision about the activation of the 
emergency support under this Regulation in case of an ongoing or potential disaster shall be taken 
by the Council on the basis of a proposal by the Commission, specifying where appropriate the 
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Commission referred to in paragraph 1 and shall decide, in accordance with the urgency of the 
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Since the entire scheme is based upon EU funding of actions carried out by third 
parties, in order to guarantee the correct management of the funds, the 
Commission must follow certain special procedures of assessment and control. In 
particular, partners are expected to ensure full compliance with general visibility 
requirements in accordance with the applicable contractual arrangement as well as 
with specific visibility requirements that may include prominent display of the EU 
humanitarian aid visual identity on EU funded project sites, relief items and 
equipment and the acknowledgement of the funding role of and the partnership 
with the EU/ECHO through activities such as media outreach and digital 
communication391. In addition, according to Article 7 of the Regulation, the 
Commission shall take appropriate measures ensuring that the financial interests 
of the Union are protected by the application of preventive measures against 
fraud, corruption and any other illegal activities, by effective checks and, if 
irregularities are detected, by the recovery of the amounts wrongly paid and, 
where appropriate, by effective, proportionate and dissuasive administrative and 
financial penalties. It is then enshrined that contracts and grant agreements as well 
as agreements with international organisations and Member States’ specialised 
services shall contain provisions expressly empowering the Commission, the 
Court of Auditors and the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF) to conduct such 
audits and investigations, according to their respective competences. 
Against this background, a brief evaluation on the role played by the affected 
State is also interesting. From the letter of the Regulation, since no reference 
concerning the request of activation from the affected States is made, it seems that 
the emergency support instrument may be activated in any case where the 
requirements are respected. Such a perspective could be confirmed by the fact that 
Regulation 2016/369 clearly states only that the activation of the emergency 
support instrument shall imply “a close cooperation and consultation with the 
affected Member State”, thereby keeping it in the background rather than in the 
central place. Despite this, it should not be forgotten that the whole EU 
framework is built on a consensual caveat between the Union and Member States 
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 Further explanation of visibility requirements can be consulted on the dedicated visibility site 
http://www.echo-visibility.eu/.  
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that is envisaged by Article 4, para.2, TEU which points out that the Union “shall 
respect their essential State functions, including ensuring the territorial integrity of 
the State, maintaining law and order and safeguarding national security. In 
particular, national security remains the sole responsibility of each Member 
State”.  
There is no doubt that the State functions comprise also to protect those who are 
under its jurisdiction as manifestation of the principle of sovereignty, so that it is 
possible to presume that State consent – even tacit – is necessary for the activation 
of the mechanism392. Moreover, the very Regulation 369/2016 does not forget to 
underline more than once that the mechanism established is not intended to 
replace affected Member States’ primary responsibility in addressing the 
consequences of the event. Rather, it is an instrument that operates as a 
complement to the action of national authorities and of the Union, by fully 
respecting the principle of subsidiarity. Mutatis mutandis, the subsidiary role of 
the emergency support instrument works also in relation to the other mechanisms 
that can be activated in the event of a disaster. In fact, Article 1, para.1, of 
Regulation 2016/369 establishes that “it can only be provided where the 
exceptional scale and impact of the disaster is such that it gives rises to severe 
wide-ranging humanitarian consequences in one or more Member States and only 
in exceptional circumstances where no other instrument available to Member 
States and to the Union is sufficient”. It seems to be, hence, a last resort 
mechanism whose activation shall take into account other forms of (financial and 
in-kind) assistance already deployed. 
Ultimately, albeit the adoption of the emergency support instrument has 
apparently filled a significant gap on the provision of financial assistance in 
emergency scenarios, the multiple question marks that arise from such an analysis 
– with particular reference to the legal basis chosen for the adoption of the 
instrument at stake – make the real and future use full of relevant obstacles. In 
particular, for the purposes of the present work, the main risk is that the unclear 
temporal nature (that is its permanent or non-permanent character) may lead again 
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di emergenza all’interno dell’Unione ai tempi delle crisi”, cit., p. 17.  
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to a legal vacuum concerning the provision of financial assistance to EU Members 
in situations of emergency thereby undermining the implementation of solidarity 
measures in the internal context.  
 
3. Some concluding remarks on financial instruments of assistance in the 
event of a disaster 
 
The analysis concerning the financial instruments that States may rely on in order 
to respond (both in the immediate and in the aftermath) to a disaster has 
highlighted some relevant elements.  
In the first place, this investigation has reported the attention of the Union to the 
necessity to fill the gap between EU Members and third countries in terms of 
immediate financial assistance to be granted. But, the positive premises of the new 
emergency support instrument as parallel mechanism of humanitarian aid in 
response to internal emergencies seems not to meet reality, even though it surely 
represents an attempt to show major solidarity within the Union, by being 
disengaged from the issue of damages calculation. 
In the second place, this chapter has revealed a strong separation in the 
effectiveness of the solidarity principle between the response tools that draw 
power directly from the action of the Union – such as the emergency support 
mechanism and the EUSF – and those that operate on a national level without any 
direct involvement of EU institutions if not in terms of control. In fact, in relation 
to the former, although further improvements are still desirable, the Commission 
ensures a ‘horizontal’ support to States becoming complementary to them, while 
respecting the principle of subsidiarity. On the contrary, the overall regulatory 
framework concerning State aids and fiscal policy is still characterised by a top-
down reconstruction of the relationship between the Union and the Member States 
with the risk that a strict control over national financial choices could represent a 
limit to the application of the principle of solidarity. Albeit the instruments 
illustrated give a relevant contribution in disaster response, they remain within the 
financial framework and, thus, subjected to physiological shortcomings deriving 
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from the necessity to secure the national and EU budgets as well as the normal 
market equilibrium in the European Union.  
At this point, it is therefore appropriate to make a step forward by investigating 
the existence of other significant instruments having an operative character and 
envisaging a more cooperative attitude among States, but also between States and 
EU. Indeed, from a theoretical point of view, more and better coordination can 
serve to diagnose, prevent and redress divergences within a group, thus reducing 
the need for solidarity-based-on-difference while producing a ‘widespread 
solidarity’.  
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CHAPTER IV 
 
THE EU CIVIL PROTECTION MECHANISM:  
IN-KIND ASSISTANCE TO COPE WITH DISASTERS 
 
 
1. The Union as catalyst of solidary integration: an introduction 
 
In recent years, it has become increasingly clear that traditional ways of managing 
crises no longer suffice in this diffuse threat environment. A centralized, nation-
based apparatus filled with planners and risk managers is no match for threats that 
escalate across geographic, cultural, legal and policy boundaries. In particular, 
transboundary threats demand transboundary crisis management capacities. 
Therefore, a growing distress among the EU Members about the trans-national 
effects of major emergencies – such as the health ones – has convinced them that 
more cooperative operational arrangements within the field of disaster are a 
necessary prerequisite and an added value for efficient crisis management at 
national level. Moreover, responding to (multiple) disasters and taking care of the 
victims could not see anymore the sole responsibility of the individual Member 
States and financial assistance could not be the only way to show solidarity. 
Hence, the EU392 has become a political and legal forum of discussion and sharing 
of common strategies, in some cases open also to third countries. Among these the 
Civil Protection Mechanism established in 2007 represents, from an operational 
point of view, one of the key instruments of response to disasters.  
The EU countries have a long tradition of concern for disaster relief, but the 
management of civil protection operations at supranational level is a relatively 
new issue. Before the Lisbon Treaty, it was not mentioned in any founding 
treaties and, thus, it was lacking in legal basis. Indeed, as underscored in the 
previous chapters, the protection of the population in case of calamity is 
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“European Community”, thus embracing all the moments of the EU integration process. 
147 
 
traditionally conceived as one of the main responsibilities relating to State 
sovereignty and, therefore, detached financial assistance is more welcomed and 
successful. However, experience shows that it is increasingly necessary to rely on 
international cooperation in order to tackle disasters in a more effective way. This 
is the reason why the Member States have progressively allowed the EU 
institutions to play a significant role of coordination and support in the field of in-
kind assistance by means of several legal instruments which have been changed 
and improved in the course of time. The following paragraphs will present an 
excursus of the main rules adopted from ‘80s to the changes brought by the 
Lisbon Treaty in the area of civil protection in order to evaluate how and to what 
extent solidarity materialises in this sector.  
 
2. The long way towards the creation of the EU Civil Protection Mechanism 
 
2.1   The normative framework of civil protection: first steps within the EEC  
 
Cooperation in the area of civil protection at EU level could be traced to the end 
of 1970s. At the beginning, such a cooperation developed at bilateral level with 
the establishment of two parallel initiatives in France and Italy dealing with 
disaster mitigation. Both countries, for responding to social concern over the 
devastating potential of catastrophic events, initiated a highly beneficial period of 
cooperation. As early as 1980, France established the Plan d’Exposition aux 
Risques393, a national programme to assess the geophysical environment and map 
natural and man-made hazards, examining the level of risk they posed to the 
public. In Italy, three groups of the National Research Council were given the task 
of assessing the level of risk posed by floods, landslides, volcanic activity and 
earthquakes, and of developing technical policies for risk mitigation. 
Given the diverse nature and extent of the risks many EU countries face, it is easy 
to understand the scale of the task presented to national administrations. Disaster 
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hazards were largely dependent on the geography and climate of the individual 
nations concerned. Many southern States were especially prone to earthquakes or 
forest fires, while in northern Europe disasters tended to be smaller and related to 
technology, such as industrial or transport accidents. In some cases, countries 
were able to cope with such catastrophes on their own, but often emergency 
assistance was required from other nations. It was in this context that the EU 
concept of cooperation in civil protection issues emerged: it was recognised that 
different countries had developed different areas of expertise to cope with the 
different types of hazards they faced and that there were benefits and efficiencies 
to be gained through cooperation. 
The clear necessity to tackle this issue in a supranational coordinated manner 
emerged just in the early 1980s, after the Seveso disaster394 and the Chernobyl 
accident395. Indeed, the underestimation of the risks originating from the presence 
of production facilities on one hand and the subsequent growing attention to the 
protection and preservation of the environment and of individuals on the other, 
put the issue of industrial risk at the centre of the public debate.  
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In April 1985, the European Commission – DG Environment hosted the first 
meeting on civil protection and, under the Italian Presidency impulse, the Italian 
Minister of Civil Protection Giuseppe Zamberletti invited the other European 
Ministers for an informal summit in Rome. Indeed, Italy had been already hit by a 
number of natural catastrophes, i.e. the earthquake in Garfagnana which had 
caused thousands of displaced and homeless people, and the Italian Minister had 
urged his European colleagues to tackle this issue all together. On this occasion, 
Member States had agreed to coordinate their national civil protection capacities 
in the case of major natural disasters laying the foundations for Community 
cooperation in this field396.  
As the initial agenda focused on managing large-scale natural disasters, 
responsibility for the European Community’s activities in this area was given to 
the European Commission’s Directorate-General for Environment. The Italian 
Commissioner Ripa di Meana then argued that his Directorate should do more in 
the wake of forest fires and heat waves in Southern Europe by working for the 
development of a “Europe for citizens”397. While the general interest was more 
oriented to the effects of natural disasters, the 1986 explosion of the Chernobyl 
nuclear facilities confirmed the potentially devastating effects of such disasters. 
Accordingly, Member States became more sensitive towards possible man-made 
disasters able to cause damages to the environment, to people as well as to trade. 
Thus, seen the difficulties faced by the then European Community in tackling the 
different approaches of Member States, it arrived the moment to provide a even 
more combined response to whatever kind of calamity at EU level. 
Between 1985 and 1994, studies and research programmes, a variety of policy 
instruments were put into place leading to the establishment of operational tools 
for the preparedness of those involved in civil protection and response in the event 
of a disaster. It must be noted that all these Community operations were based on 
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ad hoc resolutions by the Council and Member States without a legal basis398. 
Therefore, at these first stages of the process of development of a EU 
configuration for civil protection, it appears quite clear that it was essentially a 
intergovernmental system based on national capacities and determination. Despite 
this and the fact that the instruments adopted were and non-binding, step by step 
they became more relevant up to the creation of a comprehensive system capable 
to face different kinds of calamities and helped to shape the basis of the existing 
Civil Protection Mechanism legislation by making the occurrence of serious 
disasters an issue of common concern399.  
 
2.2 The normative framework of civil protection: from Maastricht to the 
establishment of the Community Civil Protection Mechanism 
 
A first timid step towards the recognition of a communitarian competence in civil 
protection there was with the entry into force of the Treaty of Maastricht, adopted 
in 1992, which extended the objectives of the Community and dropped the 
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‘economic’ label to form the European Union400. As well known, such a Treaty 
introduced a new institutional structure composed of three ‘pillars’ and a broader 
umbrella, new policies and forms of cooperation were created401.  
Article 3 of the Maastricht Treaty listed the activities that the Community was 
empowered to carry out for the purposes set out in Article 2 of the Treaty on the 
European Community402. In particular, the European Community could take “a 
policy in the sphere of the environment” and “measures in the sphere of energy, 
civil protection and tourism”; albeit it recognized the competences of the 
Community in this field, it was not accompanied by any other provision in the 
Treaty articulating the objectives of the measures to be adopted in the areas in 
question403. Moreover, such a reference did not constitute per se a legal basis for 
the adoption of measures in the three spheres so that the Community competence 
in the field of civil protection was left ‘hanging in the air’404.  
As a result, actions in that area could be pursued thanks only to the flexibility 
provision (Article 308 TEC) or to the legal bases offered by provisions concerning 
other Community policies, such as those on the environment. Indeed, among the 
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objectives of the environmental policy, Article 174 TEC included “promoting 
measures at international level to deal with regional or worldwide environmental 
problems”405. In addition, the establishment of operational instruments dealing 
with the preparedness of those involved in civil protection and the response in the 
event of a disaster was based on the subsidiarity principle laid down in Article 3B 
of the Maastricht Treaty406. Therefore, although the inclusion of this sector in the 
targets of the Union marked an important step, it was clearly a compromise based 
on a firm and lasting agreement among the national authorities.   
In May 1993, the Commission adopted the report entitled “Community 
programme of policy and action in relation to the environment and sustainable 
development”407 which explicitly referred to civil protection. It was expected that 
the Community’s activities stepped up in the fields of civil protection and 
environmental emergencies as mirror of political and economic developments 
within and outside the Community. In particular, it was underscored the need to 
press ahead with further improvement and refinement of the mutual assistance 
procedures and arrangements in respect of both natural and technological 
catastrophes, as well as to enhance coordination for the optimisation of 
interventions in the case of emergencies in third countries.  
For these purposes, the Commission suggested to increase the range and quality of 
training courses and the improvement of information and communication systems 
for more rapid and efficient transmission of information, instructions and 
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decisions between the key players in emergency situations. Even more important, 
it advocated the establishment of task forces to respond to different types of 
emergency, shaping an embryonic Community structure for civil protection408. 
Besides, in accordance with the procedure laid down in Article N (2) of the Treaty 
on European Union409, the Commission was supposed to prepare a report on the 
opportunity to introduce a separate Title for civil protection into the Treaty410.  
The 1995 Reflection Group’s Report outlined its position concerning the 
possibility of including the spheres of energy, tourism and civil protection in 
common policies and, by considering the divergent opinions expressed by the 
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1996 to examine those provisions of this Treaty for which revision is provided, in accordance with 
the objectives set out in Articles A and B”. 
410
 The first Declaration attached to the Maastricht Treaty states as follows: “The Conference 
declares that the question of introducing into the Treaty establishing the European Community 
Titles relating to the spheres referred to in Article 3(t) of that Treaty will be examined, in 
accordance with the procedure laid down in Article N(2) of the Treaty on European Union, on the 
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present provisions of the Treaties establishing the European Communities”. This opportunity has 
recalled in the Resolution of the Council and the Representatives of the Governments of the 
Member States on strengthening Community cooperation on civil protection, 31 October 1994, OJ 
C 313, 10 November 1994. For its part, the European Parliament pointed out that the Union should 
strengthen its existing policies but without adopting any particular stance on civil protection (see, 
European Parliament, Resolution on the functioning of the Treaty on European Union with a view 
to the 1996 Intergovernmental Conference - Implementation and development of the Union (17 
May 1995), OJ. C 151, 19 June 1995). Instead, the Council did not specifically include civil 
protection in its report on the functioning of the Treaty on European Union, but noted that the 
Community’s action in the new areas of competence, including civil protection under Article 3(t) 
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Intergovernmental Conference, Briefing No. 34, “Civil Protection and the IGC” – V. Positions, 
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States’ representatives411, the final decision was to support an increasing 
cooperation on civil protection, rather than extending the Community competence 
to this area412. Given these premises, there was not any possibility to extend the 
scope of Article 3(t) and to create a Community civil protection force. However, 
starting from the end of 1997, the Council improved the foundations for co-
operation still further and their implementation was the Commission’s main 
priority in this field.  
 
2.2.1 The Community Civil Protection Action Programme  
 
Since the end of 1997, acting on the Commission’s proposal and on the basis of 
Article 235 of the Treaty establishing the European Community, the Council 
adopted a Decision addressed to all the Member States establishing a Community 
action programme in the field of civil protection. The main objective was to 
support and complement Member States’ activities at the national and sub-
national levels through different projects for the protection of persons, property 
and environment in the event of natural and technological disasters.  
The Council considered that Community cooperation in the field of civil 
protection helped to achieve the objectives of the Treaty by promoting solidarity 
among Member States, raising the quality of life and contributing to preserving 
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 As for the positions of Member States, they mirrored the disagreement of the Reflection Group. 
The first group composed by Germany, Finland and Belgium considered civil protection as an 
example of an area where the compatibility between existing Community competence and the 
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of new titles on energy, civil protection and tourism. See, White Paper on the 1996 
Intergovernmental Conference – Volume II. Summary of Positions of the Member States of the 
European Union with a View to the 1996 Intergovernmental Conference, European Parliament, 18 
September 1996.  
412See, Reflection Group’s Report, Official positions of the other Institutions and Organs - Council 
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1995, para 141. Available at 
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and protecting the environment. Despite the Decision had stated that the 
programme should not last for more than two years, after the first two-year Action 
Programme (1998- 1999)413 it was established a new five-year Action Programme 
for the period 2000-2004414. In 2005, the Council adopted the Decision 
2005/12/EC to cover the period until 31 December 2006415. The Programme 
covered initiatives of cooperation dealing with prevention, preparedness and 
response to disasters, as well as information and awareness-raising activities 
through the exchange of lessons learned and best practices regarding techniques 
and methods of response to an emergency416.  
The adoption of the first programme has thus represented the foremost moment 
the European Community has been inspired by a general interest-based approach 
in the field of civil protection. Indeed, for the first time the Council decided to 
endorse the Commission proposal and to adopt a Decision according to the 
legislative procedure involving European Parliament, Economic and Social 
Committee and Committee of the Regions. Besides such a matured recognition, 
the serious consequences of earthquakes in Turkey and Greece in 1999417 and of 
the terrorist attacks in the United States on 11 September 2001 have contributed to 
trigger the establishment of the so-called Community Mechanism for Civil 
Protection in 2001.  
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 See, Council Decision of 19 December 1997 establishing a Community action programme in 
the field of civil protection, OJ L 8, 14 January 1998. 
414
 See, Council Decision of 9 December 1999 establishing a Community action programme in the 
field of civil protection, OJ L 327, 21 December 1999. 
415
 See, Council Decision of 20 December 2004 amending Decision 1999/847/EC as regards the 
extension of the Community action programme in the field of civil protection, OJ L 6, 8 January 
2005. 
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 See, T. Ǻhman, C. Nilsson, “The Community Mechanism for Civil Protection and the European 
Union Solidarity Fund”, cit., p. 85. Moreover, see European Commission, Handbook on the 
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 In particular, Turkey was hit by two consecutive earthquakes which caused the death of about 
19.000 people and 50.000 people were injured. For further information, see B. Ramberg, “The two 
earthquakes in Turkey in 1999: International coordination and the European Commission’s 
preparedness”, in S. Larsson, E-K. Olsson, B. Ramberg (eds.) Crisis Decision-Making in the 
European Union, 2005, pp. 93-130. 
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2.2.2 The establishment of a Community Civil Protection Mechanism 
 
Encouraged by the success of the Action Programme and by the devastating 
earthquakes in the two Mediterranean countries, on 29 September 2000 the 
Commission proposed the adoption of a Decision establishing a Community 
mechanism for the coordination of civil protection intervention in the event of 
emergencies418. To justify this necessity, the Commission referred first of all to 
the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE) Convention on 
the Transboundary Effects of Industrial Accidents entered into force on 19 April 
2000, which contains provisions on matters such as prevention, emergency 
preparedness, public information and participation, industrial accident notification 
systems, response and mutual assistance419. In addition, the mechanism would 
have enriched the Community Action Programme by making concrete support 
available in the event of an emergency and demonstrating the capacity to combine 
different national needs. Indeed, for the first time a reinforced Community Civil 
Protection structure was envisioned to facilitate coordinated assistance 
interventions and the mobilisation of intervention teams, expertise and other 
resources, as required, through a network of Member States’ national contact 
points.  
After the positive opinion of the European Parliament and those of the Economic 
and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, on the basis of Article 
308 TEC and Article 203 of the Treaty establishing the European Atomic Energy 
Community, the Council adopted the Decision 2001/792/EC launching the new 
Mechanism420. The Civil Protection Mechanism (CPM) that entered into force in 
2002 consisted in a number of tools that have been established by the later 
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 See, European Commission, Proposal for a Council Decision establishing a Community 
mechanism for the coordination of civil protection intervention in the event of emergencies 
(2001/C 531 E/17), COM (2000) 593 final 2000/0248(CNS), 29 September 2000.  
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 The Convention was approved by the Community via the Council Decision of 23 March 1998 
concerning the conclusion of the Convention on the Transboundary Effects of Industrial 
Accidents, OJ L 326, 3 December 1998. 
420
 See, Council Decision establishing a Community mechanism to facilitate reinforced 
cooperation in civil protection assistance interventions, 2001/792/EC, Euratom, OJ L/297/7, 15 
November 2001, Article 1. 
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implementing Decision 2004/277/EC421: pre-identification of intervention 
resources422, a training programme to improve response capability423, a system of 
assessment and coordination teams424, a monitoring and information centre and of 
a common emergency communication system425. Furthermore, the Monitoring and 
Information Centre (hereinafter MIC) and the Common Emergency 
Communication and Information System (CECIS), managed by the DG 
Environment in the unit for civil protection were established for representing the 
operational core of the Mechanism. In particular, the MIC served as a 
communication hub by providing access to and the sharing of information 
between the participating countries. Second, it provided early alerts and 
information on interventions carried out through the Mechanism as well as 
updates on ongoing emergencies. Third, the MIC facilitated co-ordination of 
assistance by matching offers of assistance put forward by participating countries 
to the needs of disaster-stricken countries requesting help. The national contact 
points had to provide the MIC with information on the availability of civil 
protection assistance426. The operational network of Member States’ civil 
protection authorities was called the Permanent Network of National 
Correspondents (PNNC), while the political body overseeing the Commission’s 
work was the Committee on Civil Protection Issues (ProCiv). All of these 
structures served to create a dense environment of institutional bodies and 
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 See, European Commission Decision of 29 December 2003 laying down rules for the 
implementation of Council Decision 2001/792/EC, Euratom establishing a Community mechanism 
to facilitate reinforced cooperation in civil protection assistance interventions, 2004/277/EC, 
Euratom, OJ L 08, 25 March 2004, Chapters III and IV. Hereinafter, Commission Decision 
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 See, Commission Decision 2004/277/EC, Article 4(a) and (b). 
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contacts that had to bring the Member States and European Community together 
on a regular basis for civil protection issues. As a result, for the first time, 
Member States were asked to reach a minimal level of cooperation in the field of 
civil protection, by making use of a single information and coordination centre 
instead of having to activate a whole range of bilateral contacts427.  
During the following years, the European Community continued to work for the 
improvement of cooperation in the field of civil protection though the adoption, 
by the Council, of a number of resolutions requiring for an improvement of the 
very Mechanism428. From its establishment, the mechanism has been employed 
several times both inside and outside the European Community. Regarding 
calamities occurred beyond EU boundaries, it is appropriate to recall for instance 
the earthquakes in Algeria and in Iran in 2003 as well as that in Pakistan in 2005, 
the tsunami in Southeast Asia in 2004429, the hurricane Katrina in the USA in 
2005, the explosions in the arms storages in Albania in 2008, the typhoon in 
Burma in 2008 and the terrorist attacks in India in 2008430. Crises inside the EU 
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include, for example, the oil spill following the Prestige accident in 2002431, the 
floods in Central and Eastern Europe in 2002432, 2005 and 2006, the forest fires in 
Portugal in 2003/2004/2005, the storm in northern Europe in 2005 and the forest 
fires in Greece in 2007433. Notwithstanding the Mechanism has been applied, 
these cases-study have also demonstrated the existence of several weaknesses in 
its efficiency and an overall lack of coordination because of the general reliance 
on bilateral treaties rather than on community mechanisms. 
 
2.3 From the Community Civil Protection Mechanism to the entry into force of the 
Lisbon Treaty 
 
Starting from 2004, the European Union has introduced a number of measures 
aimed at reinforcing the Mechanism. On March 2004 the Commission adopted a 
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 On 13 November 2002, the Prestige, a 26-year-old single hull tanker carrying heavy fuel oil 
sprang a leak off the coast of Galicia spilling tonnes of oil into the sea. After few days, the oil 
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Communication entitled “Improving the Community Civil Protection 
Mechanism”434 which underscored three areas for the possible improvement of the 
whole system: preparedness of the resources to be deployed, communication with 
the MIC, coordination between Member States and the Commission.  
The Commission’s proposal boosted the debates among Member States which, in 
the same year, were negotiating and drafting the Treaty establishing a Constitution 
for Europe. Indeed, the new Treaty was expected to contain some solutions to act 
together more effectively and to reinforce co-operation among Member States in 
the field of prevention and protection against natural or manmade disasters, by 
proposing to introduce an ad hoc provision on civil protection435. Furthermore, 
Article I-42 of the Draft Treaty calling for solidarity between Member States in 
case of terrorist attacks and natural disasters provided for access to the complete 
array of civil protection instruments in order to protect citizens and democratic 
institutions436.  
The period of reflection which followed the failure of the Treaty establishing a 
Constitution for Europe did not stop the dialogue on the improvement of the Civil 
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 See, European Commission, Communication on Reinforcing the Civil Protection Capacity of 
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Protection Mechanism and a deeper assessment of the options to reinforce the EU 
response to disasters started from the Barnier Report adopted in 2006437. 
 
2.3.1 The Barnier Report. For a European civil protection force 
 
In view of the European Council planned for June 2006, the former French 
Foreign Minister and European Commissioner Michel Barnier produced a report 
on the EU’s response to major cross-border emergencies as requested by the 
Presidents of Commission and European Council, José Manuel Barroso and 
Wolfgang Schüssel respectively. While it was initially ignored, the idea to 
establish an independent EU disaster management force progressively gained 
popularity and to date the report is considered a landmark document in subiecta 
materia438.  
The report centred around the reaction to major emergencies occurring outside the 
Union, sure that if the Member States and the EU institutions had taken up the 
proposals outlined in his report to improve the civil protection response, that 
would have applied also to disasters within the territory of the EU439. Indeed, the 
2004 Asian tsunami had demonstrated that the price of non-Europe in crisis 
management was too high. Although the Community Civil Protection Mechanism 
was undoubtedly a step forward, the whole system continued to rely too much on 
spontaneous offers of help in relation to a formal request through the MIC. There 
were no systematic scenarios or protocols at EU level for responding to any of 
seven major risks with the result that existing resources were not always offered 
when needed. Furthermore, despite Member States had a capacity to organise 
relief and prepare for disasters, the Mechanism, lacking a European pool of 
existing national assets, had reduced impact and visibility on the ground. 
According to Barnier, the EU response was, therefore, limited to guarantee more 
cost-effectiveness by properly organising the Member States’ civil protection 
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capabilities and consular assistance on the basis of common scenarios, training 
programmes and exercises. However, “Europe is expected to show solidarity: the 
EU is called on to act and the Member States asked to help”440. Hence, he 
suggested the creation of a primordial EU civil protection force, called Europe 
Aid, that had to undertake civil protection missions inside as well as outside the 
EU according to some compromise elements.  
First of all, the resources of people and equipment put at disposal had to be 
managed and maintained by the Member States and not centralised in Bruxelles. 
Secondly, the former EU Commissioner proposed a bottom-up approach 
consisting in the identification of precise needs listed in a ‘menu’ corresponding 
to different standard scenarios for civil protection. Member States would have 
voluntarily chosen and financed one or more items on the menu maintaining them 
in its own country in any case. In this way, they could specialise in the handling of 
one or more threats, relating to the different scenarios (fires, floods, earthquakes 
etc.) that had been precisely identified and mapped to the resources needed to 
tackle them. In order to achieve a better outcome, States could also join together 
to establish a group of countries skilled at managing a particular threat441.  
The new force imagined by the former EU Commissioner would have not 
determined a real centralization of civil protection instruments at Union level. 
Rather, it would have basically kept relying on some resources earmarked by 
States on a voluntary basis. To balance the constant reference to States’ assets and 
capacities, the report introduced the necessity to acquire additional EU-funded 
resources and equipment (ships, helicopters, aircrafts), in particular in order to 
perform horizontal tasks (assessment, logistic, coordination) or to fill gaps in the 
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civil protection capacities of Member States. Moreover, he proposed the use of 
complementary military resources, in order to achieve maximum integration and 
to limit the cost of emergency deployments. The Barnier’s recipe focused on the 
opportunity to overcome State sovereignty and the inter-governmental logic in 
order to create a unique EU force able to respond to specific scenarios in a 
planned, organised and tested way to prove the EU’s value added. This argument 
was reinforced by the negative results of the referendums for the European 
Constitution in France and Netherlands that, according to Barnier, urged European 
countries to show more solidarity. The EU was called on to act and the Member 
States asked to help442.  
Although the report introduced some relevant new ideas, it received contrasting 
opinions both within the European institutional framework and among Member 
States. As for the European institutions, the report was not given any closer notice 
during the Austrian Presidency, but some ideas were re-launched through, inter 
alia, a Council Decision recasting the previous one establishing the Community 
Civil Protection Mechanism in 2007. 
 
2.3.2 Developments after the Barnier report 
 
The first result of the Barnier report was the adoption of the Council Decision 
2007/162/EC establishing a Civil Protection Financial Instrument443 intended “to 
support and complement the efforts of the Member States for the protection, 
primarily of people, but also of the environment and property, including cultural 
heritage, in the event of natural and man-made disasters, acts of terrorism and 
technological, radiological or environmental accidents”444.  
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Essentially, it had to support developments in the field of prevention and 
preparedness as well as response by funding cooperation projects on disaster risk 
reduction and early warning, exercises, exchanges of modules and experts. The 
Instrument was immediately operational and covered a period from 2007 to 2013 
amounting to approximately €190 million. Moreover, the instrument was intended 
also to finance up to 50% of the total transportation costs for civil protection 
operations, with exceptions for materiel.  
There is no doubt that, in adopting this instrument, the European Community 
recognised the importance of immediate civil protection assistance as a tangible 
expression of European solidarity in the event of major emergencies. But, at the 
same time, without a convincing revision of the existing Mechanism, it remained 
only a financial tool aimed at supporting single national activities in prevention 
and preparedness. Such awareness led the Council to endorse the Commission 
proposal on a renewal and reappraisal of the framework of the Community Civil 
Protection Mechanism by adopting the Decision 2007/779/EC445.  
One of the major changes brought by the new Decision was the recognition that 
the term “disaster” should cover not only natural disasters but also complex 
emergencies, such as terrorist attacks and man-made disasters as events triggering 
the activation of the Mechanism446. The choice to broaden the scope of the term 
reflected the reality of the situation since 2001 when Member States agreed that 
terrorist attacks are security threats for European citizens travelling to third 
countries or residing there447. As a consequence, the Civil Protection Mechanism 
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could support consular assistance to EU citizens in any kind of major emergencies 
in third countries, if requested by the consular authorities of Member States448.  
The second main innovation was the development of the modular approach 
consisting of resources of one or more Member States which aimed to avoid 
duplications of actions and to be fully interoperable depending on the type of 
major emergency and on particular needs in that emergency449. This procedural 
change recalled the Barnier’s proposal to identify precise needs in a “menu” 
corresponding to different standard civil protection scenarios in order to facilitate 
the deployment of resources when necessary. In this way, the Council tried to 
overcome the limits of a decision taken on a case by case basis as established in 
the Decision 2001/792/EC that extend the time-limits for providing assistance. 
However, modules still were made up on a voluntary basis450. Moreover, it is 
worth to note that, as proposed by Barnier, the 2007 Decision introduced the 
opportunity for Member States to provide preventive information about relevant 
military assets and capabilities that could be used as a last resort as part of the 
civil protection assistance through the Mechanism, such as transport and logistical 
or medical support451.  
The last important change was the clear division between preparedness and 
response. In terms of preparedness, the Council set a list of tasks for the 
Commission like establishing and managing the MIC and CECIS, contributing to 
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the development of the early warning system, establishing a way to quickly 
mobilise experts and setting up a training programme. As for response, it is 
interesting to underline the recasting Decision not only appointed the Commission 
as co-coordinator of the intervention outside the European Union, but also 
established a distribution of tasks between Presidency of the Council and 
Commission in order to ensure “the effectiveness, coherence and complementarity 
of the overall Community response” 452.   
Overall, the recast decision introduced some ameliorations to the existing 
regulatory framework that, without however radically reforming it, reflected the 
progressive shift from a State-centred to a supranational approach. However, the 
Mechanism inaugurated by Decision 2007/779/EC had some considerable 
limitations in terms of effectiveness, efficiency and coherence of the European 
disaster response.   
The first one was that the reaction was dependent on voluntary and ad hoc offers 
of assistance by States Parties. The impossibility of foreseeing exactly what and 
how much assistance could be offered for any given emergency meant that a 
meaningful planning for deploying assistance could not be done for operations 
under the Mechanism. This could lead to a degree of improvisation and 
fragmentation in the immediate response phase that could undermine the 
intervention itself and deny protection to people in need.  
A past example of this ineffectiveness was the major forest fires in Bulgaria in the 
summer of 2007, where the request for assistance was left unanswered by other 
States Party because their fire fighting aircrafts were either in use in other State or 
on high alert to react domestically. In addition, there was often unavailability of 
critical response assets to be quickly mobilised and thus needs of disasters’ 
victims could not be met. In particular, capacity gaps occurred with regard to 
assets dealing with low probability and law impact risks that refrained States from 
justifying investments, even though the impact could be huge. Moreover, while 
such inadequacy has been repeatedly reported, the previous legal basis did not 
allow the Union support to filling such gaps. It was thus clear that relying on 
capacities of States and on their willingness, occasionally, could mean to fail.  
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In the second place, optimal responses were hindered by limited transport 
solutions and heavy procedures for States that have to face unexpected high cost 
for transports453. Actually, the 2007 Decision established that States could rely on 
support in the form of a EU co-financing for transport or on the activation by the 
Commission of a transport contractor to lease transport assets. But, the 
burdensome and long procedures as well as the maximum 50% co-financing 
clearly represented an obstacle in deploying assistance in a collective and 
coordinated way.  
In the fourth place, despite the organisation and development of early warning 
systems as well as of preparedness projects and training courses, coordination and 
sharing of experience among personnel of States Party was rather limited. This 
was because, despite the efforts of some civil protection structures, given the lack 
of a common language and of compatible operating procedures, it was easier to 
organise trainings and meetings at national level rather than at transnational level. 
As a consequence, without an orientation and a concrete assistance from the EU, 
first responders could not be able to substantially raise their preparedness levels 
for responding to overwhelming and cross-border events. 
The last shortcoming was the lack of integration of prevention policies, despite 
the high number of Communications delivered by the Commission and the 
legislation on the necessity to improve cooperation in the area of risk 
assessment454. Indeed, given the growing complexity of emergencies, separate 
planning and isolated action without improved coordination were insufficient to 
prevent the consequences of future disasters. In addition, since Council Decision 
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2007/1627EC did not clearly cover the phase of prevention and the development 
of common disaster risk management plans, no activity in this field both at 
national or supranational level could be co-financed through the Civil Protection 
Financial Instrument.  
All these shortcomings can be partially explained by the fact that, despite a 
number of initiatives, cooperation in the area of civil protection contained certain 
political tensions among Member States according to a logic of north-south 
division. On one hand, States in southern Europe tended to stress the importance 
of enhancing the EU’s capacity to respond to crises and, consequently, to 
advocate the establishment of common EU civil protection capacities to 
complement the national ones. However, few would have accepted the 
Commission in a ‘commanding’ role in the area of civil protection455. On the other 
hand, Member States of northern Europe stressed the importance of the EU just as 
a driver to encourage an improved national capability as regards the ability to 
respond to a crisis and to carry out preventive and preparedness measures 
throughout financing measures. In addition, they downplayed the need for 
commonly owned EU resources and the EU’s role as a coordinator in the area of 
civil protection. This north–south division reflected also different opinions about 
the balance between national responsibility and collective responsibility of the EU 
as well as the nature of solidarity among Member States.  
At this point of the present work, one could deem that until 2007 there was not a 
clear intention to further develop the field of civil protection within the European 
Community. Even though the European institutions boosted a deeper integration 
of practices, the intergovernmental approach prevailed on the communitarian one 
and Member States maintained a significant degree of power which were not 
intentioned to leave. Moreover, it was apparent that also in case of serious 
emergencies both inside and outside the territories of Member States national 
interests were stronger than the collective ones. The tension between national and 
supranational dimension and the lack of a shared attitude among the Member 
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States of what the cooperation within the EU should focus on seemed to render 
the further development of the Mechanism uncertain.  
 
3.  The Lisbon Treaty and the Union Civil Protection Mechanism 
 
3.1 The new competence in the area of civil protection  
 
The entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon in 2009, even though driven by a 
political compromise among conflicting ideas on the nature and the future of the 
European Union, has opened the way for some common ground in the area of 
civil protection which, according to Article 6 TFEU, now falls within the so-
called supporting competences456. The detailed definition of the objectives and the 
scope of the new EU competence regarding civil protection is spelled out in Title 
XXIII, Article 196 of the TFEU that states as follows: 
1. The Union shall encourage cooperation between Member States in order 
to improve the effectiveness of systems for preventing and protecting against 
natural or man-made disasters. Union action shall aim to: 
(a) support and complement Member States’ action at national, regional and 
local level in risk prevention, in preparing their civil-protection personnel 
and in responding to natural or man-made disasters within the Union; 
(b) promote swift, effective operational cooperation within the Union 
between national civil-protection services; 
(c) promote consistency in international civil-protection work. 
2. The European Parliament and the Council, acting in accordance with the 
ordinary legislative procedure shall establish the measures necessary to help 
achieve the objectives referred to in paragraph 1, excluding any 
harmonisation of the laws and regulations of the Member States. 
First of all, the provision refers, ratione materiae, both to natural and man-made 
disasters, even if a more specific definition is left to secondary legislation. In line 
with the orientation of the legal doctrine and with the practice consolidated over 
time, it has been thus clearly recognised the complex nature of emergencies, that 
may have both natural and anthropogenic origins.   
                                                          
456
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Even though the EU interventions for coping with disasters occurring outside the 
Union’s territory are not covered by the present work, it is anyway important to 
stress the broad scope of the new treaty provision which covers, ratione loci, civil 
protection cooperation both inside and outside the EU. In this way, it reflects the 
previous legal framework, but with some differences underscored by the verbs 
used. Indeed, if the EU action is intended to “support” and “complement” that of 
Member States in managing emergencies occurring within the Union, as for the 
external sphere it is just called upon to “promote consistency”. The issue of 
consistency of the EU external action has gained significant importance with the 
entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, since it does not require only that there are 
not contradictions between the internal and the external dimension of the EU 
policies, but also that the actions carried out in the international arena are coherent 
and compatible with each other457. It is thus clear that, in order to understand how 
the EU can foster consistency of measures of civil protection adopted to respond 
to emergencies occurring outside the Union, Article 196 must be read in 
conjunction with other provisions concerning the EU external action, in particular 
Article 21 TEU and Article 214 TFUE on humanitarian aid.  
Another positive element to be indicated is the broad scope ratione temporis of 
the new competence as for the range of actions to be carried out. It covers not 
only the phases of preparedness and response, but also that of prevention which, 
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 The concept of ‘consistency’ was introduced by the Single European Act (SEA), whose 
Preamble refers to the “responsibility incumbent upon Europe to aim at speaking ever increasingly 
with one voice and to act with consistency and solidarity in order more effectively to defend its 
common interests and independence”. Starting from the Lisbon Treaty the issue has become object 
of a number of contributions, in particular as regards to the distinction between coherence and 
consistency. See, ex multis, C. Hillion, “Tous pour un, un pour tous! Coherence in the External 
Relations of the European Union”, in M. Cremona (ed.), Developments in EU External Relations 
Law, Oxford University Press, 2008, pp. 10-36; A. Mignolli, L’azione esterna dell’Unione 
europea e il principio della coerenza, Jovene Editore, 2009; P. Van Elsuwege, “EU External 
Action after the Collapse of the Pillar Structure: In Search of a New Balance Between 
Delimitation and Consistency”, in Common Market Law Review, Vol. 47, 2010, pp. 987-1019; M. 
Cremona, “Coherence in European Union Foreign Relations Law”, in P. Koutrakos (ed.), 
European Foreign Policy. Legal and Political Perspectives, Elgar Publishing, 2011, pp. 55-94; L. 
Den Hertog, S. Stroß, “Coherence in EU External Relations. Concepts and Legal Rooting of An 
Ambiguous Term”, in European Foreign Affairs Review, Vol. 18, 2013, pp. 373-388; M. Gatti, 
European External Action Service - Promoting Coherence through Autonomy and Coordination, 
Brill, 2016.  
171 
 
as then proposed by the Commission in its 2009 Communication458, should be 
reinforced in the light of a more comprehensive approach to disaster 
management459. This gives the opportunity to the Union to have a certain room for 
manoeuvre to increase Member States awareness on ex-ante disaster management. 
Indeed, before the Lisbon Treaty, there was not a coherent and comprehensive 
system of measures for prevention in the field of civil protection. Decision 
2007/779 had sidestepped to focus on prevention and early warning systems by 
repeating the ambivalent statement of the 2001 Decision which had recognised 
just its importance and the necessity of further considerations460. On the contrary, 
following the Lisbon revision, secondary legislation in the area of civil protection 
has adopted an entirely different approach by making prevention the new core of 
the Mechanism.  
As for the recipients of the Union action, one may suggest that, from a substantive 
point of view, the explicit competence in the area of civil protection essentially 
mirrors the practice that has developed in subiecta materia prior to the Lisbon 
Treaty. Indeed, Article 196 refers to the objective of supporting and 
complementing Member States’ action at all levels, by explicitly mentioning the 
responsibility of regional and local authorities. As a result, the new mechanism of 
EU civil protection should be complementary and not intending to replace nor 
radically transform national systems in this area.  
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As already anticipated, the crucial innovation derives from the provision of an 
explicit legal basis for the area of civil protection. Under Article 196, para.2, 
TFEU the EU measures taken in this materia shall be enacted in accordance with 
the ordinary legislative procedure, envisaged by Article 294 TFEU. As a 
consequence, legislative acts are to be adopted upon a proposal from the 
Commission, in co-decision by the European Parliament and the Council that 
votes by qualified majority. Against this background, it is surprising the lack of 
any reference to a duty of consultation of the Committee of the Regions with 
respect to the legislative acts to be adopted. The new decision-making process is, 
therefore, a crucial step forward in comparison to the pre-existing legal 
framework where the legislative acts were adopted according to the flexibility 
clause requiring the unanimous voting within the Council. The procedure 
provided for in the Treaty involves a strengthened legislative role for the 
European Parliament and undoubtedly facilitates further advances in the EU Civil 
Protection Mechanism461.  
The EU has, therefore, more competence in this area than it might be thought, but 
it appears clear the tension in the frame of the Treaty provisions between the 
nature of the act to be adopted and the condition of non-harmonisation. At first 
sight, the easier way to achieve the objectives of the EU action to support, 
coordinate or supplement the actions of the Member States without resorting to 
harmonisation would be to adopt ‘soft law’ instruments. However, no reference to 
‘soft legislation’, such as guidelines, action programmes or recommendations is 
made, but the mention of the legislative procedure to be used indicates that the 
institutions shall select any type of legislative act. Since the Treaty does not 
provide any specific link between the types of acts adoptable and the nature of the 
competence to be exercised, the Union may adopt the whole range of legal 
binding instruments at disposal in accordance with Article 288 TFEU462.  
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The only requirement is that the Commission bears in mind the specific 
characteristics of each act, its compliance with the targets of the regulatory 
intervention as well as with the principle of proportionality and, in the case of 
supporting competences, also the caveat concerning legislative harmonisation. In 
this case, the principle of proportionality plays a fundamental role as it establishes 
that the content and form of EU action must not exceed what is necessary to 
achieve the objectives of the EU treaties. However, the problem upstream is that 
the opportunity for the EU institutions to adopt binding measures in the field of 
civil protection may conflict with the prohibition of harmonisation. Any enacted 
binding measure may be tantamount to harmonisation of national law, even 
though it does not bear the imprint on the face of the measure463. The borderline 
between the adoption of legitimate binding acts and illegitimate harmonisation of 
national law is very narrow. The consequence for Member States is that, despite 
their remits are not per se superseded, they will be constrained to the extent 
stipulated by the legally binding act chosen among regulations, directives and 
decisions. It remains to be seen whether the act adopted according to Article 196 
respects the prohibition of harmonisation or whether it represents a challenge for 
Member States’ competence in this area. 
 
3.2 The adoption of a new legislative act on a Union Civil Protection Mechanism 
 
The changes brought by the Lisbon Treaty as well as by some events, like the 
devastating earthquake in Haiti in early January 2010 and the floods in Pakistan in 
June of that year, have triggered the Commission to adopt new initiatives on civil 
protection from an operational and legal point of view.  
First of all, in February 2010, the Directorate-General for Humanitarian Aid 
(ECHO) absorbed the civil protection sector and became the Directorate for 
International Cooperation, Humanitarian Aid and Crisis Response by responding 
to the desired improvement of synergies envisioned by the Council in the 
                                                                                                                                                               
Recommendations and opinions shall have no binding force”. For legal doctrine, see R. Adam, A. 
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mentioned Humanitarian Aid Consensus. Moreover, as acknowledged by the 
European Parliament, this should improve consistency of the overall disaster 
response outside the Union according to para. 1 c) of Article 196464. Furthermore, 
on the basis of the 2010 Communication Towards a stronger European disaster 
response: the role of civil protection and humanitarian assistance465, the 
Commission urged to reinforce the effectiveness, efficiency, coherence and 
visibility of EU’s response to disasters. The Commission was aware that, while 
the Mechanism was performing well for what it was designed for in 2001, it was 
limited by a number of shortcomings related mainly to response planning and 
integration of preparedness and prevention actions, thus making it increasingly 
difficult to ensure an appropriate handling of the future challenges.  
As a result, according to the provisions of the Lisbon Treaty, in 2011 the 
Commission presented a proposal for a decision of the European Parliament and 
of the Council on a Union Civil Protection Mechanism to replace both the 
decision on the CPM and that on the Civil Protection Financial Instrument.  
On December 2011, the Commission Directorate-General responsible for 
humanitarian aid and civil protection delivered a Working Paper on Impact 
Assessment to review the Civil Protection regulatory framework466. In particular, 
the paper examined EU Civil Protection cooperation policy options, including all 
aspects of an ex-ante evaluation for the future form of the Civil Protection 
Financial Instrument. During the assessment process, the Steering Committe 
consulted different stakeholders like national civil protecion authorities, 
international organisations, UN agencies, emergency management organisations 
and the humanitarian community that supported advanced planning of 
preparedness and response operations under the Mechanism. Indeed, it was clear 
that a more effective and integrated EU support for disaster management 
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including risk management planning could have a positive impact on society and 
environment. 
In the light of this preparatory working paper, according to the ordinary legislative 
procedure, the European Commission handed over its draft proposal on a Union 
Civil Protection Mechanism to the European Parliament and the Council467, both 
having the possibility to amend what delivered by the Commission. Moreover, 
since the field of civil protection concerns also regional and local governments, 
even if not expressly required by the Treaties, the Committee of the Regions was 
asked to present its opinion on the Commission proposal468 in order to ensure that 
the position and needs of regional and local authorities were respected. The 
Committee welcomed the efforts of the Commission to reinforce the existing Civil 
Protection Mechanism, but it wanted to be reassured on the practical impact of the 
Mechanism because the first response to the emergency has to be guaranteed at 
the local level. Thus, the components of the Committee insisted on the fact that 
the establishment and management of the new Mechanism should not create 
parallel structures or unclear deployment procedures at EU level able to threat 
national bodies469.  
On the same page but with much more arguments, debates within the Council 
started under the Danish Presidency in the Working Party on Civil Protection 
(PROCIV) and continued under the Cyprus Presidency. In terms of the main 
innovations brought by the Commission Proposal, Member States immediately 
demonstrated overall support for strengthening planning and disaster prevention, 
as well as for merging the Council Decisions on the Civil Protection Mechanism 
and the Civil Protection Financial Instrument into one legal document. 
Nevertheless, as reported in the Presidency’s compromise text, diverging views 
remained mainly on the scope and extent of the obligations on Member States that 
did not want to lose their prerogatives. In the light of this evaluation, as it will be 
illustrated in the next paragraph, the Commission proposal was subjected to some 
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modification by the Council470 which, however, recognised the necessity to 
improve the effectiveness and cost-efficiency of systems preventing, preparing for 
and responding to natural and man-made disasters of all kinds. Even though both 
Germany and Austria voted against the Decision and United Kingdom 
abstained471, there were the necessary conditions for a first-reading agreement 
with the European Parliament. The text was thereby soon approved and on 17 
December 2013 Decision 1313/2013 on a Union Civil Protection Mechanism472 
was signed thereby marking the latest step of the institutionalization of EU civil 
protection mechanism as expression of in-kind solidarity among Member States. 
 
3.3 The Decision 1313/2013: old and new elements framing the Union Civil 
Protection Mechanism 
 
Decision 1313/2013 represents a real improvement for the system of civil 
protection at Union level, but in some respects also a sort of compromise between 
the Commission and the Council. It is, therefore, worth to explore the content of 
the Decision by underlying both aspects. 
On the path of the previous legislation on civil protection, the first element to be 
noted is the broad meaning attributed to the term “disaster” which is defined in 
Article 4 of the Decision as “any situation which has or may have a severe impact 
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on people, the environment, or property, including cultural heritage”473. It is thus 
reiterated the actual or potential severity of an emergency triggering the response, 
which is not clearly determined by its transnational nature, but rather by the 
incapacity of the State to react its own. Secondly, the serious consequences of a 
disaster may refer also to those events which affect the environment or the 
cultural heritage without necessarily jeopardising people’s lives.  
So far, anything new in comparison to Decision 2007/779; the subtle difference is 
enshrined in Article 1, para. 2, which establishes the scope of application of the 
Mechanism, that “shall cover primarily people, but also the environment and 
property, including cultural heritage, against all kinds of natural and man-made 
disasters, including the consequences of acts of terrorism, technological, 
radiological or environmental disasters, marine pollution, and acute health 
emergencies, occurring inside or outside the Union” [emphasis added]. As 
emphasised, by using the term “including” the provision does contain just an 
illustrative list of situations where the Mechanism can be activated and this leaves 
the door open to an even wider interpretation474.  
Once reported the scope of application of the Mechanism, it is interesting to 
analyse the temporal element of its activation. In line with the spirit of the Lisbon 
Treaty, the second main change lies in the fact that Decision 1313/2013 reflects 
the classical disaster management circle, by including prevention, preparedness 
and response. As a consequence, compared with the legislation previously in 
force, the new instrument has been intended to give a much greater emphasis to 
disaster prevention and risk management thus translating from a culture of 
reaction to a culture of prevention as expression of long-term solidarity475.  
From an institutional point of view, the most relevant plan is the establishment of 
an Emergency Response Coordination Centre (ERCC) aimed at merging the two 
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crisis rooms operating for civil protection (MIC) and humanitarian assistance 
(ECHO). The ERCC built on the existing Monitoring and Information Centre, has 
been strengthened to be a communication platform and to ensure 24/7 operational 
capacity (Article 7). The breakthrough of this idea is twofold. On one hand, it 
represents the opportunity to streamline existing structures and to grant to the 
ERCC a more active role consisting in guaranteeing operational and logistical 
support. On the other hand, it has become clear the Commission interest to ensure 
close coordination between civil protection and humanitarian aid, as well as 
consistency with possible actions carried out under other areas of cooperation and 
instruments operating both within and outside the Union476.  
Furthermore, the Commission expressed its intention to create a unique European 
Civil Protection Force by establishing an “European Emergency Response 
Capacity” (EERC)477. Despite the more prudent terminology used, the idea is 
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similar to that proposed by Barnier in 2006: rendering the EU response to 
disasters more predictable, better planned, and coordinated by overcoming the 
inefficient system based on ad hoc offers of assistance from the participating 
States.  
In this regard, the Commission proposal was particularly daring. The first step set 
out by the Commission was to improve the planning of assistance, by developing 
reference scenarios for the main types of disasters, mapping the assets available in 
the Member States and adopting prior contingency plans for the deployment of the 
capacities478. The second step was to enhance the availability of key resources by 
feeding the EERC with a voluntary pool of pre-committed civil protection assets 
from Member States to be placed on standby for EU disaster response 
operations479. In this context, the European Commission and Member States 
should have been responsible for defining quality requirements for the capacities 
to be committed and for ensuring their quality, respectively480.  
Albeit the attempt of compromise between general interest and national interest – 
underscored by the nature essentially voluntary of the registration of the capacities 
from Member States – a lively debate on the Commission proposal has been 
sparked within the Council. Indeed, some Member States were determined to 
leave open the possibility of opting-out in specific disasters thereby jeopardising 
the common effort in facing disasters. Accordingly, the Presidency’s compromise 
stressed the necessity that the response capacities made available for the EERC 
should remain accessible for national purposes in case of compelling reasons and 
that the ultimate decision on their deployment should be taken by the Member 
                                                                                                                                                               
http://erccportal.jrc.ec.europa.eu/getdailymap/docId/2291. For a comment on the effectiveness of 
the EERC, see European Commission, Report from the Commission to the European Parliament 
and the Council on progress made and gaps remaining in the European Emergency Response 
Capacity, 17 February 2017.  
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 See, European Commission, Proposal for a Decision of the European Parliament and of the 
Council on a Union Civil Protection Mechanism, Article 10.  
479
 See, European Commission, Proposal for a Decision of the European Parliament and of the 
Council on a Union Civil Protection Mechanism, Article 11 (1). Moreover, it is provided that the 
process of registration of Member States’ capacities had to be managed by the Commission 
(Article 11 (4)). 
480
 See, European Commission, Proposal for a Decision of the European Parliament and of the 
Council on a Union Civil Protection Mechanism, Article 11 (3). 
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States which registered the response capacity concerned481. As it will be explained 
in detail in the following paragraph, the final version of the Decision 1313/2013 
includes such amendments which further underline the voluntary nature of these 
commitments. It is thus clear that, even though the system is more certain and 
efficient given the accelerated process of response, States still keep a high degree 
of discretion in this phase.  
The pressures received from States are then evident also while reading Article 12 
of the Decision. The initial idea, already envisaged in the 2010 Communication 
and endorsed by the European Parliament 482, was to develop specific EU-funded 
assets for civil protection. This would have guaranteed burden-sharing and 
common use of cost-efficient resources, but Member States presented multiple 
reservations related to the potential political cost of such a step. Indeed, it could 
represent an incentive for each Member States not only to reduce its civil 
protection capacities to protect its citizens, but also to start relying systematically 
on these EU-funded assets. But, the leading reason invoked was the fear that it 
could lead to an unwanted command and control from the EU institutions. Indeed, 
in view of primary responsibility of States Party for the protection of their 
populations, it was inappropriate for the EU to develops its “own” assets and to 
pose a risk of “crowding out” national capacities483.  
It was thus decided to adopt another formula which, however, is completely 
different from that elaborated by the Commission in its proposal. Indeed, Article 
12 of the Decision provides that the Commission should determine, in co-
operation with Member States, the existence of gaps in the emergency response 
capacities and examine whether the necessary capacities are available to the 
Member States outside the EERC. More precisely, Article 21 (j) establishes that 
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 See, Council of the European Union, Preparation of the Council (Justice and Home Affairs) 
meeting on 25 and 26 October 2012, Proposal for a Decision of the European Parliament and of 
the Council on a Union Civil Protection Mechanism = State of play / Orientation debate, Doc. 
14445/12, 8 October 2012, p. 9. Moreover, see, Decision 1313/2013/EU, Article 11, paras. 6-7.  
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 See, European Parliament Resolution on “Towards a stronger European disaster response: the 
role of civil protection and humanitarian assistance”, 2011/2023 INI, 27 September 2011, paras. 
23-24. 
483See, Council of the European Union, Proposal for a Decision of the European Parliament and of 
the Council on a Union Civil Protection Mechanism, Doc. 14445/12, cit., pp. 11-12.  
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the development of new response assets could be eligible for financial assistance 
up to a maximum of 20 % of the eligible costs. It is important to highlight that the 
delivery of co-financing is linked to the subsequent commitment of those 
resources to the voluntary pool for a minimum period of two years and that, where 
appropriate, preference shall be given to consortia of Member States cooperating 
on a common risk. Despite this clause, it has been completely deleted the 
opportunity to develop response capacities at the Union level that, being part of 
the European Emergency Response Capacity, could serve as a common buffer 
against shared risks484. This demonstrates that in managing interventions of civil 
protection States are still linked to the idea that the Mechanism should coordinate 
multiple forms of assistance, but without guaranteeing a real and unique EU 
assistance capable of showing the factual side of solidarity as enshrined in the 
Treaties485.  
 
3.4 The Union Civil Protection Mechanism: right or obligation to solidarity? 
 
According to the wording of Decision 1313/2013, it is not possible to force 
Member States to help because, in general terms, the deployment of in-kind 
resources relies on the willingness of the participating States which have 
registered them. In particular, Article 15, para. 4, of Decision 1313/2013 states 
that “any Member State to which a request for assistance is addressed shall 
promptly determine whether it is in a position to render the assistance required 
and inform the requesting Member State of its decision through the CECIS, 
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 See, European Commission, Proposal for a Decision of the European Parliament and of the 
Council on a Union Civil Protection Mechanism, Article 12, para. 2 (b). 
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 See, ECORYS, “Strengthening the EU capacity to respond to disasters: Identification of the 
gaps in the capacity of the Community Civil Protection Mechanism to provide assistance in major 
disasters and options to fill the gaps – A scenario-based approach”, September 2009, p. 10. 
Actually, in this regard, it is necessary to stress that the European Commission has recently issued 
a proposal for amending Decision 1313/2013 which would establish a dedicated reserve of 
operational capacities at Union level (rescEU), see Proposal for a Decision of the European 
Parliament and of the Council amending Decision No 1313/2013/EU on a Union Civil Protection 
Mechanism, COM/2017/0772 final, 23 November 2017.  
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indicating the scope, terms and, where applicable, costs of the assistance it could 
render”486.  
This means that once Member States have received a call for action from the 
ERCC, they can decide whether and how to provide for assistance, thereby 
returning to a discourse which excludes the existence of solidarity obligations in 
the field of disaster response. However, it is appropriate to recall that the new EU 
Civil Protection Mechanism has been thought to progressively avoid ad hoc 
interventions by creating pre-planned structures and modules of intervention, that 
form the so-called “voluntary pool” or EERC487. 
Actually, the voluntary pool is not only a strategic way to respond more 
effectively and rapidly to wide-ranging disasters, but also one of the 
manifestations of that spirit of solidarity under which all the States of the 
European Union should act and that underpins the process of integration. Indeed, 
pooling national resources for the benefit of each EU Member means to go 
beyond national borders and react as the affected territory was its own, by putting 
solidarity before sovereignty. But, it remains a voluntary force whose 
‘voluntariness’ – both in the phase of establishment and in that of deployment – 
has to be assessed in order to challenge State consent and discretion in responding 
to crisis occurring within the Union.  
As for the establishment of the voluntary pool, Member States have the power to 
decide whether or not pre-commit a number of resources. It is a key issue that has 
been discussed at length during the debates on the adoption of the Decision 
1313/3013 when, under pressure of some States, it was decided to cut the level of 
commitment required to the Member States in relation to the inclusion of national 
resources to the EERC. As proof of that, the Decision repeats more than once that 
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 It is to be noted that the time limit within which the Member State shall in principle reply is 
based on the nature of the disaster and shall in any case not be less than two hours, see, 
Implementing Decision 2014/762/EU, Article 35, para. 9.  
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33/2016 on “Union Civil Protection Mechanism” published on 18 January 2017. Moreover, on 
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report on the developments of the EERC, see European Commission Report on progress made and 
gaps remaining in the European Emergency Response Capacity, COM (2017) 78 final, 17 
February 2017. 
183 
 
the identification of the means to be committed must be carried out on a voluntary 
basis, without creating a specific obligation. As a result, it seems that State 
willingness has not been jeopardised by the new Mechanism that, despite its 
evolution, could not undermine the State-centred system in favour of a solidarity 
one. But, the significant benefits that States can receive from the financial 
contribution eligible according to Article 21 of Decision 1313/2013 and Article 17 
of the implementing Decision 762/2014, may frame the issue in a different light.  
As already reported, the resources at disposal must follow the quality 
requirements defined by the Commission in Article 35, para. 7, of the 
implementing Decision488 and, to this end, Member States may request a grant for 
the financing of adaptation costs covering individually up to 100% of the eligible 
costs for the supply of modules, technical assistance, support teams or other 
response capacities.  
Moreover, Article 21, para. 2, point (d), of Decision 1313/2013 opens to the 
possibility for financial assistance to make available capacities additional to 
participating States’ existing capacities which would contribute to addressing 
temporary shortcomings of response capacities in extraordinary disaster 
situations. The EU grant may cover 100% of total eligible costs of designing, 
preparing, negotiating, concluding and managing the contracts or arrangements, as 
well as the costs of developing standard operating procedures and exercises to 
ensure the effective use of buffer capacities. These buffer capacities would be 
registered in the voluntary pool and would be available for Union Mechanism 
deployments under the same general terms as other capacities registered in the 
voluntary pool489. By considering the high technical quality of the final assets and 
the extensive funding received, it is conceivable that an increasing number of 
Member States decides to benefit from the financial support of the Union and 
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 In particular, the Decision refers to (a) availability; (b) suitability; (c) location/proximity; (d) 
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 For further details on the procedure of financial granting, see European Commission, Call for 
proposals – Buffer capacities for addressing temporary shortcomings in extraordinary disasters. 
Grant application guide, 2016 edition, available at http://ec.europa.eu/echo/sites/echo-
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therefore to join the EERC. Moreover, in nowadays political and financial 
context, it is more reasonable for Member States to invest and specialise in 
different response capacities to ensure more complementarity, as well as to jointly 
develop response measure that are not needed very often, but that one may need to 
have.  
As a consequence, in the establishment phase of the voluntary pool, it seems that 
the number of advantages coming from both the financing of adaptation costs and 
the permanent opportunity to use the resources when necessary contribute to 
mitigate, although partially, the initial discretion of the States in participating to 
this system of pre-commitment. Furthermore, in a wider perspective, it is 
appropriate to recall that also applicants established in third countries that 
concluded an Agreement for participation in the Mechanism with the Union – that 
means Iceland, Montenegro, Norway, Serbia, former Yugoslav Republic of 
Macedonia – may be eligible for grants. In this way, State consent in joining the 
EERC, as manifestation of the voluntary dimension of sovereignty, is nuanced not 
only for EU Member States, but also for enlargement countries that are 
encouraged to give they own contribution to faster response to exceptional 
disasters.  
In respect of the phase of deployment of the resources, despite they are pre-
committed and directly at disposal, in Decision 1313/2013 there is no shortage of 
details which question such an automaticity. Indeed, the content of Article 11 of 
Decision 1313/2013 is in a hurry to set “[t]he ultimate decision on [the] 
deployment [of the response capacities] shall be taken by the Member States 
which registered the response capacity concerned” [emphasis added]. In order to 
further specify this point, Article 11, para.7, adds that “when domestic 
emergencies, force majeure or, in exceptional cases, serious reasons prevent a 
Member State from making those response capacities available in a specific 
disaster, that Member State shall inform the Commission as soon as possible by 
referring to this Article”. Therefore, Member States keep the right to deny 
assistance especially in case of domestic emergencies, force majeure or, in 
exceptional cases, serious reasons. In addition, Decision 1313/2013 is careful to 
underscore that “the role of the Commission shall not affect the Member States’ 
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competences and responsibility for their teams, modules and other support 
capacities, including military capacities. In particular, the support offered by the 
Commission shall not entail command and control over the Member States’ 
teams, modules and other support, which shall be deployed on a voluntary basis in 
accordance with the coordination at headquarters level and on site”490.  
In line of principle, this reflects not only current rules of international law 
concerning the chain of command, but also the division of competences enshrined 
in the Lisbon Treaty. Voluntariness seems, therefore, particularly strong in this 
phase, but from a legal point of view it cannot be ignored the wording of the first 
sentence of Article 11 of Decision 1313/2013, setting out that “response capacities 
that Member States make available for the EERC shall be available for response 
operations under the Union Mechanism following a request for assistance through 
the ERCC”. The use of the modal verb “shall” suggests that the response 
capacities previously committed must be used to help the requesting State. Hence, 
even though the participating States pool their resources by simply promising 
their intervention, it is a promise, a commitment which should be respected 
because once the EERC is established it must work out.  
In this perspective, it not a coincidence that, as for the buffer capacities registered 
in the voluntary pool, their domestic use in the Member State that co-financed the 
availability of the capacities is subjected to some limits491. Indeed, prior to any 
domestic use, the ERCC shall be consulted to confirm that: (i) there is no 
simultaneous or imminent extraordinary disaster that may lead to a request for 
deployment of the buffer capacity; and (ii) the domestic use does not unduly 
hinder the rapid access of other Member States in the event new extraordinary 
disasters arise. These two options, on the one hand, counter that vision which 
places singular national interests over the global ones and, on the other one, 
confirm the orientation to take in due consideration the requests of assistance 
coming from the affected States.  
Furthermore, the detailed exceptions to the deployment of the pre-committed 
resources specified in Article 11 of the Decision 1313/2013 – domestic 
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186 
 
emergencies, force majeure or, in exceptional cases, serious reasons – make the 
offer of assistance in the framework of the voluntary pool a particularly stringent 
commitment on all the participating Member States. It is suffice to recall that, if 
we look at the provisions of international law and in particular to the 2001 
Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts492, the 
mentioned exceptions represent genuine and formal derogations to an 
international obligation.  
According to Article 23 of the Articles on Responsibility of States, force majeure 
is recognised as one of the circumstances precluding wrongfulness of those 
conducts that would otherwise not be in conformity with the international 
obligations. In particular, it defines ‘force majeure’ as the occurrence of an 
irresistible force or of an unforeseen event, beyond the control of the State, 
making it materially impossible in the circumstances to perform the obligation. 
The provision, then, points out two circumstances where the justification of the 
force majeure cannot operate, that are when (a) the situation of force majeure is 
due, either alone or in combination with other factors, to the conduct of the State 
invoking it; or (b) the State has assumed the risk of that situation occurring.  
In defining the notion of ‘force majeure’, the CJEU has always been very rigorous 
and, although Member States had more than once invoked such an excuse to 
justify their failure to fulfil EU obligations, the CJEU has regularly rejected pleas 
of force majeure clearly far from the deeper meaning of such a notion. Moreover, 
it has consistently ruled that “a Member State may not plead provisions, practices 
or circumstances existing in its internal legal system in order to justify a failure to 
comply with obligations”493. The CJEU did, however, agree that force majeure 
could be invoked in “circumstances beyond the control of the person claiming 
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force majeure, which are abnormal and unforeseeable and of which the 
consequences could not have been avoided despite the exercise of all due care”494.  
As for the other two exceptions, that are state of emergency and other serious 
reasons, it can be appropriate to equate them to the notion of ‘state of necessity’, 
included in the 2001 Articles of the ILC whose Article 25 establishes that 
‘necessity’ precludes the wrongfulness of an act when “(a) is the only way for the 
State to safeguard an essential interest against a grave and imminent peril; and (b) 
does not seriously impair an essential interest of the State or States towards which 
the obligation exists, or of the international community as a whole”. For what 
concerns EU law, the concept of necessity does not hold an independent character, 
but has been often conceived in relation to that of public and social security of the 
State, that is, by definition, linked to the national dimension of sovereignty. 
Accordingly, this means also that the burden of proof is up to the national 
authorities which – in the case at stake – shall demonstrate the existence of 
imperative circumstances preventing the deployment of resources pre-committed 
in the voluntary pool.  
In the light of these arguments, it is fair to affirm that the participation in the 
EERC, alongside envisaging a voluntary pre-commitment of resources, expects a 
high level of commitment on the States so that it can operate in an effective 
manner. And, exactly in this phase, it cannot be underestimated the role played by 
the principle of loyal cooperation which permeates the interaction between the 
Union and Member States by establishing four classes of mutual loyalty duties: 
the duty to adopt all appropriate measures to ensure the fulfilment of EU 
obligations, the duty to assist EU institutions and facilitated their action in 
carrying out EU tasks, the duty to abstain from measure jeopardising EU 
objectives as well as the duty of mutual assistance. Therefore, when the EU 
objective is, according to Article 3 TEU, to promote solidarity among Member 
States and, more specifically, to promote swift, effective operational cooperation 
for protecting against natural or man-made disasters (Article 196 TFEU), Member 
States have to act in order to comply with their loyalty duties thus fully 
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cooperating with the EU institutions for ensuring the effectiveness, in this case, of 
the Civil Protection Mechanism. As a result, when the Union is requested to 
intervene through the deployment of the Mechanism, since it is not provided with 
its own resources, it has to rely on those put at disposal by Member States that, in 
a spirit of loyal cooperation, have to cooperate in good faith with the EU 
institutions in order to give substance to the tasks which flow from the Treaties495. 
On the other hand, also the Commission has to play its part by guaranteeing the 
whole coordination of the assets deployed and sharing the financial and operative 
burdens thus giving practical substance to its loyalty duties in its interaction with 
EU Members.  
Against this background, as anticipated in Chapter II of the present work, the 
suggested elements confirm the fact that the principle of loyal cooperation in 
times of crisis is capable of establishing conducts that ultimately have also a 
solidary nature. In fact, loyalty expresses the practical attitude that EU actors shall 
have in implementing the very process in the view of the common interest thereby 
complement the principle of solidarity which reflects the more general political 
inspiration to complete the integration process496. This notwithstanding, there is to 
say that State willingness is at the basis of the Union Civil Protection Mechanism 
both in the phase of pre-commitment and in that of deployment of the civil 
protection assets with the result that also this instrument responds to the 
traditional logic according to which the State has the right, rather than the duty, to 
provide for assistance. As proof of this, more than once the Commission has 
reported that the reliance on voluntary (and not compulsory) offers of mutual 
assistance has partially limited the deployment of sufficient capacities to address 
the basic needs of those affected by disasters497. Indeed, the fact that States are 
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more prompted to intervene or that hardly may shy away from their duties of loyal 
cooperation because of a number of different reasons does not implies that such a 
behaviour is determined by the pre-existence of an obligation of solidarity. 
Pending the potential changes of the near future498, the next chapter will verify, 
inter alia, whether the so-called ‘solidarity clause’ enshrined in the Lisbon Treaty 
may represent the adequate provision for making the provision of assistance via 
the Civil Protection Mechanism an obligation of solidarity.  
                                                                                                                                                               
on the Civil Protection Mechanism, modules and response capacities still have to be created or at 
least improved. See, Report of the European Commission to the European Parliament and the 
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Commission, Proposal for a Decision of the European Parliament and the Council amending 
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CHAPTER V 
 
THE ‘SOLIDARITY CLAUSE’: LEGAL DUTIES AND 
INTERACTION WITH THE EU INSTRUMENTS  
FOR DISASTER RESPONSE 
 
The previous chapters have served to illustrate the main instruments the Union 
and Member States may rely on in order to provide financial and in-kind 
assistance to the victims of a severe disasters. And, in general terms, it has 
emerged that mainly in the last years there has been a number of attempts to 
improve the effectiveness of each instrument and to foster models of solidarity. 
However, in order to avoid that such an analysis remains just a desk study, it is 
now necessary to make a step forward.  
The present chapter will be thus aimed at evaluating in a more comprehensive 
way the very essence of such mechanisms by wondering to what extent EU 
disaster response law complies with the requirements of solidarity enshrined in 
the Treaties. To this end it will be pursued a two-fold investigation. First of all, it 
will be explored in detail the ‘solidarity clause’ which explicitly asks the Union 
and Member States to act in a spirit of solidarity in order to provide assistance to 
another Member States. Secondly, it will be evaluated the coherence of the 
instruments analysed, how they interplay with the solidarity clause and whether 
the existence of an EU system of solidarity499 in situations of disaster can be 
established. Finally, it will be evaluated what is the actual legal value of this 
provision of primary law500. 
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1. The ‘solidarity clause’: content and implementation  
 
As already made clear in the second chapter of the present work, the increasing 
relevance of the notion of solidarity among Member States in the field of response 
to serious emergencies was enlivened starting from 2002, in the framework of the 
Convention proposing a draft Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe. 
Actually, in the wake of the attacks of 11th September 2001, the issue was 
originally matter for discussion within the Working Group on Defence, chaired by 
Mr. Michel Barnier, that took up the issue of security and defence from terrorist 
attacks and witnessed most of the deliberations on whether, and how, the 
European Union should develop its instruments for collective security, thereby 
balancing subsidiarity with solidarity501.  
Members of the Working Group on Defence were, however, divided with regard 
to the value to be given for the notion of ‘solidarity’ and the situations wherein it 
could be invoked thereby establishing specific duties of intervention. Indeed, on 
the one hand there were those who considered the already issued solidarity clause 
as complement to the mutual defence clause enshrined in Article I-41(7)502 and 
thus applicable in case of armed aggression. On the other hand, a group of States 
– led by Sweden and Finland – proposed not to limit the application of the 
provision just to events of armed aggression, but to extend it to a range of new 
threats confronting the EU. Indeed, a new kind of clause was needed to 
supplement, but not to overlap with the mutual defence clause.  
The Lisbon revision has changed the latter orientation by including an 
autonomous provision concerning solidarity in the event of emergency situations 
other than armed attacks. For the purpose of the present chapter and of the 
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which are members of it, remains the foundation of their collective defence and the forum for its 
implementation”. 
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research work as a whole it is of utmost importance to deeply explore the content 
of the provision enshrined in Article 222, paras. 1 and 2, TFEU.  
1. The Union and its Member States shall act jointly in a spirit of 
solidarity if a Member State is the object of a terrorist attack or the 
victim of a natural or man-made disaster. The Union shall mobilise all 
the instruments at its disposal, including the military resources made 
available by the Member States, to: 
(a) - prevent the terrorist threat in the territory of the Member States; 
- protect democratic institutions and the civilian population from any 
terrorist attack; 
- assist a Member State in its territory, at the request of its political 
authorities, in the event of a terrorist attack; 
(b) assist a Member State in its territory, at the request of its political 
authorities, in the event of a natural or man-made disaster. 
2. Should a Member State be the object of a terrorist attack or the 
victim of a natural or man-made disaster, the other Member States 
shall assist it at the request of its political authorities. To that end, the 
Member States shall coordinate between themselves in the Council. 
The use of the modal verb “shall” leaves no doubt that it is a mandatory 
formulation, able to give practical effect to solidarity as principle. Indeed, the 
wording of Article 222 TFEU and the use of the reinforcing adverb “jointly” 
clearly makes “acting in a spirit of solidarity” an obligation on States and on the 
Union as a whole to intervene in the event of a disaster or of a terrorist attack and 
not just as an inspiring principle governing EU law. According to Article 222 
TFEU, solidarity does not represent a moral rule, but has been extended to 
categorical obligation that, being part of “hard law”, must be practiced by the 
Union – by deploying EU’s own institutional tools, mechanisms, and resources 
that that may operate in a coherent, coordinated and effective way – and by all and 
not some Member States. Thus, the solidarity clause is by far not coextensive with 
the institutional principles aimed at regulating the relationship between the actors 
of the EU legal order. Furthermore, in comparison to the still unclear content of 
the duties of loyalty incumbent on the EU institutions vis-à-vis the Member 
States503, as it will be seen in the next paragraph, the Union is entrusted with 
specific obligations of solidarity. 
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Notwithstanding the obligation on the Union to use all its instruments at disposal, 
including military resources made available by States504, in order to avoid 
conferring on the Union too much autonomy in application of the solidarity 
clause, Article 222, para. 3, TFEU establishes that:  
3. The arrangements for the implementation by the Union of the 
solidarity clause shall be defined by a decision adopted by the Council 
acting on a joint proposal by the Commission and the High 
Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. 
The Council shall act in accordance with Article 31(1) of the Treaty 
on European Union where this decision has defence implications. The 
European Parliament shall be informed. 
For the purposes of this paragraph and without prejudice to Article 
240, the Council shall be assisted by the Political and Security 
Committee with the support of the structures developed in the context 
of the common security and defence policy and by the Committee 
referred to in Article 71; the two committees shall, if necessary, 
submit joint opinions. 
4. The European Council shall regularly assess the threats facing the 
Union in order to enable the Union and its Member States to take 
effective action. 
In the elaboration of the implementing decision, the Council is supported by the 
Political and Security Committee (PSC) and by the Standing Committee on 
Internal Security (COSI) that, if necessary, may offer joint opinions on the issues 
at stake without, however, being involved in the preparation of legislation or the 
operations themselves.505 On the other hand, in the decision-making process, a 
dialectic with the European Parliament, which needs only to be informed, is 
clearly missing thereby exposing the full procedure to a democratic deficit506.  
                                                          
504
 The reference to “military resources made available by Member States” suggests a mobilisation 
of military assets, either such assets that have already been registered for use in civilian disasters, 
or a much wider range of resources including, for example, troops for crowd control or equipments 
for large‐scale disaster clean‐up.  
505
 Actually, the actual function of COSI and of PSC needs further clarification: indeed, there is 
not a real division of tasks and, moreover, it is not easy to assess how these Committees could be 
useful in responding to natural or man-made disasters by dealing with security issues. For further 
details on the COSI and PSC, see T. Ahman, The Treaty of Lisbon and Civil Protection in the 
European Union, 2009, Swedish Defence Research Agency, pp. 52-62. 
506
 See, S. Blockmans, “L’union fait la Force: Making the Most of the Solidarity Clause (Article 
222 TFEU)”, in I. Govaere, S. Poli (eds.), EU Management of Global Emergencies. Legal 
Framework for Combating Threats and Crises, Brill, 2014, p.120. Despite this, after the entry into 
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Despite the (almost) inter-governmental character of the decision-making 
procedure enshrined in Article 222 TFEU and the reference to a cooperation 
between Commission, Council and High Representative as well as the Political 
and Security Committee that de facto excludes the European Parliament, it 
appears, however, curious that a provision concerning just events occurring within 
the territory of EU Member States is set in the Fifth Part, TFEU, related 
exclusively to the EU’s external action. Similarly, despite its potential relevance 
in the field of the CSDP, it would have hardly been appropriate to include it in 
Title V, Section II TEU507, since Article 222 TFEU stretches beyond the CSDP by 
also engaging with non-military instruments508. Instead, by referring both to 
terrorist attacks and natural or man-made disaster – and therefore also to non-
conventional threats to peace and security –, it would have been more reasonable 
to include it in the Third Part, Title V, Chapter I TFEU, establishing general 
provisions in the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice. Moreover, it is in this 
section that the establishment of the Standing Committee on Internal Security is 
proposed in order to “ensure that operational cooperation on internal security is 
promoted and strengthened” within the EU509 and that a specific legal basis for the 
adoption of restrictive sanctions against individuals in the framework of the EU’s 
counter-terrorism activities is introduced510.  
                                                                                                                                                               
force of the Lisbon Treaty, the European Parliament has demonstrated to be really interested in a 
full implementation of the Solidarity Clause. On 31st October 2012, the European Parliament 
adopted the Resolution entitled “The EU’s mutual defence and solidarity clauses: political and 
operational dimensions”, 2012/2223(INI).  
507
 An opposite opinion is presented by Koutrakos, in P. Koutrakos, The EU Common Security and 
Defence Policy, Oxford University Press, 2013, Chapter 3. 
508
 The link between the solidarity clause and the CSDP deserves a more detailed analysis which is 
not possible to render in the present work. For more details on the issue, see T. Konstadinides, 
Civil Protection in Europe and the Lisbon ‘solidarity clause’: A genuine legal concept or a paper 
exercise, Working Paper 3, 2011, pp. 17-21. 
509
 See, The Lisbon Treaty, Article 71 TFEU: “A standing committee shall be set up within the 
Council in order to ensure that operational cooperation on internal security is promoted and 
strengthened within the Union. Without prejudice to Article 240, it shall facilitate coordination of 
the action of Member States’ competent authorities. Representatives of the bodies, offices and 
agencies of the Union concerned may be involved in the proceedings of this committee. The 
European Parliament and national Parliaments shall be kept informed of the proceedings”.  
510
 See, The Lisbon Treaty, Article 75 TFEU: “Where necessary to achieve the objectives set out 
in Article 67, as regards preventing and combating terrorism and related activities, the European 
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A plausible explanation of the collocation of the solidarity clause among those 
provisions concerning the external action by the EU could be its “hybrid nature” 
due to the increasingly blurry boundaries between internal and external security as 
well as the reference to military resources511. Definitely, whatever the reasons of 
such a choice are, it appears that there is a gap between the inclusion of the 
provision in the Fifth Part TFEU, where the rules on common foreign and security 
policy are based on a decision-making procedure that continues to be more inter-
governmental and less supranational in comparison to other areas of Union 
competence512, and the role that is granted to the Union as a whole in mobilising 
all the instruments at its disposal. In addition, it seems that it has been given major 
emphasis to the mutual reaction to terrorist attacks occurring within the Union – 
for which the clause operates also in the phase of prevention – than to disasters 
which may have a different origin. The next paragraphs will address the way it 
has been decided to implement the solidarity clause in order to better evaluate its 
implications in situations of disaster.  
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                               
Parliament and the Council, acting by means of regulations in accordance with the ordinary 
legislative procedure, shall define a framework for administrative measures with regard to capital 
movements and payments, such as the freezing of funds, financial assets or economic gains 
belonging to, or owned or held by, natural or legal persons, groups or non-State entities. The 
Council, on a proposal from the Commission, shall adopt measures to implement the framework 
referred to in the first paragraph. The acts referred to in this Article shall include necessary 
provisions on legal safeguards”. 
511
 See, S. Blockmans, “L’union fait la Force: Making the Most of the Solidarity Clause (Article 
222 TFEU)”, cit., p. 120. 
512
 See, M. Cremona, “External Relations and External Competence of the European Union: The 
Emergence of an Integrated Policy” in G. de Búrca, P. Craig (eds.), The Evolution of EU Law, 2nd 
edition, Oxford University Press, 2011, pp. 217-268; M. Cremona, “Defining Competence In EU 
External Relations: Lessons from the Treaty Reform Process” in A. Dashwood, M. Maresceau 
(eds.), Law and Practice of EU External Relations – Salient Features of a Changing 
Landscape, Cambridge University Press, 2008, pp. 34-69; P. Koutrakos, “The European Union’s 
common foreign and security policy after Lisbon”, in D. Ashiagabor, N. Countouris, I. 
Lianos (eds.), The European Union after the Treaty of Lisbon, Cambridge University Press, 2012, 
pp. 185-209. 
196 
 
1.1 The implementation of the solidarity clause by the Union: Council Decision 
2014/415/EU 
 
The Council Decision on the implementation to the clause from the Union is the 
result of negotiations that took place starting from 2011 and that lasted a very long 
time because of the classical reluctance of States to activate binding procedures 
limiting their sovereignty and discretion.  
In order to facilitate the drafting works, the Presidency of the Council addressed 
to the Member States a document encouraging national authorities to take 
appropriate steps forward to give proper implementation to the clause513. Member 
States thus provided written contributions to the preparation of the proposal on the 
basis of a list of questions jointly prepared by the Commission and the EEAS and 
held discussions within the Political and Security Committee, the Standing 
Committee on Operational Cooperation on Internal Security, the Coordinating 
Committee in the area of police and judicial co-operation in criminal matters and 
the Military Committee.  
On 21st December 2012, the Commission and the High Representative presented 
to the Council a Joint proposal for a Council Decision on the arrangements for the 
implementation by the Union of the solidarity clause514 that provided some more 
clarity about the definitional scope of Article 222 TFEU as well as its activation. 
On the basis of such a proposal, even though with some substantial differences, on 
24th June 2014 the Council has adopted the final text of Decision 2014/415/EU515. 
In order to evaluate the effective added value of the solidarity clause in its 
complexity, it is therefore appropriate to explore critically the arrangements for 
implementing the provision by the Union as prescribed by Decision 2014/415 by 
addressing: i) the scope of application ratione materiae and ratione temporis of 
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 See, Presidency of the Council of the European Union, Solidarity Clause – the way ahead? - 
Orientation debate on Art. 222 TFEU, doc. 14840/11, 29 September 2011. 
514
 See, European Commission and High Representative of the EU for Foreign Affairs and 
Security Policy, Joint proposal for a Council Decision on the arrangements for the implementation 
by the Union of the Solidarity Clause, JOIN (2012) 39 final, 16 January 2013. 
515
 See, Council of the European Union, Council decision of 24 June 2014 on the arrangements for 
the implementation by the Union of the solidarity clause, 2014/415/EU, OJ L 192/53, 1 July 2014. 
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the clause; ii) the scope of application ratione loci of the clause and, iii) the 
response arrangements that can be activated following the invocation of the 
clause.  
 
i) scope of application ratione materiae and ratione temporis of the solidarity 
clause 
 
As general rule, according to Article 222 TFEU, the solidarity clause applies in 
case of terrorist attacks or disasters, but such a general provision has prompted the 
necessity to explore what circumstances are exactly covered. In particular, it was 
appropriate to indicate a clear definition of ‘terrorist attacks’ in time of peace, that 
so far does not exist at international level516.  
Article 3 of Council Decision 2014/415 distinguishes between ‘disaster’, ‘terrorist 
attack’ and ‘crisis’ in the following way:  
“(a) ‘disaster’ means any situation which has or may have a severe 
impact on people, the environment or property, including cultural 
heritage;  
(b) ‘terrorist attack’ means a terrorist offence as defined in Council 
Framework Decision 2002/475/JHA;  
(c) ‘crisis’ means a disaster or terrorist attack of such a wide-ranging 
impact or political significance that it requires timely policy 
coordination and response at Union political level.”  
It is evident that each definition deserves a specific analysis as regard to content 
and implications.  
As for the notion of ‘disaster’, it is firstly appropriate to underscore that the 
definition reproduces that contained in Article 4 of Decision 1313/2013 
concerning the establishment of the new Civil Protection Mechanism. As a 
consequence, the solidarity clause may be activated not only in response to the 
actual occurrence of a severe event, but also in case of a potential disaster; and as 
with the Mechanism, such a opportunity opens a range of issues, concerning 
                                                          
516
 See, A. Cassese, “The Multifaceted Criminal Notion of Terrorism in International Law”, in 
Journal of International Criminal Justice, 2006, Vol. 4(5), pp. 933-958; S. D. Murphy, “Terrorism 
and the Concept of Armed Attack in art. 51 of the Charter”, in Harvard International Law 
Journal, Vol. 43, 2002, pp. 41-52. 
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prevention and risk assessment. Similarly, in relation to the threshold of 
application, the Decision refers to the notion of “severe impact” of a disaster that, 
in comparison to adjective “adverse” offered in the Joint proposal517, appear less 
vague and more precise in terms of seriousness of the event. 
In the framework of elaboration of the implementing Decision, the threshold of 
application was yet one of the most debated issues between Member States. Back 
in 2011, in a time when the European Union was struggling to overcome the 
financial and economic crisis, at the meeting of the Article 36 Committee518, 
States delegations agreed in general that “the solidarity clause should only be 
invoked in specific exceptional and emergency circumstances (...). The general 
triggering criteria to be defined would have to take account of the differences in 
size and capacities of Member States as well as the nature of the event”519. Indeed, 
it was floating around the belief that well-equipped Member States would make 
little use of the solidarity clause, while disaster-prone States could rely much 
more on it to limit the mobilisation of national resources.520 Accordingly, the 
potential problem of free-rider States pushed some governments to propose 
specific requirements of severity to be respected in order to request the activation 
of the clause. Moreover, others argued that the evaluation and verification on the 
application of the clause should not be entrusted just to the affected State, but also 
to the Council.521 For these purposes, certain State representatives forwarded the 
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 See, Joint proposal for a Council Decision on the arrangements for the implementation by the 
Union of the Solidarity Clause, cit., Article 3.  
518
 Article 36 Committee is a senior coordinating committee which stands between the usual 
working group and Coreper. Named after the provision of the EU Treaty that provides for its 
existence, it comprises senior officials from national ministers of justice or interior affairs.  
519
 See, Council of the European Union, doc. 15498/11 (CATS 98), 3 November 2011, p. 3. For 
further details, see T. Konstadinides, “Civil Protection Cooperation in EU Law: Is There Room for 
Solidarity to Wriggle Past?”, in European Law Journal, Vol. 19, No. 2, 2013, pp. 267–282. 
520
 See, N. Von Ondarza, R. Parkes, The EU in the face of disaster, implementing the Lisbon 
Treaty’s solidarity clause, SWP comments, 9 April 2010, p. 3. 
521
 The Governments which addressed such a proposal were: Denmark, Germany, Netherlands, 
Poland, Italy and Great Britain. See, doc. MD 5/1/13 REV1 on the position of States concerning 
the Join Proposal on the implementation of the solidarity clause. In addition, certain scholars 
recommended a list of tools to guarantee the proper application of the clause: 1) the establishment 
of a level of severity under which the affected Member States should be obliged to deal with 
disasters themselves; 2) the recognition of a so-called “subsidiarity baseline” providing that just 
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idea to confine the use of the clause to disasters affecting multiple EU Members in 
order to reduce the risk that the system was monopolised by those who are less-
prepared in terms of response.522  
The compromise reached is suggested by the wording of the Decision itself that 
seems to introduce the most reasonable solution to this dilemma, by prescribing 
that the clause may be activated when the State is unable to cope with the scale of 
a disaster by resorting to its own response capacities supplemented by any other 
tool or resource available at EU level523. Thus, the first and foremost subject 
called upon to assess the level of impact of a disaster is again the affected State.  
The definition of the term ‘terrorist attack’ does not appear exactly in the text of 
the Decision which, however, contains a reference to the Council Framework 
Decision 2002/475/JHA on combating terrorism524. Such a Framework Decision 
represents the most advanced legislative act from the defining point of view as, 
within an international context where States keep their own definition of 
terrorism, it addresses a common definition at EU level by indicating, inter alia, a 
clear list of offences that may constitute acts of terrorism against a country or an 
international organisation.  
In particular, Article 1 of the Framework Decision refers to those offences 
seriously intimidating a population, or unduly compelling a government or 
international organisation to perform or abstain from performing any act, or 
                                                                                                                                                               
Member States organs could trigger the solidarity clause; 3) an obligation for disaster-prone States 
to develop a certain level of capabilities to avoid unwanted European intervention; 4) the 
formulation of an indicative “disaster catalogue” containing details on the crises to which the 
clause would apply. See, N. Von Ondarza, R. Parkes, The EU in the face of disaster, implementing 
the Lisbon Treaty’s solidarity clause, cit., p. 4. 
522
 See, S. Myrdal, M. Rhinard, The European Union’s Solidarity Clause: Empty Letter or 
Effective Tool? An Analysis of Article 222 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union, UI Papers, No.2, 2010, Swedish Institute of International Affairs, p. 17. 
523
 Such a conclusion, may be found both in the Explanatory Memorandum attached to the Joint 
Proposal, that talk about “exceptional circumstances” which may prompt a Union intervention and 
in Article 4(1) of the Implementing Decision 2014/415, which states as follows: “In the event of a 
disaster or terrorist attack, the affected Member State may invoke the solidarity clause if, after 
having exploited the possibilities offered by existing means and tools at national and Union level, 
it considers that the crisis clearly overwhelms the response capabilities available to it”.  
524
 See, Council of the European Union, Council Framework Decision 2002/475/JHA of 13 June 
2002 on combating terrorism, OJ L 164, 22 June 2002. Hereinafter, Implementing Decision 
2014/415/EU.  
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seriously destabilising or destroying the fundamental political, constitutional, 
economic or social structures of a country or an international organisation525. 
Therefore, in accordance with the Council Framework Decision 2002/475/JHA, 
there would be a very wide range of possible offences falling under the term 
‘terrorist attack’ that could trigger the activation of the solidarity clause. 
Furthermore, it is evident that such a definition does not cover just acts of 
terrorism occurring abroad, but also those organised by EU citizens against 
Member States.   
Finally, Council Decision 415/2014 introduces the notion of ‘crisis’, as residual 
category for the application of the clause. However, it inexplicably restricts the 
term by including only disasters and terrorist attacks “of such” wide-ranging 
impact or political significance to urge a EU action. By contrast, the Joint 
proposal had defined a “crisis” as a “serious, unexpected and often dangerous 
situation, requiring timely action; a situation that may affect or threaten lives, 
environment, critical infrastructure or core societal functions, may be caused by a 
natural or manmade disaster or terrorist attacks”.526 The definition contained in 
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 Ibid., Article 1. Terrorist offences and fundamental rights and principles: “1. Each Member 
State shall take the necessary measures to ensure that the intentional acts referred to below in 
points (a) to (i), as defined as offences under national law, which, given their nature or context, 
may seriously damage a country or an international organisation where committed with the aim of: 
- seriously intimidating a population, or - unduly compelling a Government or international 
organisation to perform or abstain from performing any act, or - seriously destabilising or 
destroying the fundamental political, constitutional, economic or social structures of a country or 
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hostage taking; (d) causing extensive destruction to a Government or public facility, a transport 
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continental shelf, a public place or private property likely to endanger human life or result in major 
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manufacture, possession, acquisition, transport, supply or use of weapons, explosives or of 
nuclear, biological or chemical weapons, as well as research into, and development of, biological 
and chemical weapons; (g) release of dangerous substances, or causing fires, floods or explosions 
the effect of which is to endanger human life; (h) interfering with or disrupting the supply of 
water, power or any other fundamental natural resource the effect of which is to endanger human 
life; (i) threatening to commit any of the acts listed in (a) to (h). 2. This Framework Decision shall 
not have the effect of altering the obligation to respect fundamental rights and fundamental legal 
principles as enshrined in Article 6 of the Treaty on European Union.”  
526
 See, European Commission and High Representative of the EU for Foreign Affairs and 
Security Policy, Joint proposal for a Council Decision on the arrangements for the implementation 
by the Union of the Solidarity Clause, cit., Article 3.  
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the Joint proposal was, therefore, broader than that approved by the Council that 
decided to limit any potential abuse of the notion. Considering its genesis and the 
restrictive interpretation of Article 222 TFEU, the intention of limiting the 
invocation of the clause only in exceptional circumstances is perfectly in line with 
the original aim of the clause, but it is less intuitive which other categories of 
events could be covered.  
Apart from the said doubts concerning the definition of the circumstances that 
may trigger the activation of the clause, there is to underscore that the Decision 
does not refer to any temporal element. Instead, it would be relevant to know 
whether the clause covers single and circumscribed events or also multiple and 
continuing situations of crisis, thus needing a long-term approach of resolution. 
The only reference concerning the temporal extension of activation of the 
solidarity clause is in Article 7, where it is prescribed that “the Member State 
having invoked the solidarity clause shall indicate as soon as it considers that 
there is no longer a need for the invocation to remain active”. Moreover, in 
Decision 415/2014 no reference is made concerning the opportunity to invoke the 
solidarity clause to prevent serious events, despite Article 222 TFEU introduced 
this element with reference to terrorist attacks. It thus remains unsolved the scope 
of application ratione temporis of the solidarity clause.  
Finally, there is to say that, according to Article 4 of Decision 415/2014 the 
solidarity clause can be invoked by the affected State just after having exploited 
all the possibilities offered by existing means and tools at national and Union 
level. The result is that, from a temporal perspective, the solidarity clause is 
conceived as a last resort mechanism which makes the Union’s intervention 
compulsory just as extrema ratio, thereby narrowing the extensive wording of the 
provision enshrined in Article 222 TFEU.  
 
ii) scope of application ratione loci of the solidarity clause 
 
The scope of application ratione loci of the solidarity clause as outlined in 
Decision 2014/415, which has been partially – but significantly – reformulated in 
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comparison to the original text of the Joint Proposal, is one of the most 
controversial issues that deserve attention.  
Currently, Article 2 of the Council Decision reads as follows:  
“1. In the event of a terrorist attack or a natural or man-made disaster, 
irrespective of whether it originates inside or outside the territory of 
the Member States, this Decision shall apply:  
(a) within the territory of Member States to which the Treaties apply, 
meaning land area, internal waters, territorial sea and airspace;  
(b) when affecting infrastructure (such as off-shore oil and gas 
installations) situated in the territorial sea, the exclusive economic 
zone or the continental shelf of a Member State.”  
From the wording of such an article, it seems to be emerging a predominantly 
internal dimension of solidarity527. Actually, such a orientation is not in line with 
what proposed by the Commission and the High Representative. Indeed, the Joint 
Proposal’s version of Article 2 affirmed in its paragraph (b) that the decision of 
the Council should apply irrespective of whether the crisis originated inside or 
outside the EU and, therefore, also when affecting ships (when in international 
waters) or airplanes (when in international airspace) or critical infrastructure (such 
as off-shore oil and gas installations).528 In fact, as well know, from an 
international law perspective, ships, airplanes and critical infrastructures located 
in high sea cannot be properly considered as territory of States, but wherever 
specific criteria are respected – flag State and official registration –, they may be 
under the jurisdiction of a State with which a genuine link is kept 529.  
                                                          
527
 See, E. Neframi, “La solidarité dans l’action extérieure de l’Union européenne”, cit., p. 149.  
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 See, Joint proposal for a Council Decision on the arrangements for the implementation by the 
Union of the Solidarity Clause, cit., Article 2(b). 
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 See, UN Convention on the Law of Sea, Montego Bay, 1982, Article 92: “1. Ships shall sail 
under the flag of one State only and, save in exceptional cases expressly provided for in 
international treaties or in this Convention, shall be subject to its exclusive jurisdiction on the high 
seas. A ship may not change its flag during a voyage or while in a port of call, save in the case of a 
real transfer of ownership or change of registry. 2. A ship which sails under the flags of two or 
more States, using them according to convenience, may not claim any of the nationalities in 
question with respect to any other State, and may be assimilated to a ship without nationality”; 
Convention on International Civil Aviation, Chicago, 1944, Article 17: “Aircraft have the 
nationality of the State in which they are registered.” It must be stressed that, however, whether 
the consequences of a terrorist attack or of a disaster went beyond the structural limits of ships, 
aircraft and infrastructures thereby contaminating also international spaces, the exact exercise of 
the jurisdiction as regard to a definitive intervention could be much more complex. 
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Albeit the Joint Proposal complied with international law, it was questioned by 
some Member States that stressed on the literary content of Article 222 TFEU. 
Indeed, in the first paragraph, the primary law provision introduces a limitation to 
its geographical scope of application by making explicit reference to the 
“territory” of the Member States as regards the prevention of the terrorist threats 
and the assistance in the event of a terrorist attack as well as the protection of 
civilians in case of disaster. As a result, the majority of the EU Members finally 
favoured a stricter approach by limiting the scope to events occurring (a) within 
the territory of Member States to which the Treaties apply, meaning land area, 
internal waters, territorial sea and airspace; (b) when affecting infrastructure (such 
as off-shore oil and gas installations) situated in the territorial sea, the exclusive 
economic zone or the continental shelf of a Member State. 
As matter of fact, such a conclusion appears rather dubious for a number of 
reasons. First of all, it is clear a conceptual schizophrenia deriving from the 
distinction between the criterion of activation of the solidarity clause and its strict 
scope of application. Indeed, on the one hand, the Decision follows the Joint 
Proposal by setting that, in the event of a terrorist attack or a natural or man-made 
disaster, the clause is applied irrespective of whether it originates inside or outside 
the territory of the Member States. But, on the other hand, it clearly limits the 
geographical scope of interventions to pure internal emergencies. Moreover, the 
insertion of the clause under the section ‘External Action of the Union’ is 
meaningful in this context530. Against this background, the wording of Article 2 of 
Decision 2014/415 would suggest that Member States could invoke the 
application of the solidarity clause with regard to events either occurring within 
their formal territory or originating outside but with repercussions on their 
territory.  
It remains yet to be seen how to concretely combine the opportunity to intervene 
in response to crisis originating outside the territory of EU Member States and the 
strict territorial scope of application of the clause531. In addition, in comparison to 
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 See, T. Ahman, The Treaty of Lisbon and Civil Protection in the European Union, cit., p. 24. 
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 See, M. A. Martino, “The “Solidarity Clause” of the European Union – dead letter or enabling 
act?”, in SIAK-Journal − Zeitschrift für Polizeiwissenschaft und polizeiliche Praxis, Vol. 2, 2015, 
p. 44. 
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the Joint Proposal, events occurring in international spaces on ships, aircrafts and 
installations over the State may exercise jurisdiction have been de iure excluded 
thereby limiting significantly the cases of application of the clause.532 
Furthermore, it could be useful to understand why the Council decided to 
mention, as examples of infrastructures to be protected, just off-shore oil and gas 
installations by leaving aside other kinds of infrastructures having a ‘civilian’ 
rather than ‘economic’ character, such as embassies, that, though located in third 
countries, are an extension of the State. Such a vacuum is important, a fortiori, in 
comparison to the content of Article 222 TFEU that appears refusing any 
restriction to the territory of Member States when the Union has to “protect 
democratic institutions and the civilian population from any terrorist attack”. 
Indeed, practice shows that the Union has often intervened by organising through 
the evacuation of EU nationals in third countries following a terrorist attack533.  
In any case, it is safe that the circumstances of activation of the solidarity clause 
have been strongly narrowed by the Council Decision thus keeping to a minimum 
the extraterritorial application of this provision.  
 
iii) instruments of application of the solidarity clause  
 
As already anticipated, according to Article 4 of the Implementing Decision it is 
up to the national authorities – on a high political level534 – of the affected 
Member State to address their invocation of the solidarity clause to the Presidency 
of the Council whenever they consider that the crisis clearly overwhelms the 
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 See, M. Gestri, “La risposta alle catastrofi nell’Unione europea: protezione civile e clausola di 
solidarietà”, cit., p. 55. 
533
 One of the most known intervention is that performed in India following the terrorist attack in 
Mumbai in November 26, 2008. For further details, see G. H. Winger, In the Midst of Chaos. The 
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World Politics: The EU, its Member States, and International Interactions. University at Buffalo 
(SUNY), October 2012, available at 
http://nicholasnicoletti.com/EU%20Conference/Paper%20Submissions/Winger,%20Gregory%20-
%20In%20the%20Midst%20of%20Chaos.pdf. Moreover, see, M. Lindström, “EU Consular 
Cooperation in Crisis Situations”, cit..  
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 From the wording of the implementing decision, it seems that it is not possible to rely on 
political authorities lower than the central ones to invoke the activation of the solidarity clause.  
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response capabilities available535. In addition, it is prescribed that the invocation 
shall also be addressed to the President of the European Commission. 
In this regard, the text of the Joint Proposal set that the affected State should 
address the request of activation of the clause firstly to the President of the 
European Commission and then to the President of the Council. As a 
consequence, the original idea was to attribute the steering role to the Commission 
and the High Representative thereby leaving to the Council just a marginal role 
following the decision of the Presidency of the Council to activate all the 
necessary arrangements to respond to the crisis536. Clearly, Member States 
showed their full disagreement with such a proposal by noting that in Article 222 
TFEU there is no reference to the Commission, but just to the Council that, 
therefore, deserved to have the power to guarantee the strategic management of 
the EU response. As a result, currently, the primary role is conferred to the 
Council that “shall ensure the political and strategic direction of the Union 
response to the invocation of the solidarity clause”, albeit it has to respect the 
Commission’s and the High Representative’s competences537.  
Before illustrating the instruments that could be activated in the wake of the 
solidarity clause, it deserves to be recalled that, as stressed in the preamble of the 
Implementing Decision, the latter concerns just the implementation by the Union 
of Article 222 and not that by Member States.538 As a consequence, it aims at 
regulating the vertical perspective of solidarity thereby indicating those initiatives 
that should be carried out by the Union and those instruments that should be 
mobilised to face a disaster or a terrorist attack.539  
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Such a reference has, however, been deleted despite Article 222 TFEU clearly included in the 
scope of application of the solidarity clause also prevention activities against terrorism.  
536
 See, Joint Proposal for a Council Decision on the arrangements for the implementation by the 
Union of the Solidarity Clause, Article 6.  
537
 See, Implementing Decision 2014/415/EU, Article 5.  
538
 See, Implementing Decision 2014/415/EU, Recital 1.  
539
 For an assessment on the interplay between the solidarity clause and the instruments at disposal 
for responding to disaster scenarios, see, infra, para. 2.1 of the present Chapter.  
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Relevant instruments include the European Union Internal Security Strategy, the 
Union Civil Protection Mechanism and the structures developed in the framework 
of the response to serious cross-border threats to health and of the CSDP. For that 
purpose, the Council shall rely on the IPCR, that means the EU Integrated 
Political Crisis Response (IPCR) arrangements approved by the Council on 25 
June 2013540.  
The IPCR arrangements have been designated to replace the Crisis Coordination 
Arrangements, criticised for being too complex and too difficult to use in 
exceptional events, thereby facilitating a coordinated EU response to a major 
crisis at the highest political level541. Indeed, such a Mechanism is driven by the 
Presidency, which ensures coherence of handling in the Council and of the overall 
response at Union political level, and supported by the General Secretariat of the 
Council, the European Commission, the EEAS and, in the case of terrorist attacks, 
the EU Counter-Terrorism coordinator, acting in accordance with their respective 
roles and responsibilities. Moreover, it is a flexible and tailor-made instrument 
able to respond to any kind of crisis by including different levels of reaction: from 
information exchange to a political coordination and the adoption of proper 
decisions.542  
Therefore, there is no an automatic coincidence between the activation of the 
solidarity clause and the IPCR, because whereas the former has an inner focus and 
can be invoked in case a Member State is severely affected and its response 
capacity is not sufficient, the Council’s crisis mechanism rather provides the 
platform for tailored and rapid response by the EU political level on a crisis 
happening inside or outside the EU. However, the IPCR mechanism clearly helps 
to structure the response when the solidarity clause is invoked. Indeed, the 
procedure provides for that, once addressed the invocation of the solidarity clause, 
                                                          
540
 See, Council of the European Union, 3251st Council meeting – General Affairs, 25 June 2013, 
doc. 11442/13, p. 17. 
541
 See, P. Minard, The IPCR arrangements: a joined-up approach in crisis response?, European 
Union Institute for Security Studies, Brief Issue, n. 38, December 2015. 
542
 Ibid., p. 2. In addition, see, M. Beriain, E. Atienza-Macías, E.A. Armaza, “The European Union 
Integrated Political Crisis Response Arrangements: Improving the European Union’s Major Crisis 
Response Coordination Capacities”, in Disaster Med Public Health Preparedness, Vol. 9(3), 2015, 
pp. 234-238. 
207 
 
the Council may activate the IPCR by informing all stakeholders in Brussels and 
in the Member States543. 
As for the Commission and the High Representative, according to Article 5, para. 
2 of the Implementing Decision, they shall identify all the relevant measures 
under their competences, including, among other things, identify military 
capabilities that can best contribute to the response to the crisis with the support of 
the EU Military Staff.544 It is therefore clear that from an operational point of 
view, the role of these two institutions is not marginal. Indeed, on the one hand 
most of the instruments of response existing at the Union level are, directly or 
indirectly, under the responsibility of the Commission, and on the other one the 
High Representative keeps a decisive task in reference to crisis requiring military 
interventions or originating outside the Union thus implying a diplomatic 
dimension. Furthermore, where appropriate, the Commission and the High 
Representative shall submit proposals to the Council concerning decisions on 
exceptional measures not foreseen by existing instruments; requests for military 
                                                          
543
 Information exchanges are managed through a specific crisis web platform – the IPCR web 
platform – by the managing authorities of the Commission, the EEAS, the Member States or by 
the Council, that is the General Secretariat of the Council or the Presidency. The continuous flow 
of information shared by the EU Members on the web platform serves as the basis for the relevant 
Commission or EEAS services to prepare the Integrated Situational Awareness and Analysis 
(ISAA) reports (see, Implementing Decision 2014/415/EU, Article 6). Once the ISAA reports are 
addressed to the Coreper or the Council, the Presidency is responsible preparing proposals for 
action by working level and high-level roundtables to find solutions to the specific crisis that are 
submitted for discussion either to the Coreper or – in the event of a major crisis that requires top-
level political guidance like the refugee crisis – directly to the Council or to the European Council. 
Moreover, depending on the crisis, structures and Union agencies in the field of CFSP/CSDP 
provide their own contribution.  
544
 See, Implementing Decision 2014/415/EU, Article 5, para. 2: “At the same time, and in 
accordance with Article 1(3), the Commission and the HR shall: (a) identify all relevant Union 
instruments that can best contribute to the response to the crisis, including sector-specific, 
operational, policy or financial instruments and structures and take all necessary measures 
provided under those instruments; (b) identify military capabilities that can best contribute to the 
response to the crisis with the support of the EU Military Staff; (c) identify and propose the use of 
instruments and resources falling within the remit of Union agencies that can best contribute to the 
response to the crisis; (d) advise the Council on whether existing instruments are sufficient means 
to assist the affected Member State following the invocation of the solidarity clause; (e) produce 
regular integrated situational awareness and analysis reports to inform and support the 
coordination and decision-making at political level in the Council, in accordance with Article 6 of 
this Decision.” 
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capabilities going beyond the existing arrangements on civil protection; or 
measures in support of a swift response by Member States.545 
Finally, in the process of activation of the solidarity clause, a key element is the 
ERCC that shall act as the central 24/7 contact point at Union level with Member 
States’ competent authorities and other stakeholders in order to facilitate the 
production of reports, in collaboration with the EU Situation Room and other 
Union crisis centres546.  
Ultimately, the implementing arrangements confer a steering role on the Council 
in responding to an invocation of the solidarity clause, while respecting the role 
and competences of the other EU institutions and services. The intention was, 
indeed, “to develop a coherent, integrated and effective system and to avoid the 
compartmentalized approach”, namely towards a very early involvement of the 
Council from a political point of view, but without hindering the work of the other 
institutions at operational level547. However, against this background, the division 
of competences between the Union and Member States according to the 
subsidiary principle appears less clear.  
On the one hand, Article 222 TFEU states that Member States “shall coordinate 
between themselves in the Council”, and on the other hand, they are free to 
coordinate the assistance both on the basis of international law as within the 
CFSP. It is not thus clear how these two sets of competences would interact and 
how it would be possible to avoid any overlap and interference between the 
                                                          
545
 See, Implementing Decision 2014/415/EU, Article 5, para. 3.  
546
 See, Implementing Decision 2014/415/EU, Article 5, para. 6: “Upon invocation of the 
solidarity clause, the ERCC shall act as the central 24/7 contact point at Union level with Member 
States’ competent authorities and other stakeholders, without prejudice to existing responsibilities 
within the Commission and the HR and to existing information networks. The ERCC will facilitate 
the production of Integrated Situational Awareness and Analysis (ISAA) reports, in collaboration 
with the EU Situation Room and other Union crisis centres, in accordance with Article 6 of this 
Decision”. 
547
 See, G. Bonacquisti, The solidarity clause: one of the most unacknowledged innovations of the 
Lisbon Treaty. The European Parliament debates its implementation but also its ambiguities, EU-
logos, by citing Uldis Mikuts, Chair of the Friends of the Presidency Group on the EU Integrated 
Political Crisis Response arrangements and the solidarity clause implementation under the Latvian 
Presidency. Available at https://europe-liberte-securite-justice.org/2015/07/27/the-solidarity-
clause-one-of-the-most-unacknowledged-innovations-of-the-lisbon-treaty-the-european-
parliament-debates-its-implementation-but-also-its-ambiguities/.  
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decisions adopted by the Council, that gathers the representatives of States, and 
those taken independently by them. Maybe, contrary to what one can conclude at 
first reading of Article 222 TFEU, it does not require a separation of 
interventions, rather a positive synergy between the EU institutions and Member 
States which have a shared duty to react when the affected State demonstrates to 
not be able to control an event of extraordinary weight and dimension. As it has 
been observed, the solidarity clause is marked by a “supranational intent (...) 
making it more than an intergovernmental obligation that characterizes the mutual 
defence clause”548.  
The vertical dimension – that is immediately introduced in the first paragraph by 
referring to the mobilisation of Union instruments – meets thus the horizontal one 
– that is enclosed in the second paragraph of Article 222 TFEU and that requires 
Member States to react. As a consequence, after having illustrated in detail the 
content of the Council Decision establishing implementing arrangements for the 
Union, it is essential, for the purposes of the present work, to move into and to 
deeper evaluate which specific obligations on Member States may emerge from 
the content of Article 222 TFEU when it comes to manage a large-scale disaster 
or a terrorist attack.   
 
1.2 The solidarity clause: what implications for Member States? 
 
Article 222 TFEU does not address exhaustively the duties of EU Members when 
another is object of a terrorist attack or of a disaster. However, the procedure of 
activation and the material scope of application of the clause designed in the 
Implementing Decision 2014/415 may serve as point of reference also for the 
implementation of the provision at stake by the Member States, thereby making it 
possible to derive some States’ obligations.  
 
 
                                                          
548
 See, S. Myrdal, M. Rhinard, “The European Union’s Solidarity Clause: Empty Letter or 
Effective Tool? An Analysis of Article 222 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union”, cit., p. 10.  
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i) Member States shall jointly act with the Union 
 
Article 222, para.1, TFEU requires Member States to act jointly with the Union 
thus merging all the instruments that are at disposal at national and supranational 
level when another EU Member is seriously in trouble. This implies that, despite – 
as it will be suggested later – Member States may act also independently from the 
Union, once it has mobilised instruments that expect States’ contribution, they are 
forced to act, mainly when an effective mobilisation of the Union depends on the 
resources made available by the very Member States. 
In a broader perspective, such an obligation discredits the traditional argument 
according to which solidarity in the EU mainly refers to the relations among the 
Member States, and not to the relation between the Member States and the 
Union549. Therefore, the Union obligation to intervene becomes necessarily 
intertwined with the States’ duties according to the principle of sincere 
cooperation550.  
Such a perspective is further strengthened by the intrinsic nature of the event that 
– according to the letter of the implementing Decision – shall be faced when the 
clause is invoked, that is an exceptional situation and not an ‘ordinary’ one. Since 
wide-ranging crises are usually cross-sectoral, the engagement of a broad range of 
stakeholders and instruments requiring horizontal cooperation, networking and 
coordination between different actors, both at Member State and EU level is 
needed.  
As a consequence, once the solidarity clause is activated, the response cannot be 
limited to the Union, but also to those Member States which are able to provide 
for additional measures to be deployed, according to a sort of subsidiarity basis. 
Ultimately, from the reading of Article 222 TFEU, it is possible to deduce both 
negative and positive Member States obligations. The negative obligation requires 
States to avoid limiting the mobilisation of the Union instruments in response to 
                                                          
549
 See, M. Klamert, The Principle of loyalty in EU law, cit., p. 35.  
550
 See, S. Myrdal, M. Rhinard, “The European Union’s Solidarity Clause: Empty Letter or 
Effective Tool? An Analysis of Article 222 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union”, cit., p. 17. 
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exceptional circumstances while, as other side of the coin, the positive duty is to 
actively participate in the deployment of EU and national resources.   
 
ii)  Member States shall assist the affected State 
 
Besides requiring to act jointly with the EU institutions, Article 222, para. 2, 
TFEU reinforces the role of the Member States by prescribing that they shall 
make assistance available to another State in case its political authorities request 
the activation of the clause. In general terms, there is to say that, whether 
according to Council Decision 2014/415 the invocation of the solidarity clause for 
activating Union’s instruments may occur just in extrema ratio, by taking into 
considerations the evaluations made by the Member States in its elaboration, it is 
possible to state – by analogy – that also the alleged interventions of the other EU 
Members have to be conceived as acting in last resort.  
In any case, providing for assistance constitutes a formal obligation on all EU 
Member States and not just a concept operating in the political dimension. And, in 
this regard, EU primary law represents the unique legal framework at international 
level that has introduced a clear obligation on sovereign States to offer assistance 
in the event of a large-scale disaster or of a terrorist attack, at least for those 
events occurring in the Member States territory. Furthermore, it appears even 
more relevant that Article 222 TFEU is under the jurisdiction of the CJEU that 
potentially could be asked to interpret the correct scope of application of the 
clause or to assess the compliance with the deriving obligations by both the Union 
and Member States.551  
                                                          
551
 Indeed, the control by the Court is limited just with reference to the Common Foreign and 
Security Policy, see, Article 275 TFEU: “The Court of Justice of the European Union shall not 
have jurisdiction with respect to the provisions relating to the common foreign and security policy 
nor with respect to acts adopted on the basis of those provisions. However, the Court shall have 
jurisdiction to monitor compliance with Article 40 of the Treaty on European Union and to rule on 
proceedings, brought in accordance with the conditions laid down in the fourth paragraph of 
Article 263 of this Treaty, reviewing the legality of decisions providing for restrictive measures 
against natural or legal persons adopted by the Council on the basis of Chapter 2 of Title V of the 
Treaty on European Union.” It is not, however, excluded that the solidarity clause could be 
activated within CSFP matters thereby limiting the CJEU jurisdiction. 
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Such a mandatory tone is yet mitigated by the softer language used in Declaration 
n. 37 attached to the Lisbon Treaty which traces back to that adopted with the 
Constitution for Europe:  
“Without prejudice to the measures adopted by the Union to comply 
with its solidarity obligation towards a Member State which is the 
object of a terrorist attack or the victim of natural or man-made 
disaster, none of the provisions of Article 222 is intended to affect the 
right of another Member State to choose the most appropriate means 
to comply with its own solidarity obligation towards that Member 
State.”552 
It, therefore, prescribes that States keep their procedural autonomy in establishing 
which resources to put at disposal in order to provide for assistance to the affected 
State. Having regard to the potential implications that the content of such a 
Declaration could have in respect of the scope of the solidarity clause, it is thus 
appropriate to provide a deeper evaluation of its legal effect.  
As reported by some influential scholars553 the mere fact that the Declaration is 
annexed to the Lisbon Treaty does not imply that it is integral part of EU primary 
law; moreover, Article 51 TFEU clearly establishes that just “the Protocols and 
Annexes to the Treaties shall form an integral part thereof”, without citing 
Declarations. Therefore, Declaration n. 37 seems to have a strong political rather 
than legal value. However, it is part of that ‘context’ that should be use for the 
interpretation in good faith of the Treaty itself, according to Article 31 of the 
Vienna Convention on the law of Treaties554. 
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 See, Treaty of Lisbon, Declaration n. 37 on Article 222 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union. 
553
 See, M. Gestri, “La risposta alle catastrofi nell’Unione europea: protezione civile e clausola di 
solidarietà”, in M. Gestri (ed.), Disastri, protezione civile e diritto: nuove prospettive nell’Unione 
Europea e in ambito penale, Giuffrè Editore, 2016, p.37. 
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 See, Vienna Convention on the law of Treaties, 23 May 1969, Article 31. General Rule of 
Interpretation: “1. A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary 
meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and 
purpose. 2. The context for the purpose of the interpretation of a treaty shall comprise, in addition 
to the text, including its preamble and annexes: (a) Any agreement relating to the treaty which was 
made between all the parties in connexion with the conclusion of the treaty; (b) Any instrument 
which was made by one or more parties in connexion with the conclusion of the treaty and 
accepted by the other parties as an instrument related to the treaty. 3. There shall be taken into 
account, together with the context: (a) Any subsequent agreement between the parties regarding 
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For a detailed assessment of the legal effect of the Declaration, it is also necessary 
to refer to the annexed Protocol on the concerns of the Irish people on the Treaty 
of Lisbon555. Indeed, Article 3 of the Protocol states that “it will be for Member 
States – including Ireland, acting in a spirit of solidarity and without prejudice to 
its traditional policy of military neutrality – to determine the nature of aid or 
assistance to be provided to a Member State which is the object of a terrorist 
attack or the victim of armed aggression on its territory”. In comparison to the 
Declaration concerning Article 222 TFEU, the content of the Protocol is binding 
as part of EU primary law and, surely, it aims at protecting the status of those 
Member States that follow a policy of military neutrality. Thus, it clearly interacts 
with the solidarity clause, thereby limiting its scope, at least in reference to those 
military resources to be deployed in case of terrorist attacks.  
In any case, the general language used by the Declaration leads to an 
interpretation of Article 222 TFEU according to which each Member State, in the 
presence of a request from one victim State, is invested with a legal obligation – 
even if as last resort – to provide for assistance, but keeps the right to choose 
those measures deemed appropriate. In exercising this choice, the State in 
question is, however, obliged to act in good faith and in a spirit of sincere 
cooperation as prescribed in Article 4, para. 3, TEU556. In other words, States keep 
the freedom to decide how to show solidarity, but there is no doubt that some 
solidarity has to be shown thus limiting their discretion in choosing the most 
                                                                                                                                                               
the interpretation of the treaty or the application of its provisions; (b) Any subsequent practice in 
the application of the treaty which establishes the agreement of the parties regarding its 
interpretation; (c) Any relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations between the 
parties. 4. A special meaning shall be given to a term if it is established that the parties so 
intended.” 
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 See, European Council Decision 2013/106/EU of 11 May 2012 on the examination by a 
conference of representatives of the governments of the Member States of the amendment to the 
Treaties proposed by the Irish Government in the form of a Protocol on the concerns of the Irish 
people on the Treaty of Lisbon, to be annexed to the Treaty on European Union and to the Treaty 
on the Functioning of the European Union, and not to convene a Convention, OJ L 60, 2 March 
2013.  
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 See, Treaty of Lisbon, Article 4(3): “Pursuant to the principle of sincere cooperation, the Union 
and the Member States shall, in full mutual respect, assist each other in carrying out tasks which 
flow from the Treaties”. For further comments, see T. Konstadinides, Civil Protection in Europe 
and the Lisbon ‘solidarity clause’: A genuine legal concept or a paper exercise, cit.  
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appropriate and favourable instruments of response. A different interpretation 
could be in contrast with the principle of the effet utile and result in an 
unmotivated breach of an obligation because of arbitrary denial of assistance557.  
 
iii) Member States shall coordinate between themselves 
 
The third obligation on States arising from Article 222 TFEU concerns the 
coordination between themselves within the Council and represents an interesting 
point of analysis in several respects.  
Generally, the Treaties request the Commission, or other EU institutions, to 
facilitate the coordination between Member States in order to reach the same goal. 
Instead, the solidarity clause sets that Member States themselves shall adopt a 
coordinated approach thus operating independently from the Union, but through 
an EU institution, that is the Council. It is not just about giving appropriate 
implementation to the principle of sincere cooperation or to a formal duty to 
cooperate with one another558, but about a clear and substantial obligation to be 
coordinated. In addition, it is complement to the obligation to render assistance as 
prescribed by Article 222 TFEU itself, thus contributing to the elaboration of a 
specific framework on States’ obligations in disaster response.  
According to a broader perspective, introducing an obligation to provide a 
coordinated response leads to a clear overcoming of the logic State-to-State in 
disaster management in favour of an integrate strategy aimed at limiting diverse 
(and diverging) actions. Furthermore, an appropriate application of the duty to 
coordinate559 assumes that Member States are bound by an obligation to cooperate 
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 See, P. Hilpold, “Filling a Buzzword with Life: The Implementation of the Solidarity Clause in 
Article 222 TFEU”, in Legal Issues of Economic Integration, Vol. 42, no. 3, 2015, p. 219. 
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 See, General Assembly resolution 2625 (XXV) of 24 October 1970, Declaration on Principles 
of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation among States in accordance 
with the Charter of the United Nations, Annex: “States have the duty to cooperate with one 
another, irrespective of the differences in their political, economic and social systems, in the 
various spheres of international relations, in order to maintain international peace and security and 
to promote international economic stability and progress, the general welfare of nations and 
international cooperation free from discrimination based on such differences.” 
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 It must be underlined that in this case, the term “duty” is used as synonym of “obligation” even 
though their thrusts are slightly different, as explained in the first Chapter of the present work.    
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among themselves. What’s more, the requirement to be coordinated within an 
established institution strengthens the validity and the seriousness of such an 
obligation that does not remain just a well-intentioned initiative with a vague 
content. Hence, the clause heightens the profile of cooperation on crisis and 
disaster issues within the Union and according to EU law for national 
governments have to take a more principled (and thus high level) stance on such 
issues.  
In this way, the contribution of EU law in shaping the legal framework concerning 
disaster management is twofold: on the one hand, it challenges the position of the 
overwhelming majority of States that, within international fora, stress the 
voluntary nature of cooperation560 and, on the other one, it underpins the added 
value of the EU in fostering major cooperation and coordination between States.  
 
2. The Union shall mobilise all the instruments at its disposal: interplays 
between the solidarity clause and the instruments of disaster response 
 
Since the solidarity clause establishes a duty – reinforced by the content of 
Council Decision 2014/415 – to mobilise the resources and mechanisms existing 
at the Union level, the present analysis cannot dispense from exploring how the 
instruments illustrated in the previous chapters could interplay with the content of 
the mentioned Decision.  
As matter of the fact, Article 222 TFEU, by establishing that the Union shall 
mobilise all the instruments at its disposal, is quite vague with regard to what kind 
of mechanisms may exactly activate in order to assist a EU Member affected by a 
disaster or a terrorist attack. The implementing Decision has partially contributed 
to clarify such a point by specifying that the Union should rely on the existing 
instruments to the extent possible for avoiding the adoption of additional 
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 As reference about such a debate, see the States’ comments to the inclusion of a duty to 
cooperate in the Draft Articles on the Protection of persons in the event of a disaster elaborated by 
the ILC, Chapter I of the present work.  
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resources561 and by referring explicitly to some relevant instruments that could be 
used.  
According to recital 5 of the implementing Decision, “[r]elevant instruments 
include the European Union Internal Security Strategy, the European Union Civil 
Protection Mechanism established by Decision No 1313/2013/EU of the European 
Parliament and the Council (1) (‘the Union Mechanism’), Decision No 
1082/2013/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council (2) and the 
structures developed in the framework of the Common Security and Defence 
Policy (CSDP)”. Since the Union Civil Protection Mechanism is explicitly 
mentioned in the implementing Decision, it is first of all necessary to understand 
how it can interact with the solidarity clause by representing a useful instrument 
to be deployed. Besides, albeit it is not mentioned because of its recentness and its 
future is uncertain, even the EU emergency support instrument could be 
concerned by such a provision. Finally, whether the expression “all the 
instruments at disposal” used in Article 222 TFEU was interpreted as including 
also those mechanisms that may intervene in the phase of recovery, few words to 
the interplay between the solidarity clause and the EU Solidarity Fund are 
essential.  
 
2.1 The interplay between the solidarity clause and the Union Civil Protection 
Mechanism 
 
One of the modalities to give effect to the Member States’ obligation to act jointly 
with the Union could be to give proper execution to the EU Civil Protection 
Mechanism that seems to be one of the instruments to be most likely utilised in 
relation to the solidarity clause562. Indeed, there is no doubt that a connection 
between these two instruments is established because of the ERCC, that has been 
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 See, Council implementing Decision 2014/415, recital 4: “The implementation of the solidarity 
clause by the Union should rely on existing instruments to the extent possible, should increase 
effectiveness by enhancing coordination and avoiding duplication, should function on the basis of 
no additional resources, should provide a simple and clear interface at Union level to Member 
States, and should respect the competences conferred upon each Union institution and service”.  
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 See, P. Konstadinides, “Civil Protection in Europe and the Lisbon ‘solidarity clause’: A 
genuine legal concept or a paper exercise”, cit., p. 20. 
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gradually developing into crisis platform and central hub of the EU where all the 
information come together in case of a crisis. As already reported, whenever the 
solidarity clause is invoked, the ERCC acts as a 24/7 contact point at the EU level, 
as the entry point for any request to the President of the Commission and as 
collector of information able to develop a common picture of the emergency. As a 
result, despite the activation of the solidarity clause has, at the first stage, a 
political and inter-governmental dimension that overshadows the Union one, at 
operational level the ERCC plays a relevant role in the phase of implementation 
and coordination thereby rebalancing the general framework of action.  
Actually, the fact the Decision 2014/415 concerns just the application of the 
solidarity clause from the Union presages that the intervention of the Union 
cannot be particularly incisive but limited to make available the coordination and 
monitoring infrastructures at its disposal holding monitoring or early-warning 
functions, such as the ERCC and the CESIS. As a result, at first glance it does not 
seem possible to argue that the combination of the Decision 1313/2013 and 
Decision 2014/415 may lead to the recognition of an obligation to activate the 
Civil Protection Mechanism for disasters occurring within the EU territory563. But, 
it does not mean that the clause could not acquire a certain relevance in 
reinforcing the procedural obligations of loyal cooperation deriving from the 
participation to the Mechanism and in creating political constraints on Member 
States. Indeed, from a legal point of view, despite the lack of a perfect coincidence 
between the scope of application of the solidarity clause and that of the Civil 
Protection Mechanism – that is broader in terms of severity of the event –, the 
Council Decision seems to introduce some elements that may reinforce the 
functioning of the Mechanism itself and establish intervention obligations on 
States.  
First of all, according to a long-term perspective, the solidarity clause could 
reframe the issue concerning the costs of assistance. Indeed, albeit Article 39 of 
Decision 2014/762 on the implementation of the Union Civil Protection 
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 See, F. Casolari, “La dimensione esterna dell’azione dell’Unione europea nella risposta a 
disastri naturali ed antropici: quale coerenza?”, in M. Gestri (ed.) Disastri, protezione civile e 
diritto: nuove prospettive nell’Unione Europea e in diritto penale, Giuffrè Editore, 2016, pp. 82-
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Mechanism states that any Member State providing assistance may offer its 
assistance entirely or partially free of charge and that may waive all or part of the 
reimbursement of its costs at any time, they are in general bore by the requesting 
State. Evidently, such a provision could be easily questioned in the light of the 
concept of solidarity: indeed, even though practice shows that some Member 
States generally offer assistance without requiring the receiving country to pay, it 
remains a voluntary decision of the responding State. In theory, an accurate 
reading of Article 222 TFEU could lead to elaborate new financing arrangements 
when a massive intervention is necessary – at least in relation to events occurring 
within the EU – by imposing to Member States to refrain from requesting the 
reimbursement of the costs of deployment.  
Secondly, on occasion of the debates concerning the scope of the clause, Member 
States have intended to stress that Article 222 TFEU can be invoked just after 
having exploited all the possibilities offered by existing means and tools at 
national and Union level. These means include also the EU Civil Protection 
Mechanism, which, at the same time, could be one of the instruments to be 
mobilised following the activation of the clause.  
At first sight, one could ask how to merge these two moments and which 
additional measures to trigger within the UCPM that have not been already 
deployed. Actually, such a procedure confirms the voluntary nature of the 
Mechanism at its basic level that, however, can be challenged by the solidarity 
clause itself thereby creating an obligation to offer assistance when a crisis clearly 
needs a stronger intervention. As a result, those States that did not answer to the 
request of assistance from the affected State or that did not put at disposal 
sufficient resources in its favour would be obliged to intervene within the 
framework of activation of the solidarity clause.  
 
2.2 The solidarity clause and the EU emergency support instrument  
 
Notwithstanding the permanent nature of the emergency support instrument is 
uncertain and it is not possible to establish whether it will be activated or at least 
replicated in the event of future serious emergencies occurring in the Union’s 
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territory, at the moment it could represent one of the instruments – the only 
having financial nature – to be activated for helping a EU Member.  
Actually, on the one hand, recital 4 of the implementing Decision on the solidarity 
clause does set that, rather than creating new additional resources, the Union 
should increase effectiveness by enhancing coordination and avoiding duplication 
of the existing instruments, and, on the other one, Regulation 2016/369 quite 
unexpectedly does not cite the solidarity clause. This notwithstanding, the 
emergency support instrument might represent a way to complement the 
implementation of the very clause by the Civil Protection Mechanism. 
Furthermore, the interaction between the solidarity clause and the instrument in 
question would establish specific obligations on the Commission that should carry 
out the actions reported in the Council Regulation 2016/369. In this way, in 
comparison to the humanitarian aid instrument whose activation rely on the 
Commission’s discretion, the provision of financial assistance to EU Members 
would become compulsory. 
In this regard, however, there is to recall that both the instruments have been 
conceived as last resort mechanisms. Indeed, while on the one hand the solidarity 
clause may be activated just when the affected State has already exploited all the 
resources at disposal, on the other the instrument providing for immediate 
financial assistance may intervene just in exceptional circumstances when no 
other mechanism is sufficient. Clearly, this strict overlapping may create some 
problems both from a legal and operational point of view564.  
As matter of the fact, the very Article 122 TFEU sets that the eventual measures 
adopted under such a provision should not cause prejudice to  any other procedure 
provided for in the Treaties. One could thus interpret such a caveat exactly in 
relation to the solidarity clause, thereby implying that assistance measures 
towards the States decided ex Article 122, para. 1, TFUE strictly speaking must 
give precedence to others solidarity mechanisms foreseen by primary law, 
including, of course, those incorporated in the solidarity clause. However, seen 
the exceptional nature of the solidarity clause as conceived in the implementing 
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Decision, it is not to excluded that the emergency support instrument could be 
activated before the invocation of the solidarity clause thereby creating a sort of 
hierarchy between instruments of last resort. This interpretation appears to be in 
line with practice, since the provision of financial assistance to Greece by means 
of the instrument established by Regulation 2016/369 has not been preceded from 
any request by the national authorities to activate the solidarity clause. In this 
case, however, there is the risk that – since the affected State are always provided 
with new instruments of assistance – the clause in question is never activated.  
 
2.3 The solidarity clause and the EU Solidarity Fund: an obligation in 
perspective?  
 
Albeit no reference to the EU Solidarity Fund is made in implementing Decision 
2014/415, its potential relevance cannot be disregard. In effect, on the one hand, 
the common proposal of the Commission and the High Representative for 
implementing arrangements of the solidarity clause had already underlined the 
role of the Fund as one of the key Union instruments in applying this provision of 
the Treaty565. But, clearly, such an option has been eliminated in phase of 
approval by the Council. On the other hand, the very Commission, in its 
amendment proposal for the EUSF, made reference to the potential value of the 
solidarity clause in this field. But, it also made a point of highlighting the reasons 
that have prevented Article 222 TFEU to be used as legal basis for the new 
regulation on the Solidarity Fund. First of all, the solidarity clause is reserved for 
the most serious of crisis situations whereas the criteria for the activation of the 
EUSF are defined in a way leading to the use of the Fund several times each year. 
Secondly, under the legislative procedure foreseen by Article 222 TFEU, the 
European Parliament is informed but not actively involved, and this could not be 
in line with the provisions of the Fund which fully involves the Parliament in 
raising the appropriations for financial aid. Finally, the EUSF includes certain 
non-Member States not covered by Article 222 TFEU.  
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Notwithstanding these objections, it cannot be ignored the theoretical interest of 
the Commission to link the very objective of the EUSF with the content of Article 
222 TFEU. Therefore, the opportunity that these two instruments may somehow 
interplay is not inconceivable, considering that, as reported in the previous 
paragraphs, the scope ratione temporis of the solidarity clause in the event of a 
disaster has not been completely clarified.  
The solidarity clause, when activated for responding to exceptional emergencies, 
could indeed operate in an extensive way thereby covering all the phase of 
response and post-disaster. In this case, the obligation imposed on the Union 
could be extended also with reference to the deployment of instruments 
intervening in the recovery phase, included the EU Solidarity Fund that, as 
reported in Chapter III, is not activated on the basis of a specific obligation of the 
Union. Against this background, as well for the Civil Protection Mechanism, the 
solidarity clause could really represent the instrument capable of establishing 
duties to provide for assistance both on the Union and on Member States by 
means of the very instruments already existing.  
 
3. Evaluating the real legal value of the solidarity clause: to what extent is 
solidarity really binding? 
  
The previous analysis has underlined the potential of the solidarity clause both in 
legal and practical terms. In fact, it introduces a number of obligations on the 
Union, but especially on Member States, that are laid down in and arise directly 
from EU primary law. Moreover, it could be link and trigger of the very 
mechanisms for disaster response and assistance. National governments should 
thus consider their solidarity obligations more carefully and respect them by 
virtue of the principle of bona fide that is central in treaty law566. That represents a 
breakthrough in comparison to the current and still uncertain legal framework 
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governing disaster relief at international level. Moreover, one of its added values 
is the institutional and the procedural transparency able to ensure an effective 
coordination in times of response to crises. From a systemic point of view, it 
makes clear that some of the most basic security challenges for the Union can 
only be tackled through a solidary approach. 
Notwithstanding the overall theoretical positive value of Article 222 TFEU, 
practice shows that the reality is quite different. In particular, as for its application 
by Member States, it does not contain any unequivocal detail on the procedure 
thus leaving it open to different interpretations as regards its scope, the possible 
measures to be decided, what circumstances shall be covered and the respective 
areas of competence of the Member States and the Union, as well as of the other 
subjects involved567. Besides, the analysis of the content of the implementing 
Decision makes evident that there has been an important rereading and 
downsizing of the provision contained in primary law, mainly in terms of scope of 
application, thereby limiting the objective circumstances of invocation of the very 
clause. Finally, so far, the solidarity clause has never been clearly activated, 
despite the occurrence of a number of favourable opportunities, including the 
multiple terrorist attacks to which the French government decided instead to 
respond by activating for the first time the clause of mutual defence according to 
Article 42, para. 7, TEU568. 
Despite terrorist attacks and armed conflicts have been explicitly left out from the 
scope of the present research work569, in order to provide for a better 
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understanding of the practical obstacles that the application of the solidarity 
clause finds, it is necessary – even if briefly – to report the main legal elements 
which differentiate the content of Article 222 TFEU from the provision ex Article 
42, para. 7, TEU570. In fact, albeit both introduce binding commitments amongst 
Member States to intervene to the aid of another Member State, this similarity 
should not overshadow the differences between the two clauses.  
First of all, it must be underlined the positive decision to differentiate the scope of 
application of the two clauses, by distinguishing between international and 
regional, civil and military forces. As well known, Article 222 TFEU applies in 
case of terrorist attacks or natural/man-made disasters, while Article 42, para.7, 
TEU applies only in cases of ‘armed aggression’ against the territory of a Member 
State. As such, the mutual defence clause constitutes a reminiscence of the 
traditional concept of collective self-defence in line with the content of Article 51 
of the UN Charter571 and a form of closer cooperation in comparison to that 
provided by NATO572.  
The choice to separate the two clauses and, in particular, to include terrorist 
attacks within the solidarity clause and not in Article 42, para.7, TEU can be 
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founded on specific legal considerations concerning the still debated nature of 
terrorist aggressions. Indeed, following the attacks of September 11th, discussions 
on the question whether a terrorist attack of that magnitude qualifies as ‘armed 
attack’ in the sense of Article 51 of the UN Charter have proliferated. Despite the 
2001 events, the legal evaluation of attacks by non-State actors is still 
controversial by their lack of international personality in the sense of international 
law which requires the imputability of the attack to a foreign State573. As a result, 
the separation made is perfectly in line with the concerns addressed at 
international level.  
In the second place, Article 42, para. 7, TEU – that does not presuppose the 
necessary request from the affected State – reflects in its entirety an 
intergovernmental device and does not foresee for the involvement of the Union. 
Conversely, Article 222 TFEU requests Member States to coordinate between 
themselves in the Council and provides the EU with power to mobilize all 
instruments at its disposal in order to protect and assist them in the event of a 
terrorist attack, or natural or man-made disaster.  
Thirdly, it is possible to argue that, while Article 42, para. 7, TEU represents a 
‘mere’ obligation to assist the victim of an armed attack, Article 222 TFEU can be 
used alongside other legal bases to justify new legislative acts that will foster 
solidarity between Member States in the fight against serious crime and disaster 
response. Indeed, within the whole system of primary law, such a provision is not 
suited to serve as the sole or the primary reference point for a definition of this 
concept, but rather deals with a segment of solidarity, that must find concrete 
application by interacting with a broader range of norms that pursue similar aims. 
Said that, the Hollande’s proposal to resort to the mutual defence clause rather 
than to the solidarity clause gained unanimous support and the preparation for 
concrete actions started swiftly and smoothly. Hence, despite the uncertain 
definition of the events as an armed aggression, Article 42, para. 7, TEU was 
chosen over the solidarity clause for a number of reasons.  
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First of all, it was intended to underline that the crisis did not “clearly overwhelm 
the response capabilities available” to France, but rather conveyed the idea that it 
was an attack to the EU as a whole. Secondly, the type of expected solidarity 
related to external operations rather than to an internal response to the 
consequences of the attacks, thus pushing more reluctant Member States towards 
an enhancement of the coalition against the ISIL by supporting for its military 
campaigns in Iraq and Syria, as well as in Mali and the Central African 
Republic574. Thirdly, it was preferred to manage the situation according to an 
interstate logic, rather than to trigger the Union’s intervention.  
In any case, the French decision, besides raising questions about both the scope of 
Article 42, para. 7, TEU and what it might mean for the Union as a security actor 
given that it has been completely excluded in favour of an intergovernmental 
logic, has represented a missed opportunity to empower the solidarity clause. As 
matter of fact, regardless the ultimate French interests and the fact that Decision 
2014/415 specifies that shall not have defence implications, what happened in 
Paris could be traceable, in the abstract, to Article 222 TFEU and it would have 
been much more appropriate in terms of material scope and practical effects. In 
addition, it could not be excluded the simultaneous use of the two clauses since a 
terrorist attack involves aspects concerning both defence and internal security. 
Nevertheless, France opted for the most sovereign and least institutionalised form 
of cooperation575.  
The lack of a concrete application and the still existing reluctance of States to 
invoke the solidarity clause risk turning the content of Article 222 TFEU solely a 
political stance, having therefore a scarce legal value in terms of obligations 
mainly for Member States. And, in effect, albeit the solidarity clause operates 
with reference both to the Union and to Member States as well as it is 
unquestionable the relevance of the obligation to cooperate within the Council, the 
decision to trigger or not the solidarity clause and to activate the adequate 
arrangements are politically heavily loaded. Moreover, the content of Declaration 
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n. 37 raises doubts that remain objectively unresolved about to what extent States 
are obliged to maintain a certain level of preparedness or to have specific 
capacities in order to meet the requirements forwarded by the very solidarity 
clause. In addition, it has not been established to what extent Member States are 
free to decide what instruments to put at disposal once the arrangements are 
activated by the Council. Accordingly, it will be interesting to see whether the EU 
institutions or Member States will refer the matter to the CJEU and, if the 
occasion will arise, whether the Court will be less reluctant to deal with politically 
sensitive issues by scrutinising Member States’ compliance with the solidarity 
clause576. In conclusion, the actual legal relevance of the solidarity clause will be 
able to be assessed just in a long-term perspective, because at the moment it risks 
remaining a dead letter rather than representing an enabling act capable of 
imposing both on the EU institutions and on the Member States a clear duty of 
solidarity in the event of a disaster. 
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CONCLUSIONS  
 
1. Finding the legal implications of solidarity in international disaster response 
law: an uphill climb  
 
In recent times, the protection of persons in the event of overwhelming natural 
and man-made disasters has become an issue of great importance for international 
legal doctrine and the international community as a whole. This notwithstanding, 
Chapter I of the present work intended to stress that the high level of 
fragmentation of the so-called International Disaster Response Law (IDRL) 
affects not only the provision of effective assistance to the victims of serious 
disasters, but also the elaboration of specific duties of solidarity on States.  
As emerged in Chapter I, para. 2, despite disaster contexts are the best occasion 
for prioritising humanitarianism and demonstrating international solidarity 
towards the affected population by means of external humanitarian assistance, 
State sovereignty and the rights deriving from it are still perceived as the 
cornerstone of IDRL. Indeed, on the one hand, it is unquestionable that disaster 
response falls within the jurisdiction of the State in whose territory the 
catastrophic event has occurred and that the national authorities remain the first 
and foremost subjects responsible for controlling the provision of humanitarian 
relief within their territory thereby potentially refusing or limiting external 
assistance. On the other hand, albeit still controversial, it seems that the potential 
assisting actors (i.e. States, the United Nations, international and regional 
organisations as well as NGOs) have the right, rather than the duty, to offer and 
provide assistance to the affected State. And, the absence of a well-established 
duty to offer and to provide for assistance is indicative of the sovereignty-centred, 
rather than solidarity-centred, perspective adopted at international level.  
Since the lack of a clear set of duties on States risks, ultimately, jeopardising the 
fundamental rights to life and human dignity of the affected people, as reported in 
Chapter I, para. 2.3, over the last decades, many hypotheses have emerged to 
reconcile State sovereignty with the necessity to protect people in the event of a 
228 
 
disaster, by resorting, inter alia, to human rights instruments and by invoking the 
alleged right to humanitarian assistance. Notwithstanding the increasing human 
rights-based approach has somehow remodelled the principle of State sovereignty, 
the latter has not been substantially bruised so as to determining the shifting from 
a right to a duty of solidarity at level of international customary law.  
The work carried out by the International Law Commission as illustrated in 
Chapter I, para. 3, has attempted to overcome such an orientation by confirming 
the centrality of human rights in international legal discourses and by introducing 
some specific and relevant legal novelties in the field at stake, such as the duty to 
cooperate, the duty to seek for assistance in case the affected State is unable to 
cope with the consequences of overwhelming disasters, as well as the necessity 
that the potential assisting actors take in due consideration the requests of 
assistance coming from the affected States. But, as demonstrated in the critical 
analysis proposed in Chapter I, para. 3.2, the Draft Articles on the protection of 
persons in the event of a disaster contain a number of legal and substantive 
shortcomings – with particular reference to judicial remedies and accountability – 
to be filled. Moreover, according to the Draft Articles, the contribution of the 
international community relies just on a right, or at least on a moral duty, based on 
the discretion of the assisting actors. Besides, it has to be signalled the lack of any 
reference to the existence of a right to humanitarian assistance in case of disaster. 
In any case, by considering the reluctance already made evident by States, the 
actual chance that the UNGA adopts a universal regulatory framework by fully 
reflecting the set of duties enshrined in the draft articles appears quite remote. 
Therefore, at the moment, ‘rights of solidarity’ prevail over ‘duties of solidarity’ 
thus potentially impinging on the alleged right to humanitarian assistance of the 
affected population. As a result, one can conclude that, in situations of disaster, 
the principle of solidarity has not yet given rise to a comprehensive set of rules, 
but rather to disarticulated rights on States. 
It is hence clear that, also in the face of the increasing role played by regional 
organisations, the full implementation of the positive dimension of solidarity, 
which would require the establishment of obligations on States, has not been 
definitely reached at international level. And the absence of specific duties of 
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solidarity in the event of a disaster confirms that within customary international 
law the notion of solidarity is more an interpretative canon rather than a legally 
binding norm capable of imposing duties on States. 
Chapter II has intended to make a detailed reconstruction of the notion of 
solidarity as conceived at EU level. Besides being at the basis of the EU 
integration process, it represents the paradigm of reference of the structural and 
normative configuration of the European Union. Moreover, it has been noted that 
within the EU legal order solidarity acquires different expressions which make it 
an amorphous concept whose contours change depending on the actors and the 
legal areas involved. The Lisbon Treaty has contributed to give impetus to the 
legal concept of solidarity by assuring it a special position as manifold (but rather 
complex) notion serving as core value, as objective and as principle to be 
respected and pursued by the EU institutions and the Member States.  
It is exactly this three-fold functionality of solidarity as integrated concept at EU 
level which, in theory, should play a fundamental and decisive role in emergency 
scenarios. More to the point, the analysis carried out in the present study has 
attempted to verify to what extent solidarity animates EU disaster response law 
and, mainly, whether specific solidarity duties insisting both on the EU 
institutions and on Member States can be invoked in disaster situations thereby 
going beyond what is normally required under the principle of loyal cooperation.   
 
2. The functional dimension of solidarity within EU disaster response law 
 
As anticipated in Chapter II, para. 2, EU disaster response law has been 
progressively shaped according to a significant and ambitious position by 
establishing new legal instruments and improving the existing ones for responding 
more adequately to severe emergencies. In this regard, there is to say that initially 
both the lack of specific legal basis and of clear references to solidarity have 
affected the opportunity to adopt specific instruments of solidarity capable of 
covering all the needs of the affected population in a comprehensive way. But, the 
Lisbon revision has fuelled an important improvement as for the instruments to be 
deployed within the Union’s territory for providing for financial and in-kind 
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assistance thereby giving rise of a multilayered and complex EU disaster 
management system that is based on solidarity. Indeed, the entry into force of the 
Lisbon Treaty has introduced a number of novelties in terms of references to 
solidarity and legal bases in the field at stake, but there is to say that no single and 
comprehensive EU policy concerning disaster response exists. Rather, such a field 
of intervention has a transversal and, therefore, quite fragmented nature that 
derives, inter alia, from the absence of a specific EU competence concerning 
disasters management. On the contrary, the latter is based on a mix of shared and 
supporting competences and thus on different degrees of intensity as for the 
interventions at the Union level. Yet, it is evident that, as underscored by the 
wording of the preambles of all the instruments of secondary law, the principle of 
solidarity has guided the EU institutions and Member States in enhancing their 
collaboration in the field at stake.  
Chapter III has intended to catch such improvements with regard to the 
instruments of financial assistance. However, in these final comments it is 
difficult to make a univocal assessment, because if, on the one hand, they have 
been positively modified, on the other one, they still contain serious defects.  
More in detail, both the enhancements of the EU Solidarity Fund as well as of the 
policy concerning the granting of State aids in the event of serious calamities 
reported in Chapter III, para. 1, shall be considered remarkable. As for the EU 
Solidarity Fund, Regulation 661/2014 has, for instance, introduced the possibility 
of granting an advance payment shortly after the application for a financial 
contribution from the Fund has been submitted to the Commission by the affected 
State. In addition, with regard to the rules on State aid, the increased flexibility 
granted by the Commission in terms of notification may facilitate Member States 
in the reconstruction process thereby giving substance to the principle of 
multilevel solidarity between Union and Member States. In both cases, the 
Commission has thus proposed a reformulation in terms of time limits and 
flexibility that seems to go hand in hand with the requirement of solidarity and, as 
for State aid regime, to rebalance the trade-off between solidarity and competition 
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as well as to allow national authorities to implement the national solidarity577. 
Notwithstanding these advances, it cannot be neglected that such instruments are 
still characterised by a number of relevant shortcomings deriving from the 
necessity to secure the national and EU budgets as well as the normal market 
equilibrium in the European Union thereby affording to undermine the application 
of solidarity. More specifically, Chapter III, para. 1.3, has sought to focus on the 
existence of some requirements which reshape solidarity on the basis of the 
principle of conditionality that, mainly in the course of the economic crisis, has 
been attributed with a central and constitutional dimension578.  
Albeit the different nature of the conditions indicated by each instrument, they 
seem to be intended to establish a framework of co-responsibility between the 
affected State and the EU institutions thus making conditionality link between 
solidarity and responsibility, and instrument for boosting State accountability. 
While the principle of conditionality can be rightly conceived for preventing 
measures of financial assistance from becoming abused by Member States, it may 
appear problematic and hardly reconcilable with the final aim of these tools, that 
is to provide for direct or indirect assistance in case of a serious disaster. In fact, it 
cannot be neglected the fact that the activation of the illustrated financial 
mechanisms, as well as of the Civil Protection Mechanism, should be aimed at    
supporting the people in need according to a people-centred approach (and in this 
case a EU citizens-centred approach) thereby putting State’s failings into the 
background. In this perspective, the opportunity to make claims against the 
irresponsible State could be better and more adequately pursued ex post. On the 
contrary, whether too strictly and ex ante applied, the principle of conditionality 
risks to become justification to limit the scope of application of solidarity and to 
make the latter a ‘conditioned solidarity’579. And, besides having practical 
repercussions on the functional role of solidarity in the field of disaster response, 
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the fact that it can be relativised instead of being acknowledged in absolute terms 
casts doubts on the legal value to be attributed to the principle of solidarity. 
Indeed, this demonstrates that solidarity can be clearly revisited and shaped on a 
case-by-case basis thus ultimately affecting its capacity of being justiciable and, 
even before, of being included among the constitutional principles of EU law 
which, instead, are compulsory in their entire essence.    
The emergency support instrument illustrated in Chapter III, para. 2, which might 
fill the legal gaps concerning the provision of immediate financial assistance to 
EU Members, could represent a proper way to overcome such a limit and to avoid 
that financial assistance remains just the manifestation of a ‘subsequent 
solidarity’. Despite this, it reveals some controversial characters which could limit 
its extensive application in the near future.   
First of all, it is significant the seeming non-permanent nature of such an 
instrument which, if not extended to other situations of emergency, could remain 
just one of the multiple tools activated for responding to the contingent crisis. In 
the second place, even though it may be explained by the context wherein it now 
operates and by the fact that other instruments of financial assistance have been 
activated, it is actually worrying the scarce level of funds granted on its basis 
which, therefore, makes one wonder on the real impact of the mechanism. 
Accordingly, the real effect and the supposed added value of the emergency 
support instrument cannot be fully evaluated until it has not been activated 
(hopefully) also on future occasions.  
The temporal and substantive reconstruction proposed in Chapter IV has made 
evident that one the most notable novelty provided by the Lisbon revision has 
been undoubtedly the inclusion of a specific provision on civil protection which 
has enabled to strengthen the Union Civil Protection Mechanism. As repeatedly 
stressed in the course of the analysis, it embodies the operational side of solidarity 
thus conferring to the Union and Member States the positive capacity to protect 
both EU citizens and third-country nationals in the event of a disaster. In addition, 
new impulse to solidarity among Member States has been provided by means of 
the establishment of the EERC which reflects the timid intention to create a more 
predictable and permanent system of civil protection resources capable of better 
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and timely responding to disasters. Accordingly, since solidarity passes also 
through the effectiveness of the interventions performed by the instruments 
activated, it can be affirmed that cooperation in civil protection issues could create 
a virtuous cycle of solidarity. The findings reported in Chapter IV, para. 3.3, have 
hence suggested that the Civil Protection Mechanism inaugurated in 2014 could 
not be limited to the support and cooperation among national civil protection 
services, but aimed at progressively ‘federalising’ them under the helm of the 
European Union. And, such a potentiality is evident also from the very recent 
proposal issued by the Commission for strengthening the current Mechanism by 
establishing a new force named ‘rescEU’ and composed by EU response 
capacities to be activated and controlled directly by the Commission itself when 
those in the voluntary pool were insufficient to respond to a disaster. If approved 
by the Council and the Parliament, it could represent the prototype of the EU civil 
protection force envisaged by Michel Barnier580.  
However, from a legal point of view, such a proposal goes into a very challenging 
terrain that could fuel a new debate on the nature of the competence granted to the 
Commission by the Treaties. In fact, it cannot be neglected that in the field of civil 
protection (which is a supporting competence according to the wording of the 
Treaties), there has already been a substantive rereading of primary law in favour 
of the Commission which has carved out a competence wider than that 
prescribed581. Indeed, by introducing specific requirements to be respected when 
registering national modules within the EERC, the Commission has done a leap 
towards a voluntary quasi-harmonisation of national legislations in this field. The 
creation of a force of civil protection entirely managed by the Commission could 
represent a further extension of its competences thereby opening a new breach in 
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the labile equilibrium in terms of division of powers established with the Lisbon 
revision. If that happened, one could argue that solidarity – channelled by the 
necessity to guarantee effectiveness to the Union Civil Protection Mechanism – 
has also the potentiality to reshape the contours of the supporting nature of the 
power in civil protection issues.  
The final evaluation concerning the functional role of solidarity cannot therefore 
be unidirectional. In fact, on the one hand, it is impossible not to acknowledge 
that the instruments established and improved in the course of time comply – at 
least in terms of intention – with the requirement to apply the spirit of solidarity 
expressed by the Treaties thereby fuelling the idea that the occurrence of serious 
disasters is an issue of common concern needing a common response. After all, as 
stressed more than once also by the Special Rapporteur Valencia-Ospina in his 
reports582, the effective and complementary legal instruments the EU disaster 
response law contains are a good example of how a regional organisation may be 
active and successful in providing assistance in the event of a disaster thus 
creating a de facto solidarity.  
On the other hand, however, there is to say that – according to a more careful 
examination – the tools analysed are just partially satisfactory because of a 
number of inconsistencies having a structural and inherent nature, and legal gaps 
which still need to be addressed and filled in order to avoid slowing down the 
natural impulse of solidarity which should flow within the EU.  
These include, inter alia, the lack of an overlay with regard to the material scope 
of application of these instruments. In fact, all the instruments analysed propose a 
different scope of application and a different meaning of the term “disaster” to be 
applied for their activation. As a matter of fact, it must be highlighted that the 
existing framework is really fragmented both at the normative and the operational 
level. Indeed, each instrument operates at different stages of intervention and, 
often, is managed by different operating structures: the EU Solidarity Fund 
intervenes just in the event of disasters having natural character and provoking a 
certain degree of damage; the emergency support instrument can be activated just 
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in exceptional circumstances when the finances of the Member States are or risk 
to be seriously affected; while the Civil Protection Mechanism can be deployed 
disregarding the nature and the intensity of the emergency thus potentially 
responding to a wide range of situations. In addition, it cannot be justified the 
rigid distinction between natural disasters and other exceptional circumstances 
which characterises the EU regime on State’s aid and that makes it inconsistent 
with the Union legislation governing disaster response interventions.  
The lack of a clear convergence between the scope of these instruments of 
assistance may be an obstacle to fully respecting the solidarity needs demanded at 
every stage of disaster response. The risk of the current uncertainty could be a 
‘selective’ solidarity that operates extensively only in certain circumstances – i.e. 
those for which there is a coincidence of definition between the existing 
instruments – but excluding other situations that might deserve particular 
attention. This contributes in turn to the fragmentation of the regulatory 
framework concerning disaster management and to the downsizing of the 
requirements of solidarity required at every stage of disaster response.  
In the second place, it has to be stressed that all the mechanisms analysed respond 
to different time-frame and arrangements of assistance: the EU Solidarity Fund 
operates in the recovery phase and provides for financial assistance to the national 
authorities of the affected State; the emergency support instrument should 
intervene during the emergency and, as well humanitarian aid, provide for 
financial support to partner organisations in the field; finally, the Civil Protection 
Mechanism, which actually operates in the whole disaster cycle, may be activated 
in order to immediately respond to a critical event and to continue its work also in 
the phase of rebuilding.  
In the light of these considerations, it would be more effective and in line with a 
teleological reading of the Treaties to operate according to a long-term and 
structural rethink thereby shaping a real and comprehensive system for disaster 
response that was permanent and based on solidarity as essence of the EU 
integration process. The major problem is, however, represented by the fact that, 
even though the instruments analysed reflect the intention to place solidarity at the 
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core of their activation, it is still anywhere near what solidarity could express in 
the field of disaster response from a legal point of view.  
 
3. The normative force of solidarity: what place for solidarity obligations in EU 
disaster response law? 
 
The EU legal order should differ from the international one, inter alia, because 
solidarity is asked to have a stronger normative force, capable of establishing 
specific duties of solidarity for tackling issues of common concern that go beyond 
national interests. But, the findings of the whole research suggest that the 
existence of clear solidary obligations in the field of disaster response is still a 
challenging issue and that EU disaster response law is still far from considerably 
diverging from international customary law in terms of solidarity duties.  
Despite the fact that disaster settings may be the adequate example of situations in 
which the rationale of solidarity should be very pronounced, none of the explored 
legal instruments of secondary law, be they the EU solidarity fund, the emergency 
support instrument, or the Union Civil Protection Mechanism, reflects a 
compulsory character in its early activation or even duties of solidarity (in the 
form of a duty to provide for assistance) in favour of the affected State. Rather, 
the provision of financial and in-kind assistance remains in the sphere of the rights 
of the States and of the Union itself and, therefore, subjected to their final will. 
After all, by referring again to the principle of conditionality, it cannot be 
neglected that setting of conditions for the delivery of financial assistance in 
favour of Member States questions the intention to impose duties of financial 
assistance on the Union and its Member States. Accordingly, within the explored 
mechanisms provided by EU law for responding to internal emergencies, the 
voluntary element and the creeping logic of State discretion are predominant over 
compulsory rules. The only obligations upon both the EU institutions and Member 
States are essentially based on the respect of the principle of loyal cooperation 
whose relationship with the principle of solidarity has been dealt with in Chapter 
II, para. 1.4. In this regard, it is significant the evident duty of procedural nature, 
that is to provide for timely responses concerning the approval and the 
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coordination of the deployment of financial and in-kind resources583. These duties 
are linked to the loyalty principle rather than to the principle of solidarity 
precisely because entail a loyal relationship between the actors involved. 
Loyalty comes in also in reference to the Union Civil Protection Mechanism. As 
outlined in Chapter IV, para. 3, the Mechanism is clearly based on the voluntary – 
and not enforced – pooling of resources of the States which, moreover, make just 
a ‘promise’ of deployment in case of necessity. In this regard, there is to say that it 
is nonetheless true that the promise made by States seems to have a particularly 
strict character. In fact, according to Decision 1313/2013, once resources have 
been pre-committed in the EERC, they should then be deployed when it is needed 
except in the event that reasons of force majeure for not providing for assistance 
come in. And, this occurs exactly because of the principle of loyal cooperation 
which, in times of crisis, translates in conducts aimed at ensuring the proper 
functioning of EU tools and, indirectly, contributing to determine choices of 
solidarity for all the EU actors. In fact, the duty of sincere cooperation, as reported 
in Chapter II, does instrumentally operate both between Member States, and 
between Member States and the EU institutions thus supporting the European 
integration process from an institutional point of view584. 
Against this background, one could thus argue that the principle of solidarity 
governing the interventions for coping with disaster scenarios is just the engine, 
which leads to the activation of these instruments or to the facilitation in the 
delivery of the assistance, without, however, having clear legal implications on 
the EU institutions and on EU Members. In more general terms, it seems that 
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solidarity remains more objective and guiding principle of the EU legal order thus 
simply reinforcing the cooperation required under the principle of loyalty from 
which more concrete rules derive. This implies that in these circumstances the 
interaction between the EU institutions and Member States, as well as that 
between Member States in implementing the mechanisms to be activated in 
emergency scenarios, is actually governed by the ordinary interplay between 
loyalty, on the one hand, and solidarity, on the other. After all, the EU legal order 
ultimately rests on the voluntary obedience of its Member States585.  
The present work has, however, set out that the unfavourable findings within 
international law concerning the existence of a clear duty to provide for assistance 
alongside the duty to cooperate in the event of overwhelming disasters cannot be 
totally applied to the Union legal framework. More to the point, the solidarity 
clause contained in Article 222 TFEU and analysed in Chapter V represents a 
breakthrough of EU disaster response law in comparison to international law by 
establishing a lex specialis which imposes on Member States an explicit duty to 
assist another EU Member affected by a disaster: no matter the content of 
Declaration n. 37 which acknowledges the States’ procedural autonomy in 
defining which resources to put at disposal. Indeed, while States remain free to 
decide how to show solidarity, there is no doubt that solidarity has to be shown 
thus providing for assistance. Moreover, Article 222 TFEU entails a kind of 
solidarity which operates in its multiple dimension by applying not only to the 
interstate relations, but also to those between the Union and Member States.  
For its part, the Union is asked to activate all the instruments available to support 
the affected EU Member as well as to guarantee the positive synergy among them 
thereby rendering the solidarity clause link and trigger of the illustrated 
mechanisms of financial and in-kind assistance586. As a result, the activation of 
those instruments which usually rely just on a mere right of deployment becomes 
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compulsory when operating according to Article 222 TFEU. In this way, the 
principle of solidarity experiences a step up over the principle of loyal cooperation 
and that of conditionality in emergency scenarios.  
But, as reported in Chapter V, para. 3, a closer and comprehensive legal 
investigation suggests that the solidarity clause is characterised by a general and 
very vague scope which undermines its legal significance at the implementing 
level thus running the risk of keeping the clause a dead letter rather than an 
enabling act. First of all, with regard to the extent of the specific duties deriving 
from this provision, there is a number of critical issues concerning its 
interpretation, mainly on their scope of application ratione loci. Secondly, it 
remains unclear the maximum threshold to be reached before invocating the 
activation of the solidarity clause and when and with what result the affected EU 
Member may actually request the Union and other Member States to intervene 
according to this provision. Thirdly, it is doubtful in what consists the alleged 
separation of duties of assistance between the Union and Member States and what 
kind of solidary tools the EU Members could activate to comply with their 
obligations. Finally, from a temporal perspective the solidarity clause cannot 
operate in an extensive way: according to Council Decision 2014/415, it can be 
activated vis-à-vis the Union just as last resort, i.e. when the affected Member 
State has exploited all the possibilities offered by existing means and tools at 
national and Union level. Mutatis mutandis, the same requirement should also 
apply for the other Member States which could intervene by means of other tools. 
Accordingly, the fact that it is a last resort mechanism makes also the duty to 
provide assistance by means of this provision just a residual duty of solidarity 
operating in extrema ratio and coming in when the affected Member State has 
fully accomplished its duty to protect its own populations.  
Behind such shortcomings it is hiding, inter alia, the creeping willingness of 
States to confine solidarity to their voluntary action as well as not to undermine 
the responsibility of the affected State. The objective differences between 
Member States – in terms of risk, vulnerability and resources at disposal – open 
disagreement over individual responsibilities: southern States, which are more 
often affected by natural disasters, question to what extent the others are prepared 
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to act in a spirit of solidarity, while the less affected northern countries tend to 
emphasise national responsibilities in preventing and managing disasters587. Such 
a structural imbalance, that makes some lastingly stronger than others, 
permanently in the role of ‘givers’ and others as ‘takers’, as well as the lack of a 
de facto reciprocity limits the full implementation of solidarity in interstate 
relationships within this field588. This is also because, according to what raises 
from the analysis carried out, all the illustrated instruments essentially confirm the 
first and foremost role of the victim State as responsible of its own population. 
Indeed, if one focuses on the existence of specific duties on the affected Member 
States towards their own population, also according to EU law they keep their 
prerogatives to take care of the population and the right to seek for assistance 
from the Union and other Member States. This is substantiated by the fact that 
none of the instruments illustrated contains a duty to request for external 
assistance, but they rely on the discretion of the affected State also when the 
extent of the disaster overwhelms national capacities.  
The only substantial obligation on the affected State is expressed by Article 14 of 
Decision 1313/2013 with reference to notification in case of events which cause 
or are capable of causing trans-boundary effects. Therefore, besides tracing what 
prescribed by international law and identifying the duty to notify as expression of 
the broader duty to cooperate, the EU legal order does not introduce any further 
obligation on the affected State in order to provide better assistance to the affected 
people. Member States thus retain the power to decide when to ask for external 
aid. And, whether as for the inter-State relations this results from the classical 
requirement of State consent for getting access to its territory, at EU level it is 
justified and reinforced by the principle of subsidiarity and by Article 4, para. 2, 
TEU which stresses, inter alia, that the Union shall respect the essential State 
functions which arguably include the protection of those under its jurisdiction in 
the event of an emergency. In this regard, it cannot be neglected that, for instance, 
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the provisions concerning the activation of the Civil Protection Mechanism for 
internal emergencies do not mention other actors than the affected State as 
potential triggers of the Mechanism.  
The intention not to affect States’ prerogatives in choosing when and whether to 
ask for supranational help in case of internal emergencies is, moreover, revealed 
by the absence of any reference to the right to international humanitarian 
assistance, which is instead explicitly acknowledged by Regulation 1257/96 on 
humanitarian aid589. Hence, either the EU legal order does limit such a right to 
those leaving in third countries instead of recognising its universal application or, 
more likely, it does not fully acknowledge humanitarian assistance as a right 
stricto sensu able to establish corresponding duties. Otherwise, it would have been 
specified in the preamble of the legal instruments having a domestic scope and, 
consequently, an obligation to ask for or to authorise the provision of external 
assistance would have been incorporated or at least visibly deduced. In this case, 
the eventual violation of such obligations could be sanctioned through an 
infringing procedure against the victim State.  
In the absence of such an orientation, it is unlikely that a negligent behaviour can 
be punished by the EU Court of Justice for the manifest violation of EU law, 
considering that neither the right to humanitarian assistance nor an explicit duty to 
seek for assistance on Member States have been set590. This confirms the actual 
extremely State-centred perspective which entrusts the affected Member State 
both with the privilege and with the duty to protect its population. Such a 
configuration entirely reflects that proposed by current international law and 
enshrined in draft article 10 as elaborated by the International Law Commission.  
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In principle, such an orientation may be acceptable and reflects the idea that the 
principle of solidarity is dependent on the special meaning of subsidiarity and on 
the principle that each Member State takes its full individual responsibility. 
However, after deduction of the fact that solidarity requires a certain degree of 
responsibility, without a clear duty to provide for assistance (even in last resort) 
and the enforcement of the solidarity clause, the risk is to incline the balance more 
towards the duties of the affected State, rather than creating an equilibrium 
between mutual obligations, thus resulting in a subsidiary and discretion-based 
solidarity also at EU level to the detriment of the affected population. Moreover, 
although the absence of an obligation to provide for assistance within the EU legal 
order does not jeopardise the actual provision of assistance, it has to be 
acknowledged that, from a legal point of view, such a deficiency says a lot about 
the Member States’ intention to be constrained by genuine duties of solidarity 
even in circumstances wherein it is expressly mentioned in the Treaties and, more 
in general, about the challenges the principle of solidarity has to face within the 
EU legal framework591.  
 
4. Perspectives concerning solidarity within the EU legal order 
 
In the fragmented and complex landscape of EU legislation, it is not an easy task 
to define meaning and scope of solidarity. The present work has, nonetheless, 
widely suggested that the improvements of the legal instruments for preventing 
and protecting against natural or man-made disasters have been deemed necessary 
for responding to an issue of common interest even though there are some States 
more prone to be affected by these events.  
This notwithstanding, solidarity in subjecta materia has not fully expressed its 
potentiality and its overriding trait is very much embedded in its functional role 
rather than in the normative one. After all, even the solidarity clause, which is part 
of primary law, has proved difficult to be implemented and activated despite the 
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number of favourable occasions. If one were to generalise the insights gained in 
the present work, one could see a pattern to be used for an appropriate 
understanding of the health status of solidarity in the European Union which is 
now facing a number of profound challenges –originating both externally and 
internally – that risk undermining its existence.  
In general terms, solidarity as conceived in the EU legal order should be the 
corrective element to the tension between a high degree of supranational 
integration and a simultaneous heterogeneity of interests between the Member 
States592. It should be more than the sum of its interests and not just an arena used 
to ensure national advantages; or, as suggested by Jacques Delors, it should not be 
“based on pure generosity, but on enlightened self-interest”593. But, as the present 
work has further underscored, the concept of solidarity in the EU is still weak and 
rarely specified in its deep essence. In particular, the major problem is to 
understand the principle of solidarity as source of law, thereby giving it legal 
substance and making it foundation of concrete legal duties594. And, it is exactly 
multifunctional and cross-cutting character of this valuable notion which makes it 
uncertain with regard to the exact legal status of the corresponding principle595.  
As already mentioned in this research, the scarce judicial activism or, at least, the 
more prudent positions recently assumed by the CJEU have contributed to 
question about the future of the principle of solidarity within the EU legal 
order596. One may understand the Court’s reluctance in employing solidarity as a 
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legal instrument by considering the fact that solidarity is a politically loaded 
concept which suffers from the latent and evident conflicts among Member States. 
In effect, the first and foremost responsible of such impasse are evidently the EU 
Members which, also within the EU legal order, remain hostile to the 
establishment of specific duties of solidarity in emergency situations because this 
would produce a de facto compression of their discretion in deciding when to 
show solidarity. And, the fact that States are inclined to preserve their 
prerogatives and to defend their sovereignty is quite evident also with regard to 
other substantive areas where solidarity bears the intensive role to solve the 
asymmetric distribution of burdens occurring in circumstances where the 
suffering countries are not responsible for their situation597. 
In this sense, the difficulties met in the management of the current migrant crisis 
and in the improvement of the EU common policy on asylum are quite illustrative. 
According to the Treaties, and mainly to Article 80 TFEU, the notion of solidarity 
should result in the establishment of a “système de solidarité obligatoire et 
irrevocable” in order to tackle such a common challenge598. Hence, the principle 
of solidarity, as concretized by Article 80 TFEU, should be used as a legal 
benchmark against which the acts of the EU institutions and any implementing 
acts taken at the level of the Member States must be measured599.  
Albeit this and the fact that the EU and its Member States have made repeated 
pledges to live up to the current challenge on the massive influx of migrants, most 
of the EU governments have not followed such claims by rejecting the 
establishment of an effective and overall EU-wide mechanism based on burden-
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sharing as genuine expression of solidarity among States600. This also because, 
even though one may support the existence of a system of compulsory solidarity, 
the margin of discretion that Member States still enjoy when concretising 
solidarity in the context of asylum policy is very wider than in the case regarding 
other principles. In this field, solidarity could be indeed ‘operationalised’ in many 
different ways, ranging from hosting relocated asylum seekers and/or refugees to 
payments to common funds to be distributed on the basis of the number of 
refugees being hosted, and including the adoption of common policies as well as 
the provision of technical and administrative assistance. As a result, some 
Member States want to continue to organise their level of contribution on a 
voluntary basis – the so-called ‘flexible or voluntary solidarity’ – without 
receiving impositions from the outside on how to show solidarity. In this regard, it 
is extremely revealing the action brought by the Slovak Republic and Hungary 
before the CJEU to challenge the legality of Council Decision 2015/1601601 on the 
relocation of 120.000 asylum seekers from Greece and Italy to other Member 
States according to the Member States’ relative absorption capacities.  
Remarkably, exactly in response to the mentioned action, both the opinion issued 
by Advocate General Bot602 and the long-awaited Court’s judgement603, which 
has rejected Slovakia and Hungary’s appeal, have given an important impulse to 
the principle of solidarity and, in specific terms, partially silenced the opposition 
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of the so-called Visegrád Group to compulsory refugee relocation604. In particular, 
it is noteworthy the reasoning proposed by the AG who has forcefully underlined 
that solidarity is not only “founding and existential value of the Union”605, but has 
a “specific content and a binding nature”606. As a result, when there is a de facto 
inequality between Member States in the face of emergency situations, effective 
application of specific measures having binding nature is even more pressing “to 
confer a practical content on the principle of solidarity and fair sharing of 
responsibility between Member States”607. Indeed, whether solidarity is conceived 
as “bedrock of the European project”608, it cannot be based only on consent and 
voluntary commitments of Member States.  
Even if with less emphasis, the Court’s judges have issued the same position not 
only by mentioning several times solidarity as guiding principle in the elaboration 
of specific measures, but also – in a revolutionary way – by explicitly referring to 
its inherent capacity of imposing binding obligations on Member States609. 
Moreover, with reference to the arguments addressed in the present work, it is 
noteworthy the observation whereby the application of strict conditions for 
relocation would be incompatible with the imperative measures enshrined in the 
Council Decision at stake and, significantly, with the principle of solidarity laid 
down in Article 80 TFEU610. The Court has thus found that, in certain 
circumstances, the conditionality and solidarity cannot operate alongside when the 
affected State is not responsible for the event occurred. 
By considering that the Court had so far refrained from employing the principle of 
solidarity in these terms and from assigning it a clear legal status, the conclusions 
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reached by the CJEU are thus extremely relevant for the future perspectives. 
Indeed, it would be wrong to conclude that, because of its limited enforceability, 
solidarity does not have legal effects, but is merely a non-compulsory source of 
policy inspiration and moral orientation. Rather, in the light of recent case-law, it 
is possible to state that the principle in question is at an evolutionary stage 
towards its full accomplishment and has to be potentiated. Like the EU integration 
process, solidarity experiences a slow process of creation.  
In this regard, the multiplication of references to solidarity in the provisions of the 
Treaties, with the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon, and the continuous 
rereading and reinterpretation of the very norms of EU law according to a 
teleological approach will hopefully lead to a progressive increase in the 
application of the principle. Indeed, it has to be recalled that the EU system 
respond to a stronger dynamic of integration fuelled, inter alia, by the notion of 
solidarity which – both as objective and as “esprit constitutif”611 of the EU legal 
order – justifies, develops and adjusts the exercise of public authority in favour of 
a common interest, separate and separable from the sum of the individual 
interests612. As Pescatore stressed, “le resserrement progressif des liens entre 
États membres au sein de la Communauté permettra, dans la réalité des faits 
autant que dans les raisonnements juridiques, de mettre davantage en valeur cette 
idée de solidarité dans ses diverses expressions”613.  
The crises the EU is confronting with offer a major opportunity to ask what 
solidarity implies with regard to concrete problems, rather than in the abstract 
theoretical vacuum. While this may represent a challenge for the principle of State 
sovereignty, it could be also the element triggering the evolution of the current EU 
legal system towards a ‘more Union’ framework capable of being expression of 
major solidarity among Member States and between them and the EU institutions. 
And, today it is up to all these actors to advance the need for solidarity for the 
purpose of the very EU integration process which is to a large extent based on a 
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requirement for solidarity between the Member States which have decided to take 
part in that project.  
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